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Abstract 
This thesis is an exposition and close reading of Torrance's doctrine of revelation and 
of the theological epistemology that emerges from it. In Torrance's account personal 
knowledge of God is available only in his self revelation in Christ. However, it is 
shown that his understanding of the place of the Bible and nature in theology points to 
them both as places of divine self-revelation. 
There is a gracing of all knowledge of God whether in Christ, Scripture or nature 
which means that God is always sovereign of his self-revelation. In his engagement 
with the writings of Einstein on scientific method Torrance finds a similar gracing of 
scientific knowledge. 
Chapter one demonstrates the foundational place of revelation in Christ in Torrance's 
theology. From this self revelation Torrance arrives at his definition of scientific 
method, namely the precedence of ontology over epistemology. The epistemological 
significance of the doctrine of'justification by grace is applied to the place of the 
Bible in revelation (chapter two). Barth's reasons for rejecting natural theology are 
explored (chapter three). Chapters four and five demonstrate that the gracious aspect 
of knowledge of reality applies not only to theology but also to the natural sciences. 
The natural sciences are brought under a larger theological account of reality in which 
their inexplicable ability to uncover the reality of the universe is founded on the 
creative Word of God. Torrance is shown to have turned the natural sciences into 
natural theology but in a way that compromises neither the independence of the 
sciences from theology in their operation nor the sovereign and gracious aspect of all 
knowledge of God. 
iii 
From Torrance's doctrine of revelation there emerges a critically realist epistemology 
which takes account of the subjective element in all human knowing, is non-dualist, 
correlates with the epistemology which characterises contemporary scientific practice 
and unifies a wide range of disciplines including the natural sciences, the social 
sciences and humanities including theology. 
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Introduction 
The doctrine of revelation is fundamental to the theology of Thomas F. 
Torrance. As a reformed theologian and Barthian this is to be expected. However, 
despite its central place in his thought none of his many works contain a systematic 
presentation of his understanding of revelation; yet the doctrine of revelation impinges 
on every aspect of his theology. This thesis presents a systematic exposition of the 
doctrine of revelation as it appears in Torrance's works. At the same time it represents a 
close reading of this doctrine as it appears in Torrance's theology and an account of the 
theological epistemology which emerges from his doctrine of revelation. 
The two main conclusions of the thesis are that in Torrance's theology 
revelation is by the sovereign grace of God, and that the theological epistemology 
which emerges from his doctrine of revelation is a realist approach which is applicable 
to a wide range of disciplines. 
Despite his argument that revelation occurs only in Christ and his equating of 
divine self-revelation with revelation in Christ, there is a more fundamental doctrine of 
revelation implicit in Torrance's theology, namely revelation by grace. Torrance argues 
that the place of the Bible in revelation is as a divinely provided witness to Christ, yet 
on examining his writings on the Scriptures we find a clear understanding that they 
represent a place within the creation where the transcendent God chooses to encounter 
his people. Similarly in his description of the work of the natural scientist in uncovering 
the rational order inherent in the universe he presents the scientist as a priest of creation 
who, in investigating the universe, encounters the creative Word who is the source and 
ground of that rational order and of humanity's ability to uncover and comprehend 
reality by empirical investigation. 
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Inherent in his doctrine of revelation there is an understanding of the gracious 
nature of our knowledge of God. Torrance operates with a realist theological 
epistemology which is both objective and takes full account of the subjective element of 
all human knowledge. The grounds of this epistemology will be examined as will his 
argument that it is this objective method which allows him to count theology among the 
sciences. It will be demonstrated that Torrance's realist epistemology achieves more 
than a rapprochement between theology and the natural sciences: it is applicable to a 
very wide range of disciplines including the social sciences and humanities. 
Chapter one will focus on the foundation of Torrance's doctrine of revelation, 
namely revelation in Christ. The fundamentally gracious aspect of all knowledge of God 
will be demonstrated, for revelation is primarily personal rather than propositional. 
Jesus Christ is the place or event where the transcendent God interacts with the 
contingent universe. The patristic doctrine of the homoousion means, for revelation, that 
God as he encounters creation in Jesus Christ is not different from God as he is in 
himself. A consequence of this is that Jesus Christ is normative and contingent for all 
knowledge of God; normative in terms of the content of theology but contingent 
because there is neither compulsion nor necessity for God to reveal himself in Christ. A 
second consequence is that theology founded on revelation in Christ must pay attention 
to the scientific understanding of the universe because Jesus Christ is an element of the 
contingent creation as are those theologians who seek to engage with God's self- 
revelation. 
The personal aspect of revelation means that true revelation will also always be 
an act of reconciliation between God and those who receive this self-revelation. 
Torrance argues that Jesus Christ, as fully divine and fully human, is not only God's self 
revelation; he is also the place in which that revelation is received and where it meets 
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with an adequate response. Again there is a clear emphasis on the gracious nature of 
revelation and on God's sovereignty in his self-revelation. Torrance presents revelation 
as an aspect of grace but he equates this with revelation in Christ. Against Torrance and 
from his own writings it will be argued that although revelation in Christ is the supreme 
example of God's self-revelation and remains normative for the content of Christian 
theology, there is genuine divine self-revelation in both Scripture and nature. 
Chapter two will examine the place of the Christian Scriptures in Torrance's 
doctrine of revelation. Initially he appears to do little more than repeat Barth's 
understanding of the Bible as witness to the living Word of God who is Jesus Christ. 
This is clearly how he understands and presents the place and role of Scripture. 
However, when close attention is paid to Torrance's writings another aspect to his 
doctrine of Scripture is found. The Bible, a human artefact, becomes not merely a 
witness to revelation but by God's grace it becomes or may become a place where God 
encounters his people. Revelation in Scripture remains a dynamic and gracious self- 
revelation of which God is always in control, but when Torrance writes of the Bible as a 
meeting place between God and humankind within the universe of space and time he 
has gone beyond the Barthian formulation of Bible as witness to revelation. Yet there is 
no conflict between revelation in Scripture and revelation in Christ for the God who 
encounters us through the Bible is the God who becomes part of the contingent creation 
in Christ. According to Torrance the Bible is a divinely provided record of revelation 
and a divinely provided dynamic witness to revelation; this thesis will demonstrate that 
in Torrance's theology it is also a locus of revelation. 
Chapter three will examine Torrance's interpretation of Barth on natural 
theology. He argues that Barth objects to the independent nature of traditional natural 
theology and that he leaves open the possibility of a non-independent natural theology. 
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Torrance's interpretation of Barth on this point will be shown to be supported from 
Barth's own writings. More important for theological epistemology are the reasons why 
an independent natural theology presents a problem. According to Torrance independent 
natural theology is unscientific precisely because it is independent of actual self- 
revelation. In the sciences method is determined by the object of enquiry. It is also 
objected that natural theology introduces dualism into the being of God arriving at the 
doctrine of the one God who is known through general revelation and the Trinity who is 
known through special revelation. 
A further objection is that independent natural theology is problematic even with 
respect to propositional knowledge of God. The idea that we can know of God without 
God's will and act is difficult to sustain; if the Barthian argument that knowledge of 
God is always personal is accepted then independent knowledge of God becomes 
meaningless. 
Chapter four will continue the exploration of Torrance's non-independent 
natural theology which he transposes into the body of systematics where it is more 
accurately designated a theology of nature. By doing this he brings together two 
different accounts of reality, theological and scientific, and argues that each can benefit 
from this relationship. The model of reality disclosed to the natural sciences is 
important for a theology which focuses on divine self revelation, for it is in the real 
universe that God discloses himself to creatures who are part of that world. The unitary 
account of reality in Einstein's model of the universe has implications for theological 
epistemology undermining the dualism inherent in much western thought, specifically 
that which obtains between the formal and empirical components of knowledge. The 
Christian doctrine of creation provides an answer to questions raised by the very success 
of the natural sciences and their empirical method. The inexplicable comprehensibility 
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of the universe is one such question, but as the comprehensibility of the universe is a 
basic assumption of the natural sciences it is a question that the sciences are unable to 
answer. In this respect the sciences point beyond themselves to a transcendent source of 
unity and structure in the universe. It is here that a non-independent natural theology 
finds its place, and it is a similar place to that occupied by the cosmological argument in 
traditional natural theology. 
Chapter five will examine Torrance's argument that the nature of reality 
disclosed to the natural sciences exhibits a congruence with the understanding of 
creation disclosed to theology through the core concepts of incarnation and creatio ex 
nihilo. He argues that the understanding of the universe in the post-Einsteinian natural 
sciences points to God as the source of its existence and rational order. In his 
articulation of the work of the science's investigation of the universe Torrance argues 
that the natural scientist is brought into relationship with the creative reason which 
fashioned and ordered the universe. Torrance's theology will be shown to imply a real 
revelation, an understanding of divine disclosure in nature. Again though the God who 
is encountered in the investigation of the universe is identical with God as he has 
supremely revealed himself in the incarnation for the creative Word who is the source of 
order and meaning in the universe is the Word who became incarnate in Jesus Christ. 
When natural theology is transposed to a place within the body of systematics it 
becomes a theology of nature which provides an interpretative framework for the whole 
scientific enterprise. 
Whether in Christ, Scripture or nature there is a fundamentally gracious aspect 
to human knowledge of God. Torrance's account of the doctrine of revelation discloses 
an epistemology which is realist and operates with a disclosure model and yet is not 
naively realist but takes account of the subjective element in all human knowledge. 
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Einstein's writings on scientific method show a similar decision to allow the reality of 
the universe to determine his apprehension of it, while at the same time rejecting any 
sort of logical bridge between the two. The correlation between scientific and 
theological epistemology is Torrance's justification for positioning theology among the 
sciences. However, the argument of this thesis will be that this realist epistemology does 
more than bring together theological and natural science. It has application to all human 
ways of knowing and points to the gracious aspect of all human knowledge. From this 
Christologically grounded doctrine of revelation there emerges a universally applicable 
epistemology. 
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Chapter One Revelation in Christ 
1.1 Introduction 
The doctrine of revelation is central to Torrance's theology. ' According to 
Torrance revelation is Christologically founded, and this insight shapes not only his 
understanding of revelation but the whole of his theology and epistemology. fie argues 
that revelation and reconciliation are complementary doctrines, and are two sides of the 
same coin. Despite a career spanning the decades from the 1940's to the 1990's and 
beyond we see little change of direction in Torrance's thought. The seeds of his later 
work are found in his early writings on Calvin (Torrance 1952), the refon-ned creeds 
(Torrance 1959) and in his Auburn lectures on the doctrine of Christ from 1938 and 
1939 (Torrance 2002a). In his later writings we see him developing these earlier ideas 
and applying the principles which he found in his study of Barth, Calvin and the 
patristic theologians. 
The argument of this chapter is that the unifying idea of Torrance's theology is 
revelation in Christ. The gracious aspect of human knowledge of God in Christ is the 
foundation of Torrance's theological epistemology. In this I agree in part with the 
assessments of Morrison2 and Seng (1992) and disagree with Colyer (2001a). God's 
self-revelation in history and in the universe in the person of Jesus Christ is the 
foundation of Torrance's theological and scientific epistemology and the reason why he 
places theology among the sciences. His understanding of how theology is faithful to 
God's self-revelation is foundational for his understanding of what constitutes a 
' See the comment in Kruger 1990: 367. 
2 Morrison quotes Torrance: 'It is in this identity between revelation and reconciliation, 
in the oneness between what God is in the Person of Christ and what he has done for us 
in the atoning sacrifice of Christ, that the objective truth of the Blessed Trinity belongs 
to the very heart of the Gospel, for it gathers up and embraces the evangelical message 
of the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God and the Communion of the Holy 
Spirit' (Torrance 1996a: 33; cf. Morrison 1995: 53). 
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scientific epistemology. It is the argument of this thesis that Torrance's Christologically 
grounded epistemology affords a rapprochement between biblical and systematic 
theology and between theological and scientific epistemology; more than this it points 
to an epistemology which is applicable to all human ways of knowing. 
Seng argues that the patristic doctrine of the homoousion is central to Torrance's 
theology (Seng 1992: 341); however, he interprets the homoousion in a wider sense to 
mean 'the epistemological centrality of the Incarnation' (Seng 1992: 342, quoting 
Torrance 1975: 222). Our argument is that what is foundational in Torrance's exposition 
of revelation in Christ is the gracious aspect of that knowledge. Colyer proposes the 
rejection of dualism as the central unifying concept of Torrance's theology (Colyer 
2001 a: 57-60); but this is included in his doctrine of revelation in Christ for there is no 
general or universal revelation but only a real and particular revelation. 
The result of Torrance's period of study under Barth in 1937 was his thesis on 
the doctrine of grace in the second century fathers (Torrance 1948). He remained in 
touch with Barth throughout his career and was one of the editors of the English 
translation of the Church Dogmatics. Torrance clearly sees his work as building on 
Barth's theology. He considers Barth to be as important for twentieth century theology 
as Athanasius was in the fourth century; and as important for theology as Einstein is for 
the natural sciences. Barth has exercised great influence on Torrance's understanding of 
revelation. Torrance follows Barth in arguing that divine revelation is self-revelation; 
that what God reveals to humanity is himself rather than information about himself 
According to Torrance divine revelation is not propositional, it is personal; but he does 
formulate propositions about God based on his self-revelation. 
Torrance's life's work could be regarded as a sustained meditation on and 
application of the central theological principle of God's self-revelation in Christ. It is 
not just that God has revealed himself, but that he has revealed himself in Christ that is 
foundational for Torrance's theology. Torrance reads the patristic doctrines of the 
homoousion and the hypostatic union through the double lens of their interpretation by 
Calvin and Barth. Torrance's doctrine of revelation in Christ is the foundation of his 
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later writings on theology and science and especially for his insistence that theology is 
to be counted among the sciences. Revelation in Christ forms the basis of his writings 
on doctrine. 
In this chapter I propose to present Torrance's account of the doctrine of 
revelation in Christ and to examine his sources. Barth's influence can be seen 
throughout but particularly in the areas of the unity of revelation and reconciliation. 
Mackintosh, Torrance's teacher in Edinburgh, is another influence on his Christology. 
Calvin and the Nicene theologians, notably Hilary and Athanasius, are also important 
for his development of the doctrine of revelation in Christ. 
The whole of Torrance's work is a sustained meditation on God's self-revelation 
in Christ; this makes it difficult if not impossible to separate the various strands of his 
output. His work is thoroughly integrated and a chapter upon doctrine must refer to his 
writing on science. For this reason there is an overlap in the contents of the chapters of 
this thesis. The present chapter on revelation in Christ touches upon every area of 
Torrance's theology; the substantial issues in other areas of the doctrine of revelation 
will be noted and dealt with in the later chapters. 
Revelation in Christ is central to Torrance's work because it provides the central 
datum of theology. Torrance presents it as the objective fact within history and the 
universe to which all Christian theology must respond. 
1.2 Revelation in Christ according to Torrance 
LZI Revelation in Christ as thefoundation of theological epistemology 
God's self-revelation in Christ is, according to Torrance, an act of sovereign 
grace. In his understanding of revelation in Christ and its foundational role in Christian 
theology Torrance is working through the epistemological implications of the reformed 
doctrine ofjustification by grace (Torrance 1990: 143). In his writings Torrance uses 
revelation in Christ and revelation by grace interchangeably for he regards them as the 
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same thing. In his earliest work Torrance writes that the transcendent and inaccessible 
God has broken his silence; the invisible and unreachable God has spoken to us in his 
Word who is 'identical with the Person of Jesus Christ' (Torrance 1948: 58). Torrance's 
assessment of the central importance of the incarnation for revelation is unchanged in 
his later works where he writes that: 'The Christian doctrine of God is to be understood 
from within the unique, definitive and final self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ' 
(Torrance 1996a: 1). As the Word of God Jesus Christ is God manifest to humankind. 
When we read closely Torrance's writings on revelation we see that although God's self 
revelation in Christ is the supreme example of the epistemological implications of the 
doctrine ofjustification by grace, yet he also writes of revelation in Scripture and in 
nature as distinct from revelation in Christ. 
The self-revelation of God in Christ is the reason for Torrance's rejection of all 
independent sources of the knowledge of God. We will see in Chapter Two that this 
influences his interpretation of Scripture and in Chapter Three it lies behind his 
reconfiguration of natural theology as a component of revealed theology. The rejection 
of an independent source of the knowledge of God means that we cannot know God 
apart from his will to be known by us. For Torrance all true knowledge of God 
originates in self-revelation and is therefore act of sovereign grace. 3 This point is made 
by Mackintosh who argues that the very notion of knowledge of God independent of his 
self-revelation is incredible because it asserts that we can know God apart from his will 
to be known by us (Mackintosh 1929: 65). 4 In Christ God chooses to be known and is in 
fact known by humankind on earth and in history. In the extended introduction to a 
translation of the creeds of the reformed churches Torrance writes that in the doctrine of 
3 Ringel, another scholar influenced by Barth, writes: 'Apart from the access to himself 
which he himself affords, no thinking will ever find its way to him, (Ringel 1983: 158, 
emphasis Ringel). 
4 This point is made by Torrance in several places, e. g. Torrance 1996a: 13. 
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God it is the 'knowledge of God in Christ which governs all' (Torrance 1959: lxxiii). 5 
Torrance nowhere presents arguments or evidence for this central presumption 
of his theology, namely that God has revealed himself in Jesus of Nazareth. His is a 
work of systematic theology not of apologetics. Ringel writes that Christian theology 
must begin with a presumption, a 'presumable presumption' of God's self 
communication (RIngel 1983: 161f); and that self communication is in Jesus (RIngel 
1983: 155). Torrance's doctrine of revelation is an exploration of the implications of this 
basic presumption of Christian theology and an exposition of its implications for the 
relationship between scientific and theological knowledge. We will also explore the 
implications of Torrance's Christologically founded theological epistemology for all 
human ways of knowing. 
LZ2 The epistemological significance of the homoousion 
The summary of Christian doctrine articulated in the Nicene Creed (more 
properly the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed) of 38 ICE is important to Torrance's 
theology. He often refers to the creed and his exposition of patristic theology (Torrance 
1988a) is organised as a commentary on this statement of belief. Those theologians of 
the fourth century associated with the creed are also important to Torrance. Torrance 
regards the creed as 'the fruit of Eastern Catholic theology' (Torrance 1988a: 2) the 
6 decisive formulation of the Christian Trinitarian doctrine of God (Torrance 1994b: 4). 
The Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed can claim to be the most universally accepted 
creed (Leith 1963: 32) and for centuries has been used in the liturgies of Roman 
Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox churches (though the orthodox omit thefilioque 
5 CE Torrance 1996a: 3. We see very similar themes and a similar approach to revelation 
in Torrance's earlier writings as we find in his later and more developed works. 
6 See also Torrance's introduction to the collection of essays The Incarnation, Torrance 
1981b: xi-xxii). 
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clause). The universality of the Nicene formulation of Christian doctrine is one reason 
why it is important to Torrance's theology. For many years he has been involved as a 
Church of Scotland representative in ecumenical dialogue with Roman Catholic and 
especially Orthodox churches. 7 While not universally accepted, the creed remains the 
closest thing to an official statement of the Christian faith which transcends individual 
churches and confessions. 
The roots of Torrance's doctrine of revelation are found in the patristic 
understanding of the nature of Christ and of his relation to the Father. 8 Of particular 
influence on Torrance's thought is the Nicene doctrine of the homoousion, which states 
that Jesus is homoousios t6patri (Torrance 1988a: 130). 9 In his doctoral thesis Torrance 
writes that Jesus Christ is 'in his own person all that God is in his saving relation to 
mankind' (Torrance 1948: 59). The implication of the homoousion for the doctrine of 
revelation is that what God is towards us in Christ he is eternally in himself-, that he is of 
one and the same being as the Father (Torrance 1988a: 124). 10 For Torrance the essence 
of the gospel is the ontological relation of being and action between the Father and the 
incarnate Son, ' 1 which ultimately concerns the relation of the economic Trinity and the 
immanent or ontological Trinity. This emphasis in Torrance's theology may be 
compared with Barth's insistence on the unity of act and being in God. In the Church 
Dogmatics Barth states that 'God is who He is in His works' (Barth 1957: 260). 12 
Furthermore, Torrance argues that if Christ is not of one being with the Father, then 
7 See the biographical essay by Torrance's brother David in Colyer ed 2001 b: 22-24. 
8 In the text of this thesis the words 'Father, Son, Holy Spirit, God, Trinity and Christ' 
are capitalised in order to cmphasise the transcendent nature of God. 
9 Cf. Seng 1992: 341. 
10 Cf. Barth 1975: 438. 
11 Cf. Barth 1957: 5 1: 'The revelation of God... is the disposition of God in which He 
acts towards us as the same triune God that He is in Himself, and in such a way that, 
although we are men and not God, we receive a share in the truth of His knowledge of 
flimself'. 
12 See the whole section in Barth 1957: 257-321. 
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God cannot be known (Torrance 1962: 115, cf. 1988a: 133). In his exposition of Barth's 
early theology Torrance writes that in Jesus we meet God 'face to face'; in Jesus we 
truly know God. Authentic revelation depends upon the unity of act and being of the 
Father and the incarnate Son, therefore Torrance argues that the homoousion tells us that 
what God is in Jesus Christ in time and in history he is in himself eternally (Torrance 
1988a: 136). He also writes that: 'there is no dark unknown God behind the back of 
Jesus Christ' (Torrance 1988a: 135). Clearly in Torrance's thought, founded on classic 
Christological doctrine, what God reveals of himself is non-native for the content of 
Christian theology; but is divine revelation in Christ normative for theological 
epistemology? Torrance argues that it is, but a close reading of his theology points to 
other sources of revelation which are both distinct from and related to revelation in 
Christ. 
Torrance follows Barth and Mackintosh when he argues that all authentic 
knowledge of God comes by divine self-revelation. lie asserts that is impossible for 
God's creatures to know him unless God wills it (Torrance 1996a: 13). 13 Torrance 
formulates his doctrine of God not by speculating on what God might be but on what 
God has shown himself actually, concretely and historically to be. We have noted that 
God's self-revelation in Jesus is the foundation of Torrance's theology. 14 
Revelation is one-directional: from God to humanity. It is an act of divine 
sovereignty which breaks into life and calls human knowledge into question (Torrance 
1996a: 19). Torrance argues that any knowledge of God which is independent of God's 
desire to be known and of his act of self-revelation is impossible (Torrance 1999: 24). 
Molnar restates Torrance's argument that we can only know God from God when be 
13 Cf. Mackintosh 1929: 65. 
14 See Molnar 2002: 11-13 who cites Torrance to support his argument that 'True 
knowledge of God ... could take place only through Christ who was and is one in being 
with the Father' (Molnar 2002: 11). 
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writes that any theology which does not come from God to humanity is 'arbitrary' 
(Molnar 2002: 12). Torrance argues that God accommodates his self-revelation to our 
finite and creaturely minds which he has created; thus God's actual self-revelation sets 
the boundaries of Christian theology (Torrance 1999: 24). 
God's decision to be known to humankind lies at the heart of Torrance's 
epistemology. His is an epistemology of grace rooted in the reformed tradition 
(Torrance 1969a: 2990. Torrance formulates his doctrine of revelation in such a way 
that he rules speculation in theology out of court. It is for this reason that Torrance, like 
Barth, begins his approach to the doctrine of God and the doctrine of revelation, not 
with the possibility of divine revelation but with its actuality; not with how God may 
conceivably reveal himself but with how in fact he has revealed himself-, he begins with 
aposteriori knowledge. For Torrance, as for Barth, epistemology follows ontology 
(Torrance 1969a: 206). 15 Here Torrance also follows Mackintosh. 16 Torrance argues that 
our knowledge of God in the incarnation is certain because Jesus Christ is the place in 
space and time where humanity is able to share God's knowledge of himself and know 
him and believe in him 'in accordance with his own self-interpretation' (Torrance 
1996a: 17). 
For Torrance the Christian doctrine of God is necessarily Christocentric, for it is 
in Jesus Christ that God has shown himself as he really is. 17 Moreover the incarnate 
Jesus Christ, of one substance with the Father, is the place in space and time where the 
transcendent God chooses to be known and believed in as Father (Torrance 1969b: 15- 
18). The implication of the doctrine of the homoousion for Christian theology is that 
revelation in Christ is normative for our knowledge of God. This insight governs 
15 Cf. Morrison 1997a: ISO. 
16 Cf. Mackintosh 1929: 65f. 
17 Cf. Mackintosh 1929: 82 who writes: 'what we learn of God by looking at Jesus is, 
or ought to be, determinative of all our religious beliefs'. 
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Torrance's theology. 18 However, the argument of this thesis is that revelation in Christ 
is normative for the content of Christian theology and not necessarily for the locus of 
divine self-revelation as we will see in our discussion of revelation in scripture. 
Torrance comments upon the importance of Ralmer's approach to the doctrine of 
the Trinity which also begins with God's self communication in Jesus Christ (Torrance 
1994b: 78, cited in Molnar 1997: 288). Molnar argues that an approach to Trinitarian 
theology which begins with God's self-revelation in the incarnation affords a 
rapprochement between systematic and biblical theology (Molnar 1997: 288). This is 
also true of Torrance's theology. His emphasis on the incarnation as the point in 
creation where we have access to the reality of God brings together the disciplines of 
biblical theology and systematics. Not only does Torrance insist upon the centrality of 
God's self communication in Christ for all of our knowledge of him; he also insists that 
the historical facts of Jesus life must be kept in their theological context. 19 
Toffance focuses on the Christological foundation of theology; to speak of God 
in ways not grounded in divine self-revelation is to speak in abstract and from a point 
external to God. Torrance speaks and writes of God only in ways grounded in God. To 
attempt to speak of God from some point outside of God is to have no point of contact 
with the reality of God by reference to which our understanding of God can be tested; 
instead we are 'flung back upon ourselves' (Torrance 1988a: 5 1) and our theology is 
grounded in ourselves and our own experience. The problem that Torrance's 
thoroughgoing Christological grounding of all theology faces is the charge of fideism, 
that he appears to do nothing more than assert the actual revelation of God in Christ as a 
18 Torrance writes: 'There is no God except He who has shown us His face in Jesus 
Christ, so that we cannot go behind the back of Christ to find God, or know anything 
about Him apart from this God, for there is no other God apart from this God. Here then 
it is not some prior ontology, but Christology which is all - deten-nining in our 
knowledge of God' (Torrance 1959: lxxiii. cf. Torrance 1996a: 14). 19 See section 1.8. 
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doctrine to be accepted without question or external support. However, we will see that 
Torrance does offer support for his Christological objectivism; this support does not 
come in any prior arguments for the reality of God's self-revelation in Christ as such 
arguments would fail to pass Torrance's test of a properly scientific epistemology which 
as we will see is a posteriori. The support for his position comes when he demonstrates 
that his theology, grounded as it is in the presupposition that God has truly revealed 
himself in Christ, correlates well with an understanding of reality derived from the 
natural sciences. His justification is posterior not anterior. His theology functions like a 
hypothesis in the natural sciences which he tests by examining its congruence with the 
model of reality derived from the natural sciences. 
LZ3 The in ence of Barth on Torrance's Christocentric theology Iflu 
Torrance develops his doctrine of revelation from his engagement with Barth. 
Like Barth he argues that knowledge of God comes by an act of divine self-revelation 
and is a miracle of grace. Torrance writes about the changes forced upon Barth and his 
approach to theology by the events of the First World War and also by his experiences 
as a pastor and preacher in Safenwil. In the pro-war, nationalistic stance of his teachers 
Barth saw the bankruptcy of liberal theology and its consequent inability to take a 
prophetic and critical stance at that crucial time; and so he rejected liberal theology in 
favour of the strange, alien world of the Bible. 20 It was in his teachers' attempt to find a 
natural point of contact between humankind and God that Barth located the problem of 
liberal theology; therefore Barth rejected this path from nature to grace which begins 
with human beings on earth and works towards God in heaven. 
20 See Barth 1928: 28-50. 
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This is the context for Barth's rejection of natural theology. Torrance 
understands Barth to mean the rejection of independent natural theology. 21 In his 
lectures on dogmatics delivered at G6ttingen in 1924 - 1925 Barth expands on what he 
means by revelation (Barth 1991: 87-95). For Barth revelation is revelation of God; God 
revealing himself to us not simply filling in the gaps in our knowledge about him. 
Revelation means knowing God not merely knowing about God. Barth's chief objection 
to natural theology is its independence of God (Barth 1991: 920; when we understand 
that by revelation Barth means that God is the content of his revelation (Barth 1991: 88) 
then we can see that it is meaningless to talk about independent knowledge of God. 
According to Barth independent knowledge of God is human arrogance, an assertion of 
humanity over against God (Barth 1991: 93). For Barth knowledge of God comes only 
from revelation in Christ and the same is true for Torrance. Mackintosh also rejects the 
idea of independent natural theology. Of God's revelation in nature Mackintosh argues 
that it is not natural theology nor is it natural religion for it did not emerge in a vacuum; 
rather it is to be regarded as an aspect of revelation (Mackintosh 1929: 70). This 
understanding of God's act self-revelation in nature is how Torrance develops what he 
regards as a Barthian natural theology. 22 
According to Torrance independent natural theology is the attempt to know God 
in theory while bypassing him in practice. This is what Torrance means when he speaks 
of our attempts to know God behind the back of God (Torrance 1959: lxxiii). Torrance 
cites Iranaeus' principle that 'without God, God cannot be known' (Torrance 1996a: 13, 
emphasis Torrance). We will see that Torrance argues that traditional natural theology 
21 See the preface to the 1998 edition of Space, Time and Resurreclion, Torrance 
1998: ix-x in which Torrance reports his last conversation with Barth in the summer of 
1968, some months before Barth's death, in which he reported that he explained his 
own position on natural theology to Barth, who concurred with Torrance's development 
of his thought. See Chapter Three. 
22 See Chapter Four. 
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as a preamble to faith is an attempt at an independent way of knowing of God which our 
actual knowledge of God derived from revelation renders invalid and unnecessary 
(Torrance 1999: 33f). 
Torrance argues that Barth posits an epistemology based on the doctrine of 
grace. This epistemology of grace carries with it an implicit anthropology which makes 
natural and human knowledge of God impossible. 23 Torrance writes that God's self- 
revelation in Christ penetrates through the barriers built by our estrangement from God. 
At the incarnation Christ forged a link between God and humanity (Torrance 1999: 
85f). This language of human estrangement from God is evidence of Torrance's well 
developed theological Calvinist anthropology which undergirds much of what he writes 
about divine revelation. 24 In one of his earliest works we find a rejection of natural 
theology based on revelation in Christ and Calvin's anthropology. He emphasises the 
point that we can know God only as he has given himself to be known by us. The reality 
of revelation precludes speculative metaphysics as an approach to God for he argues 
that 'any attempt to know God out of the perverted order of nature can only partake of 
its perversity' (Torrance 1952: 164). 
It is only by paying attention to his self-revelation to Israel and in Christ that we 
can know God; but when we have come to know God in his self-revelation we are then 
able to recognise him in creation (Torrance 1952: 168). Torrance argues that this is the 
basis of legitimate natural theology which does not try to circumvent God or attempt to 
know God against his will. This non independent natural theology forms the basis of 
Torrance's dialogue with the natural sciences in his later works. 
23 f le understands human nature as fallen; one consequence of the fall is mental 
alienation, see Torrance 1996a: 41. 24 See section 1.4. 
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I. Z4 Discussion 
The foundation of the argument of this thesis is that Torrance sees a 
fundamentally gracious aspect to all human knowledge of God. Any knowledge of God 
which is not a gracious self-revelation is not truly knowledge of God but is instead 
abstraction or speculation. Torrance makes the basic presumption that it is in Jesus 
Christ that God has in fact revealed himself in time and space. This is one of the 
fundamental presumptions of his theology and as such he presents no prior arguments in 
support. 
Torrance argues that is only possible to come to true knowledge of God by an 
act of divine self-revelation and the working assumption of his theology is that the place 
in the universe where God has actually revealed himself is in the life and person of 
Jesus Christ. More basic to Torrance's theology than revelation in Christ is the 
necessarily gracious aspect of all our knowledge of God. It will be shown that 
Torrance's theology points to actual revelation in Scripture and nature, and that from 
this doctrine of revelation there emerges a realist epistemology which forms the basis of 
dialogue with the natural sciences and is applicable to all human ways of knowing. 
1.3 Jesus Christ: God's revelation in time and space 
1.3.1 God and space 
Torrance writes that as God's self-revelation in history Jesus Christ is therefore 
God's self-revelation in the universe of space and time (Torrance 1969b: 100. The 
nature of space and time is of material importance for Torrance's understanding of 
revelation. Torrance considers the nature of space and God's relationship to space both 
as its creator and as the Son of God incarnate within the universe. Ile knows from his 
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engagement with the physical sciences, especially from Einstein's theories of relativity, 
that space and time are not simple entities that can be accepted as inert background to 
events within the universe (Torrance 1969b: 2). 
In his survey of the nature of space and time as they relate to the incarnation, 
Torrance begins, not with scientific theory, but with the theology of the Nicene 
theologians as they attempt to understand God and his actions as related in the 
Scriptures. Torrance argues that the key Christian doctrines of creation and incarnation 
forced the theologians of the early church to reassess their understanding of the spatial 
universe in its relation to God. Embedded within the creed are spatial elements which, 
according to Torrance, are not simply symbolic or metaphorical; they are indicative of 
reality. 
In trying to understand the relationship between God and the universe Torrance 
begins with the doctrine of God as creator. According to the creed God is the 'maker of 
heaven and earth, of all that is, seen and unseen'. 25 The first thing that the creed tells us 
is that God relates to the universe as its transcendent creator. Torrance notes that God's 
act of creation includes the creation of time and space and he concludes that God's 
relation to space 'is not itself a spatial relation' (Torrance 1969b: 2). He refers to 
Athanasius who said that it makes no sense to ask whether God is with or without 
place. 26 The creed also states that God the Son 'came down from heaven' at the 
incarnation. Again we must not think that ajoumey through space is intended. Heaven 
as God's dwelling must not be thought of is spatial terms. Torrance comments that 'it is 
25 The translation of the Nicene Creed is found in Common Worship published in 
London for the Archbishop's council in 2000, and is found on page 173. The translation 
is taken from the ELLC text 1988, see Common Worship page 819 for more 
information. 
26 Torrance does not supply the references to Athanasius (Torrance 1969b: 2), but in a 
later work he supplies references to Contra Arius, 1.2,11,13 (Torrance 1988a: 87f, note 
49). 
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no more a spatial concept than God dwelling in Light... The relation between the 
actuality of the incarnate Son in space and time and the God from whom He came 
cannot be spatialized' (Torrance 1969b: 3). He notes that the creed does not conceive of 
a spatial or temporal but of a creative relationship between God and the universe 
(Torrance 1969b: 3). However, when the creed speaks about the incarnation it intends us 
to understand that in Jesus God actually existed within space and time, and that in the 
incarnation God interacted personally with the material creation (Torrance 1969b: 3). 
The question of how God relates to the space-time universe became a problem 
for the early church and so a model of space that was adequate and appropriate to the 
doctrines of creation and incarnation had to be developed. The Nicene theologians 
arrived at a 'relational concept ofspace' (Torrance 1969b: 4, emphasis Torrance) which 
was markedly different from that of contemporary Greek thought in which space was 
regarded as an inert container. However, within Greek thought there were other models 
of space apart from the container view; such as the Stoic idea of space as 'room forged 
for itself by an active agency' (Torrance 1969b: 10). Torrance argues that this Stoic 
notion which is close to the Biblical understanding of space helped the Nicene 
theologians to understand space from the starting point of creation and incarnation 
(Torrance 1969b: 10). 
The traditional Greek container view of space was rejected by the Nicene 
theologians in favour of a model developed from the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo which 
conceives God to be both transcendent and prior to all time and space (Torrance 
1969b: 11). Torrance argues that as components of the created universe time and space 
must be regarded not as a container in which events happen but as relations within 
creation. He writes that: 
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[t]hey are orderly functions of contingent events within it. Time is in creation, 
creation is not in time. ... God Himself, then, cannot be conceived as existing 
in 
a temporal or spatial relation to the universe. If traditional Greek concepts are to 
be used, it must be said that God is not contained by anything but rather that He 
contains the entire universe, not in the manner of a container, but by His power 
(Torrance 1969b: 11, emphasis Torrance). 
According to Torrance everything that exists in the universe, visible or invisible, 
is comprehended and encompassed by God. There is no empty void because God is in 
all places and in all things; even space and time themselves must be understood with 
reference to the power and activity of God (Torrance 1969b: I If). He cites Origen who 
holds that the transcendent God limits the universe in that he comprehends all things. In 
doing so he gives them not only a limit but also rationality; for that which is unlimited is 
indeterminate and incomprehensible (Torrance 1969b: 12). Torrance argues that this 
'creative comprehension' of the universe by God makes it rational by which he means 
reasonable and comprehensible. Therefore the model of space inherent in any doctrine 
of creation has cosmological and epistemological significance. 27 Torrance then relates 
his model of space to the incarnation whereby the creator establishes a rational 
relationship between himself and the universe and he does this within the created 
universe (Torrance 1969b: 13). We see the central and foundational significance of the 
incarnation in Torrance's epistemology: that in Jesus Christ that we have access to the 
creator within creation. 
1.3.2 Space as relation 
Torrance develops his understanding of the incarnation in terms of Einstein's 
model of space. According to Torrance Origen develops a relational model of space 
from the Stoic notions of space and body; this provided the essential background to 
27 Torrance argues that: '[t]he rationality of the universe is ... grounded in the creative 
comprehension of it by God' (Torrance 1969b: 12). 
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Athanasius' work on the relationship between space and God (Torrance 1969b: 13f). 
Torrance argues that the key to understanding the relationship between God and space 
in Athanasius and the Nicene theologians are the doctrines of the homoousion and 
incarnation: that Jesus Christ who exists as part of the created order is 'of one 
substance' with the Father. The living and active Word of God through whom all things 
were created and who comprehends and brings rational order to the universe (Torrance 
1969b: 12) is of one being with the Father. Jesus Christ binds creation into relationship 
with God; and this same living Word of God becomes part of the creation by his 
incarnation and yet in doing so he does not cease to be God nor does he cease to be one 
with the Father (Torrance 1969b: 14). Following Athanasius Torrance argues that the 
Son is a mediator between the Father and creation not only in terms of theology but 
even spatially. He is theologically and spatially the mediator (Torrance 1969b: 15). 
Torrance employs another patristic term, perichoresis, to elucidate the 
relationship between the Father and creation mediated through the Son. He contends 
that perichoresis or coinherence, 28 the doctrine that the persons of the Trinity mutually 
indwell one another, means that when we argue that God the Son became incarnate 
within the creation without ceasing to be God we are actually arguing that Jesus Christ 
is the 'place' in time and space where we meet the Father (Torrance 1969b: 16). This is 
of great epistemological significance and Torrance draws out the conclusions for our 
28 Torrance writes that perichoresis: 'was first used by Gregory Nazianzen to help 
express the way in which the divine and human natures in the one person of Christ 
coinhere in one another without the integrity of either being diminished by the presence 
of the other. It was then applied to speak of the way in which the three divine Persons 
mutually dwell in one another and coinhere or inexist in one another while nevertheless 
remaining other than one another and distinct from one another' (Torrance 1996a: 102). 
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knowledge of God . 
29 He argues that the relation between the incarnate Son and the 
Father is: 
the relation that bridges the separation ... between God and man and supplies 
the epistemological basis for all theological concepts, and therefore for our 
understanding of the relation between their creaturely content and the reality of 
God Himself. It is in Christ that the objective reality of God is intelligibly linked 
with creaturely and physical forms of thought, so that the latter may be adapted 
and given an orientation enabling them to direct our minds to what God really 
makes known of Himself, although in view of His infinite nature they will not be 
able to seize hold of him as He is in Himself (Torrance 1969b: 17). 
We will see in Chapter Three that Torrance rejects absolutely any notion of a logically 
necessary bridge between creation and God; however, he argues that there is an actual 
bridge and that this is Jesus Christ. Torrance argues that, as the place within creation 
where we meet the Father, Jesus Christ is the bridge between the creation and God and 
between our inadequate ways of understanding the reality of God and God as he is 
eternally in himself. This means that the language and concepts used in theology are 
part of the creation and are therefore inadequate to the reality of God and Torrance 
comments that if 'they are to be used to speak of God they must be stretched and 
extended beyond the range of the phenomenal world for which they were formed' 
(Torrance 1969b: 16,19); yet if the concepts and language used by theology are 
completely distorted from their everyday use in order to speak of God then they become 
meaningless. Torrance argues that although the theological concepts are inadequate and 
creaturely, they still enable us to grasp something of the reality of the God who far 
transcends all our thoughts and language about him. They direct us to that which is 
beyond. Our language may be inadequate but it can also be truthful as far as it goes; it 
can point to a truth which far surpasses it. As Torrance writes: 
29 We will also see that he uses the same language of the Bible in revelation. See 
sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.6. 
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Theological statements operate ... with essentially open concepts-concepts that 
are relatively closed on our side of their reference through their connection with 
the space - time structures of our world, but which on God's side are wide open 
to the infinite objectivity and inexhaustible intelligibility of the divine Being 
(Torrance 1969b: 21) 
This bridge between theology and divine reality which is the epistemological basis for 
theological concepts and language is Jesus Christ who is God in the space and time of 
creation but who is nevertheless of one being with the Father. The relationship between 
the Father and the Son bridges the gulf that exists between creation and God, between 
the relatively closed creation on our side and the open infinity that is God who bounds 
the universe of space and time. The incarnate Son grounds theology in the reality of 
God. It is for this reason that Torrance's doctrine of revelation, including revelation in 
Scripture and nature, is Christologically founded. 
Torrance's linking of theology to the reality of God through the incarnate Son is 
equivalent to Barth's 'analogy of faith'. Both theologians reject any natural or logically 
necessary 'bridge' between the world and God which would allow theological language 
to speak meaningfully about God. Just as Barth rejects the traditional concept of the 
6analogy of being', and substitutes for it his analogy of faith, so Torrance forges a link 
between inadequate human language and divine reality through Jesus Christ, the place 
in the rational, created universe where we meet God and where God has made himself 
known. 30 
Torrance has developed a model of space which is founded upon the doctrine of 
creatio ex nihilo which he relates to the general theory of relativity. According to 
Torrance space is neither a void nor an inertial container; it is a function of the 
30 For a definition of Barth's analogiafidei see Hunsinger 1991: 283, note 2; see Barth 
1975: 165f, 227-247. 
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relationship of objects to one another and to God within creation. God as the source and 
limit of creation confers order and rationality upon the created universe. Within creation 
Jesus Christ is the place in history, time and space where we know and relate to the 
Father. Torrance has made a clear statement of the epistemological significance of the 
incarnate Son Jesus Christ. Christ, who is of one being with the Father, is the source of 
all theological knowledge; and as the bridge between the unbounded God and the 
relatively closed universe he grounds theology in the eternal reality of God. When in 
later chapters we examine Torrance's development of Barth on natural theology and his 
own dialogue with the natural sciences we will see how far he is faithful to his 
epistemological principle developed from his understanding of revelation in Christ. 
1.3.3 Discussion 
An important aspect of Torrance's theology is that he takes seriously the nature 
of space and time as disclosed to scientific investigation. Instead of treating the space 
time universe as an inert container in which events simply happen he attempts to grasp 
the implication of the theory of spatial relativity for the doctrine of revelation. He 
attempts to correlate theological discourse about creation with scientific discussion of 
the universe, and in doing so he demonstrates the relational understanding of space in 
the theologians of the early church. 
In terins of the gracious aspect of all knowledge of God Torrance's discussion of 
spatial relativity is important for two reasons. As the incarnate Son who is of one being 
with the Father Jesus Christ is the place within time and space where men and women 
who are themselves part of the created universe are able to relate to the transcendent 
creator; Jesus of Nazareth is the mediator, the place where we are able to meet God. 
Moreover, as the mediator between the transcendent creator and the creation, Jesus 
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Christ grounds theological discourse in the reality of God. This means that in Jesus 
Christ, who is part of the contingent creation and who is also of one being with the 
Father, the reality of God is brought into relation with the physical universe, bridging 
the separation between God and humanity and providing an epistemological foundation 
for theological language and discourse. 
1.4 Torrance's theological anthropology 
We have noted that Torrance operates with an implicit though well developed 
theological anthropology. 31 This anthropology, founded on Calvin's writings, is 
expounded by Torrance in one of his earliest works (Torrance 1952). Although he only 
writes explicitly about theological anthropology in this early study of Calvin there is a 
clear Calvinist approach in his later writings. While Torrance often interprets Calvin 
through his reading of Barth in his anthropology he is closer to Calvin than Barth. 
According to Torrance our human condition is not merely 'frail and finite' (Torrance 
1996a: 40); rather to be human is to be 'lost and damned' (Torrance 1990: 228). 
Torrance's anthropology is implicit in his Christology which is heavily 
influenced by Barth. Controversially, he follows Barth in arguing that it was our fallen 
and depraved human nature which Christ assumed in the incarnation. 32 Torrance writes 
that humanity is in a state of conflict with God (Torrance 1992: 8); the human condition 
is in rebellion against God and has consequently fallen into a state of darkness 
(Torrance 1996a: 41). In his exposition of the incarnation we can see how Torrance 
views the extent of our fallen state. He writes that at the incarnation God has assumed: 
31 See Section 1.2.3. 
32 See section 1.7.2 for discussion of this point. 
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our fallen nature, our humanity diseased in mind and soul, our actual human 
existence enslaved to sin and subjected to judgement and death, precisely in 
order to save us in the very heart of our depraved condition in body and mind 
where we are [at] enmity with God (Torrance 1990: 23 1). 
Torrance emphasises our alienated mind in his description both of our fallen 
condition and in his argument that it was our fallen nature which God took in becoming 
human in Christ (Torrance 1956: 116-127, c. f. Torrance 1990: 23 1). When he became 
human Christ assumed our mental alienation from God (Torrance 1996a: 41). He argues 
that at the incarnation Christ took on real, concrete and therefore fallen, human nature; 
not some ideal, abstract, or universal human nature. Nor did Christ assume human 
nature in its unfallen state; he experienced real, that is fallen, human nature. 
For Torrance it is in the human mind that sin 'had extended itself inextricably in 
human existence' (Torrance 1990: 23 1). The sin of the mind is pride or self elevation; 
while the paradox of grace is that when we try to elevate ourselves we fail and we fall; 
our elevation is found in humility. From Calvin's writings Torrance takes the principle 
of elevation by abasement, founded on the actions of God's mercy towards us in Christ 
(Torrance 1952: 144f). He calls this a 'soteriological inversion' (Torrance 1952: 145) 
brought about by the cross of Christ. This inversion must take place in our minds. When 
we know that we are nothing then we take our stand upon God's mercy and precisely at 
that point we have truly risen (Torrance 1952: 145). We can surnmarise Torrance's 
theological anthropology by the Calvinist phrase: 'total depravity' or 'total perversity'. 
This means that in our natural, fallen, state we are nothing; we are spiritually dead and 
thoroughly depraved. Our fallenness is nothing less than total, and so our need is for 
nothing less than new creation. 
It is important that we understand why Torrance lays such an emphasis upon the 
total depravity of human nature. Torrance spells out not only the doctrine of total 
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depravity but also its context in Calvin's thought. He argues that Calvin reduces human 
nature to total depravity only because he wants to emphasise the absolute and total 
nature of divine grace (Torrance, Torrance and Torrance 1999: 29). When Torrance 
writes that Calvin, 'refuses to enunciate a doctrine of sin apart from the doctrine of 
creation, and except in the context of the doctrine of grace' (Torrance 1952: 83), he 
could equally be writing of his own theological anthropology. The absolute nature of 
divine grace in Christ argues for a total fall (Torrance 1952: 85). 
There are epistemological consequences of the fall. The total nature of the fall 
means that in order to have any knowledge of God we need God's self-revelation as an 
act of pure supernatural grace. Apart from grace human nature, including the mind, is so 
totally perverted as to make knowledge of God impossible. 33 Total salvation in Christ 
by the total grace of God implies a total state of fallenness in our human condition apart 
from grace and apart from Christ; but we can speak of total depravity only in the context 
of grace. Torrance's anthropology is driven by his epistemology of grace. If all is done 
for us by Christ then we can contribute nothing either to our salvation or to our saving 
knowledge of God. It is fitting to Torrance's whole approach to theology that he begins 
with God in his grace not with humankind in its need. The movement in Torrance's 
theology as in his epistemology is always from God to humanity, from heaven to earth, 
and never vice-versa. Torrance's Calvinist anthropology, particularly his emphasis upon 
the alienated mind, has obvious implications for his epistemology. It helps to 
understand his emphasis upon divine self-revelation as the only possible way to 
knowledge of God. The impossibility of humanity knowing God apart from God's self- 
revelation leads Torrance to posit an epistemology of grace. 
33 Barth also developed his anthropology and his understanding of the doctrine of sin as 
a consequence of his doctrine of reconciliation, for according to Barth we can only see 
and understand sin in the light of God's action to deal with it (Barth 1956b: 389-91). 
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1.5 Revelation: act and grace 
1.5.1 Personal knowledge of God 
In Torrance's theology revelation is an aspect of divine mercy and compassion, 
for without God there can be no knowledge of God (Torrance 1962: 40,115; Torrance 
1996a: 13). Torrance's point is that grace is not only an object of theological enquiry it 
is also the only means of our knowing God. Toffance's theological epistemology is an 
epistemology of grace; for without God's act of self-revelation we are left with 
speculation. This is the basis of Torrance's disagreement with those theologies 
developed from Schleiermacher. According to Torrance revelation alone provides a sure 
starting point and a firm foundation for theology. Without revelation theology's 
foundations are built on sand. What Sykes writes of Barth is equally applicable to 
Torrance: 
Barth's entire theological programme can be seen as the attempt to do justice to 
the autonomy of Christian dogmatics, to listen to the Divine Word, and to be 
obedient to what God alone, in his sovereign freedom, makes possible by his 
self-revelation' (in Barth 1986: 7). 
Torrance argues that the idea of grace as a theological method is found in the 
writings of the protestant reformers. In his first systematic exposition of reformed 
doctrine Torrance writes that by revealing himself in Christ God draws his creatures 
into conversation and into relationship with himself (Torrance 1959: lxxii). We find in 
this early work Torrance writing of knowledge as relationship, a theme which becomes 
of significance in his later work. There has never been any hint in Torrance's theology 
of revelation as primarily revelation of propositional truths about God brought together 
to fon-n. doctrines and dogmas; for him knowledge is always personal knowledge of 
God. In Torrance's theology knowledge of God is always primarily relational and it is 
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only as a corollary that it is propositional. 
In this we see the influence of Polanyi even on Torrance's earliest works. He 
depends on Polanyi for certain aspects of his claim that theology is to be regarded as a 
science. Polanyi argues that science is an art which involves the scientist personally; it 
involves both skill and personal commitment to the object of enquiry. Polanyi argues 
that this is the case even for the physical sciences (Polanyi 1962: 300-303). 34 It is not 
clear exactly when Torrance first encountered Polanyi's writings. McGrath suggests that 
it could have been as early as 1946 (McGrath 1999: 230). This is supported by the fact 
that although Theological Science (Torrance 1969a), in which Polanyi's influence on 
Torrance's understanding of scientific method can be clearly seen, was not published 
until 1969 it was based on lectures delivered ten years earlier. 
Torrance's argument that knowledge of God is personal knowledge supports his 
insistence on the Christological foundation of all Christian theology for Jesus Christ is 
the objective place within creation where God is to be met. 35 Torrance draws a helpful 
distinction between objective knowledge and objectification within knowledge. 
Objective knowledge of God is knowledge of God as he give himself to be known 
thereby remaining the sovereign of all our knowledge of him (Torrance 1969a: 300); 
objectification is an attempt to subject God 'to our natural habits of thought and forms 
of knowledge' (Torrance 1969a: 300). 36 It is for this reason that Torrance argues that 
propcrly objective knowledge of God comes by grace alone (Torrance 1969a: 299f) and 
by this he means through Christ alone. 
34 See Torrance 1969a: 93. 
35 See section 1.3.2. 
36 Cf. Torrance 1969a: 279f. 
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1.5.2 Torrance's critique of Schleiermacher 37 
Torrance contrasts the approach to theology exemplified by Barth and 
Mackintosh, the way of grace and divine self-revelation in Jesus Christ as the means to 
knowledge of God, with nineteenth century liberal theology which sought to found its 
knowledge of God on human nature and experience. Schleiermacher sought a natural 
capacity within human nature for God and he found this in the act of faith. Torrance 
quotes with approval Barth's comment that Schleiermacher only speaks of God 'by 
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speaking of man in a loud voice' (Torrance 1962: 57), when he attempts to ground 
theology in our natural human capacities. For Torrance theologians such as 
Schleiermacher always end up reducing theology to anthropology, and spirituality to 
psychology. He writes: 
what Schleiermacher and his contemporaries and followers were concerned with 
was not the living God, holy and transcendent above and beyond man who 
condescends to him in his compassion, not an Infinite above man and really 
coming to him, but an Infinite within the finite, an Eternal immanent within the 
human spirit, who cannot be disentangled from the religious self-consciousness 
for it is one with it and native to it, and indeed cannot be disentangled even from 
maWs consciousness of the world (Torrance 1962: 57; c. f. 59,61). 
Torrance argues that in his debate with Hamack in 1923 Barth was trying to do justice 
to the idea of God's self-revelation, rather than the discovery of our human religious 
potential (Torrance 1962: 81). 
Barth wrestled with Schleiermacher throughout his life reading and re-reading 
the man he regarded as the greatest nineteenth century theologian. He often rethought 
his own position in dialogue with Schleiermacher. Barth's main argument is that a faith 
37 See also Torrance's article 'Hermeneutics according to F. D. E. Schleiermacher' 
Torrance 1968: 256-267. 
38 Here Torrance is quoting from The Word of God and the Word ofMan (Barth 
1928: 196). 
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like Schleiermacher's which lies in human subjectivity can find that its statements about 
God are too easily collapsed into statements about humanity. 39 Barth's early writings on 
Schleiermacher contain the sort of critiques that we find in The Word of God and the 
Word ofMan quoted by Torrance; however, he began to reassess Schleiermacher's 
theology when he began lecturing at G6ttingen in 1923/24. Webster sounds a note of 
caution in reading Barth's assessment of Schleiermacher only in terms of his early 
antagonism. He argues that Barth's relationship to Schleiermacher is complex and that 
this complexity is often overlooked, and his engagement with Schleiermacher reduced 
to 'a few sloganised antitheses' (Webster 2000a: 37). Torrance's interpretation of Barth 
and his critique of Schleiermacher based on that interpretation falls into this category 
and while his interpretation may be true to Barth's early writings he cannot be said to do 
justice to his position after G6ttingen. 
The point of Torrance's critique of Schleiermacher, even if it is unfair to 
Schlcicrmacher himself, is his argument against any theology which begins in human 
nature or capacity and which attempts to build a bridge from humanity to God. 
Torrance's approach to epistemology is rooted in God's being and action and not in 
human nature or endeavour. 
1.5.3 The vicarious humanity of Christ 
In Torrance's theology knowledge of God is personal knowledge and therefore 
his theological epistemology is founded on God's decision and act to make himself 
known. He argues that God's self-revelation is unexpected and unlooked for: there is 
nothing in human nature that could have prepared us for it. God's self-revelation in 
Christ is not from the known to the unknown (the way of liberal theology) but from the 
39 This is the argument of the nineteenth century materialist philosopher Feuerbach; see 
Barth's introductory essay in Feuerbach 1957: x-xxxii. 
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unknown to the known (the way of revelation). Torrance argues that God's revelation is 
new and strange; it is completely different from our human conceptions and endeavours 
(Torrance 1996a: 19). 40 The gap between God and humanity cannot be bridged or 
crossed from our side; no religious consciousness or perception can bridge the gulf 
between the word of God and human words (Torrance I 962: 102f). 
Writing on the vicarious nature of Christ's humanity Torrance draws out the 
radical implications of the doctrine of grace for the human response to God. He argues 
that Christ as true God and true man offers to God on our behalf a proper and perfect 
human response to divine grace (Torrance 1960a: 15f). We find a similar understanding 
in Barth for whom Jesus Christ is the 'inclusive human being' (Hunsinger 1991: 128). 
Barth emphasises objectivity of revelation and salvation in Christ. Jesus' perfect 
response to the Father has implications, not only for Christian believers, but for all 
people. 41 Hunsinger calls this universalising tendency in Barth a 'soteriological 
objectivism' (Hunsinger 1991: 129). There is a corresponding Christological objectivity 
in Torrance's understanding of salvation. Christ's response and obedience to the Father 
are for us and on our behalf; Christ's humanity, including his response to the Father, is 
vicarious (Torrance 1960a: 81; Torrance 1992a: 76f, c. f. 62f). 
The doctrine of Christ's vicarious humanity is one of Torrance's most important 
contributions to Christology and is found in his early and late writings. He argues that: 
Jesus Christ is not only the Word of God become flesh, Ile is also Believer, but 
Believer for us, vicariously Believer, whose very humanity is the embodiment of 
our salvation.... That He stood in our place and gave to God account for us, that 
Ile believed for us, was faithful for us, and remains faithful even when we fail 
Him again and again, is the very substance of our salvation and the anchor of 
40 We see here echoes of Barth's early writings, especially his essay 'The Strange New 
World Within The Bible', Barth 1928: 28ff. 
41 See Hunsinger 1991: 128-135; c. f. Barth 1958: 271-275. 
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our hope. (Torrance 1960a: 8 I f). 42 
According to Torrance Christ has fulfilled the covenant from both the human and the 
divine side. lie is the unconditional self-giving of God to humankind and the divinely 
provided human response to this gracious self-offering. 
Despite this emphasis on the vicarious nature of Christ's response to the Father 
Torrance insists on the importance of our response to God. Like Barth he wrestles with 
the problem of proclaiming the gospel of absolute grace and still insisting upon the 
necessity of a human response to divine grace (see for example Torrance 1992a: 92-98). 
Torrance writes that the 'all Christ' of grace does not mean nothing of humanity 
(Torrance 1992a: 95). A personal response is still necessary. There are universalistic 
implications of the epistemology of grace which Torrance, like Barth, struggles against. 
Barth's position on the efficacy of grace is that Jesus Christ as the representative 
man has made the response to God's grace for all people and the salvation wrought by 
Christ is effective for all (Barth 1958: 528). Nevertheless, he also writes about the 'basic 
perversion of the human will' which brings a person to 'enmity against the grace of God 
directed to him' (Barth 1958: 454). Barth conceives of the 'terrifying ... impossibility' of 
the rejection of grace (Barth 1958: 535). Human disobedience to the command of grace 
is to Barth 'inconceivable, inexplicable and impossible' (Barth 1958: 535) yet Barth 
avoids a dogmatic statement of universalism by accepting this impossible possibility. 
In Torrance's theology there is a different nuance. He argues that the grace of 
God must be appropriated and consequently be develops his understanding of the 
vicarious humanity of Christ to include repentance; at Jesus' baptism we see a vicarious 
42 C. f. Torrance 1992: 76f 'Jesus Christ constitutes in his own self-consecrated 
humanity the fulfilment of the vicarious way of human response to God promised under 
the Old Covenant, but now on the ground of his atoning self-sacrifice once for all 
offered this is a vicarious way of response which is available for all mankind' 
(Torrance 1992: 760. 
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act of repentance, our nature being so fallen that we are unable to do even this for 
ourselves (Torrance 1992a: 85f). Torrance exhorts the church to proclaim, not 
conditional grace, but the unconditional grace of God in Jesus Christ (Torrance 
1992a: 93); and to do this is to invite people to put their trust in Christ, not only as God 
the redeemer, but also as man making the perfect response to God. Our response to the 
unconditional grace of God is not our response instead it is Christ within (Torrance 
1992a: 98). We appropriate the unconditional grace of God by always trusting in 
Christ's response to God and not our own. For instance when we pray we know that our 
prayers are worthless and powerless; all that we can do is to rest in Christ's vicarious 
prayer (Torrance 1992a: 880. 
Torrance, like Barth, has a radical doctrine of the grace of God in his reconciling 
revelation. Both theologians regard redemption as objective, as something done for 
humanity by Christ. Redemption is efficacious and universal in its application. Yet also 
like Barth, Torrance resists the logical next step of universalism. He argues that the 
unconditional grace of God shown in Jesus Christ must be appropriated by a radical act 
of trust in Christ. 
1.5.4 Discussion 
Torrance argues that the doctrine of revelation in Christ places human 
knowledge of God on a finn foundation. in this he contrasts the revealed theology of 
Barth and the reformers with the approach of Schleiermacher. However, his 
understanding of Schleiermacher's position lacks the depth and subtlety of Barth's 
interpretation and Torrance can be said to be arguing against a caricature rather than the 
developed theology of Schleiermacher himself. What is clear in his attack on theologies 
which are founded on human experience and nature rather than on divine self-revelation 
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is that for Torrance the reformed notion of grace is much more than an element of 
Christian theology; it is the method of reformed theology. Central to his understanding 
of revelation is that what God reveals is himself and not something about himself. 
Revelation is encountering or more properly being encountered by God, and according 
to Torrance this occurs in Christ alone; for him revelation by grace and revelation in 
Christ are used interchangeably. 
This is further evidence of the centrality of grace in Torrance's theology in his 
exposition of the vicarious humanity of Christ. He argues that not only is Jesus Christ 
the personal revelation of God to humankind, he is also and at the same time the 
vicarious human response to divine grace. Jesus Christ is the place in the universe of 
space and time where divine revelation and human response meet. Instead of following 
his argument to its universalistic conclusion Torrance argues for a human response of 
trust in Christ's vicarious response. 
1.6 Revelation as reconciliation 
1.6.1 Incarnation and revelation 
Torrance argues that revelation is an act of the grace of God, a personal 
revelation in which God reveals himself (Torrance 1999: 85). This self-revelation of God 
is not general and universal, it is particular and historical. There is no logically 
necessary reason why God should reveal himself in Christ therefore there can be no 
prior justification for Torrance's presumption that God does reveal himself in Christ. 
This is a fundamental working assumption in Torrance's theology. We will see that all 
human disciplines, including the natural sciences, operate with their own fundamental 
assumptions which can only be justified a posteriori, and so Torrance's presumption 
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that God has in fact spoken in the life of Christ does not necessarily invalidate his 
theology. Torrance's doctrine of revelation assumes the Chalcedonian understanding of 
the nature of Jesus Christ as both fully God and fully human in hypostatic union. This is 
why there is such an emphasis in Torrance's writings on the unity of revelation and 
reconciliation in Jesus Christ, for in the one person of Christ divine and human nature 
are united. The incarnation is an act of atonement and reconciliation between God and 
humanity; it is also the revelation of God in human flesh (Torrance 1988a: 114). The aim 
of revelation is not to increase knowledge about God but to bring about reconciliation 
(Torrance 1965: 132). 
According to Torrance the New Testament presents Christ as God become man 
(Torrance 1988a: 1 14). However, the incarnation is not a uniting of divine nature with 
ideal or abstract human nature nor is it unity with humanity in general; rather it is union 
with a particular, historical, man Jesus (Torrance 1988a: 147, c. f. Molnar 2002: 257). It is 
for this reason that Torrance argues that at the incarnation Christ assumed fallen human 
nature. 
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The doctrine of the hypostatic union has implications for the doctrines of 
revelation and reconciliation. For the doctrine of revelation it means that in Christ God 
reveals himself to us in history in the universe of time and space and that what God is to 
us in Christ he is in himself. The God whom we meet in the economy of revelation and 
salvation is God as he is in himself; and the God as he mediates himself to us in space 
and time is God as he is in eternity (Torrance 1992: 23). For the doctrine of 
reconciliation the hypostatic union means that reconciliation between God and 
humankind takes place in the being, we could even say in the flesh, of Jesus. We may 
speak of an incarnational atonement; this incarnational atonement constitutes Jesus 
43 See section 1.7.2. 
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Christ as the mediator between God and humanity (Torrance 1988a: 155). For Torrance 
reconciliation between God and humankind is not only something that Christ does; it 
describes who he is in his incarnate person. For Jesus Christ is the reality and substance 
of God's self-revelation within space and time (Torrance 1969b: 68). Therefore in God's 
self-revelation in Christ revelation is reconciliation and reconciliation is revelation 
(Seng 1992: 3420. God reveals himself to us in his work of reconciling humanity to 
himself in the life, death and resurrection of Christ (Torrance 1996a: 33). 
The unity of revelation and reconciliation in Torrance's theology is founded 
upon the classic patristic formulations of Trinitarian and Christological doctrine; it 
grounded upon the inner relations of the Father and the Son (Torrance 1992: 104). The 
incarnate Son is homoousios to patri and so in his self-revelation he reveals to us what 
is eternally true of the Father. What God is towards us in the economy of revelation and 
salvation he is eternally in himself-, the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity. The 
unity of revelation and reconciliation is also built upon the doctrine of the incarnation. 
The incarnation is an act of divine self-revelation but, because what God is in his 
revelation is not different from what he is in himself, in revealing himself God has 
united himself to us thereby effecting reconciliation. In Christ God comes to us as a 
human being embracing in his own person both sides of the mediating relationship. 
From the side of God he is gracious self-gift; from the human side he is the perfect 
human response to divine grace. Torrance argues that Christ is no mere agent of 
reconciliation and revelation; he is what he mediates to us. He is both the content and 
the reality of revelation and reconciliation (Torrance 1992: 56f). Toffance draws out the 
implications of the patristic doctrine of the homoousion in a Barthian-Polanyian 
understanding of personal knowledge. One of the strengths of Torrance's position is that 
he focuses attention on the salvific significance of the incarnate life of Jesus Christ 
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when much western theology has only seen soteriological importance of his death. 44 
1.6.2 The hypostatic union 
According to traditional understanding, as formulated in the Nicene Creed, the 
incarnation of the Word of God takes the form of hypostatic union between divine and 
human nature. Torrance argues that this hypostatic union is 'the immediate ground for 
all Christ's mediatorial and reconciling activity in our human existence' (Torrance 
1992: 65). In Christ God is with us and we are with him; he makes his own the physical 
nature of our fallen existence in order to heal and sanctify it (Torrance 1976: 490. 
We have seen that in Torrance's theology Christ is not only God for us; his 
vicarious human nature is also for us as well. 45 Jesus Christ is both the reality of Divine 
revelation to us and of our receiving of that revelation. It is only in and through Christ 
that we are able to hear and to understand the Word of God; on our own we are unable 
to do so (Torrance 1962: 142). It is for this reason that Torrance is critical of expressions 
of the doctrine of substitutionary atonement which focus exclusively on Christ's death 
as effecting atonement. Ile develops the meaning of substitution in relation to Christ 
and argues that the whole of Christ's vicarious life, including his death, is 
substitutionary. Ile argues that: 
Substitution understood in this radical way means that Christ takes our place in 
all our human life and activity before God, even in our believing, praying and 
worshipping before God, for he has yoked himself to us in such a profound way 
that he stands in for us and upholds us at every point in our human relations 
before God. (Torrance, Torrance & Torrance 1999: 24). 
Paul's phrase in Galatians 2: 20, '1 live by the faith of the son of God', is central to 
Torrance's development of the reformed doctrine of Christ's substitutionary atonement. 
Everything is done for us and on our behalf by Christ. Torrance even argues that our 
44 See section 1.6.2. 45 See section 1.5.3. 
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faith is sustained by Christ's faithfulness. We are saved by God's grace alone. His 
radical interpretation of the doctrine of grace leads him to criticise evangelical theology 
as Pelagian in throwing humanity back in the last resort upon its own act of faith which 
makes salvation depend upon belief (Torrance, Torrance & Torrance 1999: 28). 
However, we have seen that Torrance refuses to follow the logic of his position to its 
conclusion by asserting universalism. Ultimately his insistence on our need to 
appropriate the unconditional grace of God by a radical act of trust is no less 'Pelagian' 
than a call for faith; he has simply moved the necessary human response one step 
46 further back. 
We have noted that Torrance argues that in Christ God comes to us in our 
fallenness, depravity and enmity with God (Torrance 1992: 39). He takes upon himself 
our fallen human nature in order to redeem it from within (Torrance 1992: 40). 47 He 
argues that the atonement is not an external action but something which occurs in the 
person of the mediator (Torrance 1990: 230). He illustrates this point by recalling an 
incident during his time as moderator of the Church of Scotland: 
During my first week of office as Moderator of the General Assembly of the 
Church of Scotland... a highlander asked me whether I was bom again, and 
when I replied in the affirmative he asked when I was bom again.... I told him 
that I had been bom again when Jesus Christ was bom of the Virgin Mary and 
rose again from the virgin tomb, the first-born from the dead.... He took my 
corrupt humanity in his Incarnation, sanctified, cleansed and redeemed it, giving 
it new birth, in his death and resurrection.... so that when we speak of our 
conversion or our regeneration we are referring to our sharing in the conversion 
or regeneration of our humanity brought about by Jesus... (Torrance 
1992a: 85 f). 48 
Torrance is critical of what he calls the 'Latin heresy' in western theology. This is a 
gospel of external relations between God and humanity (Torrance 1990: 214). He argues 
that in it a theory of atonement emerges which deals with the penalty of sins but not 
46 See section 1.5.3. 
47 See section 1.7.2. 
48 Torrance was moderator of the Church of Scotland in 1976-7. 
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with sin itself-, not with fallen human nature or with the reality of human estrangement 
and corruption. He argues that atoning reconciliation takes place within the being of the 
mediator and not simply by his death as a price paid. Christ assumes our fallen nature 
and reconciles this fallen nature to the Father (Torrance 1990: 227f) by living vicariously 
a life of response to divine grace. 
Torrance argues that western theology, Protestant and Catholic, has tended to 
downplay the significance of Christ's life and has concentrated instead on the 
incarnation and the passion - resurrection. The atonement is reduced to an external 
action between a sinless Christ and God; on the cross Christ pays the price for human 
sin to the Father. However, if in his incarnation Christ assumed our fallen nature, then 
atonement or reconciliation between God and fallen humankind occurs in the depth of 
Christ's being. In the person, in the veryflesh, of Christ who is both divine and human 
God and fallen humanity are reconciled. Atoning reconciliation is no longer an external 
contract but is effected in the person of the mediator (Torrance 1990: 230). 
Torrance's theory of atoning reconciliation or incarnational redemption is 
criticised by Macleod who makes two charges against Torrance's understanding of the 
atoning significance of the incarnation. First he accuses Torrance of being unbiblical as 
the New Testament insists upon the centrality of the cross; his second charge is that 
when the focus shifts from the crucifixion to the incarnate life of Christ then 'what is 
stressed is not atonement but compassion gained through human experience' (Macleod 
2000: 131). 
Notwithstanding Macleod's charges, the cross is clearly central to Torrance's 
understanding of the reconciliation and atonement mediated by Christ. He writes that 
Jesus did what no one but God could do, in forgiving and undoing sins through the 
atoning sacrifice of himself upon the Cross' (Torrance 1996a: 52, c. f. 249). In Torrance 
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the atonement is not merely something that Jesus does on the cross; the cross is the 
culmination of a reconciliation which begins at the moment of incarnation (Torrance 
1992a: 41). The cross is central to Torrance's doctrine of atonement but it does not 
exclude the rest of Christ's incarnate life from having atoning significance. In fact 
theories of atonement which focus only on the cross are unbiblical because they not 
only divide Jesus death from the rest of his life; they render that life immaterial to 
salvation as if Jesus is only important because he lived and died. 
Macleod's second charge, that theologies which accentuate the incarnation stress 
not atonement but compassion, is not substantiated. It is precisely the atoning and 
reconciling significance of the incarnate life of Jesus that Torrance lays great emphasis 
upon. For example he writes that 'atoning reconciliation began to be actualised with the 
conception and birth of Jesus of the Virgin Mary' (Torrance 1992a: 41; c. f. pages 39- 
42). In Torrance's theology the incarnation is an act of atonement and not simply an 
illustration of God's compassion. The atoning significance of the incarnate life of Jesus 
is the ground of Torrance's doctrine of the vicarious humanity of Christ. It is the 
atoning significance of the incarnation that leads Torrance to accept Barth's argument 
that it was fallen human nature that Christ assumed in becoming human. 
1.6.3 Discussion 
Torrance argues that revelation and reconciliation are complementary doctrines 
because true knowledge of God is not propositional but a personal encounter. He argues 
that reconciliation between God and humankind occurs in the person, in the flesh even, 
of Jesus Christ, because his human nature is a vicarious human nature. Jesus Christ's 
human response to divine grace on our behalf means that he embraces both aspects of 
reconciliation between God and humanity. This allows him to argue that we are not 
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saved by our response to divine grace but by Christ whose faith is for us and on our 
behalf Torrance demonstrates a clear understanding that we are saved by grace alone, a 
grace evident in both the divine and human aspects of reconciliation. It is the argument 
of this thesis that this emphasis on grace is true not only for Torrance's doctrine of 
reconciliation but is also true for his doctrine of revelation. It will be demonstrated that 
the doctrine of revelation by grace is even more fundamental to Torrance's theological 
epistemology than revelation in Christ. This will be shown by the exposition of the role 
of Scripture in Torrance's doctrine of revelation in chapter two and in his transposition 
of natural theology in chapter four and five. 
1.7 Reconciliation as revelation 
1.7.1 The mediation of Christ in Barth and Torrance 
Barth argues that God is inaccessible to humanity except as he chooses to reveal 
himself. In practice for Barth this means as mediated by Christ. 49 There is a chasm 
between humankind and God which from our side is totally unbridgeable but which 
God is able to cross; in Jesus Christ the incarnate Word he has in fact crossed it (Barth 
1956: 29). 50 This is an important starting point for Torrance's theology and 
epistemology. It is important for his development of Barth's theology of revelation, 
especially for the direction in which he develops what he conceives of as a Barthian 
natural theology; similarly it is an important point in his dialogue with the natural 
sciences on epistemology. 
Barth makes the point that God is identical with his revelation (Barth 1975: 296). 
49 See flunsinger 1991: 76. 
50 CE Hunsinger 1991: 79, 'No truth of God's identity is higher, different or more 
complete than the truth of God's identity in the humanity of Jesus Christ'. See also 
Bromiley 1979: 19. 
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This is the reason why he begins his doctrine of the word with the Trinity. In his 
revelation God reveals not something about himself; he reveals himself. For Barth, 
followed by Torrance, God is Trinity. There is no general revelation of the unity of God 
followed by a second movement to the doctrine of the Trinity. 
We find in Barth an insistence upon beginning not with the possibility of 
revelation but with its actuality; not with how God might reveal himself but with how 
God has in fact revealed himself (Barth 1956: 3,7). It is for this reason that we refer to 
the position of Barth and Torrance as 'actualist'. What is meant by actualist is that their 
understanding of revelation is founded upon how God has revealed himself rather than 
on speculation as to how God might reveal himself (Torrance 1996a: 199). For Barth 
revelation is an act of God's sovereignty; it is possible from God's side alone. 51 In 
Barth's theology the revelation of God is God's presence with and for us (Barth 
1975: 353). For Barth no less than for Torrance revelation is itseýfreconciliation. In 
Scripture God reveals himself as reconciler (Barth 1975: 399). 52 Reconciliation, like 
revelation, is an act of God's sheer grace and mercy to us, and it is unlooked for and 
unmerited. 
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The unity of revelation and reconciliation which he found in Barth's writing is 
central to Torrance's theology. As one reality, both human and divine, Jesus Christ in 
his incarnate person embraces both sides of the mediating relationship. He quite literally 
embodies the gospel of reconciliation; as Torrance writes: 'what he mediates and what 
he is arc one and the same' (Torrance 1992: 56). Reconciliation is the taking up of 
51 Barth writes' 'From the reality of Jesus Christ we gather that revelation is possible on 
God's side, that God is free for us, in such a way that His Word by becoming Man at the 
same time is and remains what He is, the true and eternal God, the same as He is in 
Himself at the Father's right hand forever and ever, (Barth 1956: 37). 
52 Barth writes, 'Revelation takes place as the revelation of reconciliation. 
Reconciliation is indeed revelation' (Barth 1961: 8; cf. Barth 1975: 409). 
53 See Webster 2000a: 133, where he quotes Barth 1961: 46. 
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human being in and through Christ into the inner relations of God's own life, and this 
reconciliation takes place within the person of the mediator. In his life and being he 
bridges our estrangement from God and puts an end to our enmity with God. 
1.7.2 Jesus Clorist the mediator 
In his writings on Christology Torrance emphasises Christ's vicarious humanity. 
Jesus Christ, he argues, embraces both sides of the mediating relationship in hypostatic 
union (Torrance 1992: 76f). Torrance's position is that Christ has fulfilled the covenant 
from both sides. In Christ alone God's self-revelation meets with a faithful response; 
and Christ's response to God's self-revelation is made vicariously. Christ is for us both 
in his divinity and in his humanity. Torrance regards the vicarious humanity of Christ to 
be the 'cutting edge' of his theology (Palma 1984: 16). 
Torrance explores the implications of the vicarious humanity of Christ in several 
areas including revelation and reconciliation. As Torrance conceives of revelation in 
personal terms this means that the vicarious human nature of Christ is the fulfilment of 
divinc self-rcvclation. At the incarnation 'thc Word was translatcd into a human life' 
(Torrance 1992a: 78); and there is also provided for humanity a way of response to God 
in which each person is free to share through communion with Christ. Jesus is the 
content of God's word to humanity and of our response to God. In Torrance's 
understanding of the nature of Christ not onlY does the Word of God become flesh; the 
flesh of Jesus becomes our word of response to God. 
Torrance argues that in order to effect reconciliation when the Son becomes 
incarnate he enters our fallen and estranged state and in his own human nature he brings 
it back to God the Father in obedience and love (Torrance 1992a: 79). His whole life is a 
vicarious human response to God provided for us and on our behalf by God (see 
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Torrance 1992a: 80, Torrance 1988a: 1500.54 Torrance follows Barth in arguing that the 
human nature assumed by Christ at the incarnation was not human nature in its pre- 
fallen state but was in fact fallen human nature. Torrance claims that this position was 
held by the fathers of the church from Iranaeus to Cyril of Alexandria, by Luther and 
even by Mackintosh who explicitly rejects this doctrine (Torrance 1990: 231,232, c. f. 
Mackintosh 1913: 276-8). Torrance believes that the patristic doctrine that 'what is not 
assumed is not healed' in the incarnation means that Christ must have assumed fallen 
human nature in order to heal it (Torrance 1990: 23 1). Barth explores the implications of 
John 1: 14, 'The Word became flesh'. 'Flesh' here is the Greek word sarx, which, 
according to Barth, refers tofallen human nature which falls under the wrath and 
judgement of God (Barth 1956: 15 10. Barth writes: 'Flesh is the concrete form of 
human nature marked by Adam's fall' (Barth 1956: 15 1). In his reconciling revelation 
God in Christ puts himself on the side of his own enemy. God reveals himself in our 
fallen nature and what he reveals in that nature is himself. 
Barth notes that in the writings of earlier theologians there is an understandable 
reserve in ascribing to the incarnate Christ fallen human nature (Barth 1956: 153f). 
However, he cites exceptions to this reserve including Irving who was deposed from the 
ministry for holding this doctrine. Barth discovered references to Irving in Mackintosh 
who dismisses Irving's position (Mackintosh 1913: 277). 
Torrance also argues that it is important for soteriology that Christ assumed 
fallen human nature (Torrance 1990: 23 1); it is certainly important for Torrance's work 
on the vicarious humanity of Christ. Torrance's argument is founded on what he refers 
to as 'the cardinal soteriological principle of the ecumenical Church that "the 
54 On the implications of this for Torrance's understanding of the relationship of the 
Christian Scriptures to revelation, see chapter two. 
54 
55 
unassumed is the unhealed... (Torrance 1990: 232). Torrance argues that Christ unites 
himself to our human nature in all its weakness. He goes so far as to say that in Christ 
God takes on our 'corruption and damned existence' (Torrance 1976: 49); and it is 
precisely in our corrupt and fallen human nature that he lives a life of truth, holiness and 
purity, overcoming in our fallen human flesh our separation and estrangement from God 
(Torrance 1976: 49). Christ lives human life for us as it ought to be lived in response to 
and in relationship with the Father. Torrance's argument for fallen nature of Christ is 
based upon his understanding of vicarious humanity of Christ. 
Macleod argues that Irving was a direct influence upon the development of 
Torrance's Christology (Macleod 2001: 125). As we have seen the doctrine that Christ 
assumed fallen and corrupt human nature is central to Torrance's Christology. If 
Torrance first encountered it in Mackintosh's lectures it has left little impression upon 
him for we find no reference to Irving either in Torrance's writings on doctrine or in 
Scollish Theology (Torrance 1996c). Macintosh dismisses Irving's doctrine of 
reconciliation as 'eccentric though touching' (Mackintosh 1913: 277) and treats his 
thought as an interesting but ultimately flawed attempt at Christology. Macleod states 
that although the idea of incarnational redemption, so central to Torrance's theology, 
was also held by Irving it was expressed differently (See Macleod 2000: 130). Against 
Macleod the lack of references to Irving in Torrance's writings suggest that Irving was 
no influence on the development of Torrance's theology and that the direct influence on 
this crucial element in Torrance's thought is Barth. 56 
Crisp 57 argues that the condition of fallenness is not essential to human nature; 
we can conceive of a fully human person not being fallen - this is the traditional 
55 C. f, Torrance's reference to Cyril of Alexandria who wrote that 'what has not been 
taken up has not been saved' (Torrance 1988a: 165). 
56 1 am very grateful to Dr A. F. Mason for discussion of this point. 
57 Crisp 2007, chapter four. 
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understanding of Adam's nature before the fall. For this reason he questions Barth's 
argument that it was fallen human nature which Christ assumed at the incarnation. Crisp 
argues both that sinfulness entails actual sin and that fallenness requires sinfulness thus 
he rejects Barth's argument. Instead he allows Augustine's argument that 'Christ's 
human nature was affected by the Fall without being actually fallen' (Crisp 2007: 115). 
We can see in Jesus the effects of the fall but he himself is not fallen. 
That Christ assumed fallen human nature is central to Torrance's case for 
incarnational atonement in which Christ takes on fallen human nature in order to 
redeem it from within (Torrance 1990: 229); thus atonement begins at Christ's 
conception. In the hypostatic union the holy God unites himself to sinful human nature 
and in making it his own he 'healed and sanctified it in his own sinless life' (Torrance 
1990: 230). 
Torrance presupposes that the fall effects a fundamental change in human nature 
such that if Christ had not assumed fallen nature at the incarnation he would not have 
been able to redeem fallen human beings; this is not the same as arguing that fallenness 
is essential to human nature merely that human nature has in practice changed as a 
result of the fall (Torrance 1976: 47). He argues that Christ appropriated fallen nature 
without committing sin and so from within disobedient and sinful human nature he lived 
a sinless and obedient life, thus 'he converted our disobedient human being back into 
true filial relation to the heavenly Father' (Torrance 1990: 23 1). 
Torrance does not define how Christ can be sinful yet not actually commit sin 
and for this reason his Christology is vulnerable to Crisp's criticism (Crisp 2007: 93- 
106); however, Torrance argues that those doctrines of redemption which are an 
external exchange between the Son and the Father cut off the person of Christ from his 
work of redemption and that this is unsatisfactory since Christ mediates reconciliation, 
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like revelation, in his own being (Torrance 1990: 23 1). Torrance's doctrine of atoning 
incarnation is built on his argument that the fallen nature which characterises all human 
beings was assumed by Christ at the incarnation. To argue that it was an essentially 
different human nature, one which was not fallen and could not sin, is to deny the 
reality of the incarnation and to throw doubt upon the atonement as anything other than 
an arbitrary exchange. Further if Christ was unable to sin then his victory over 
temptation can have neither moral nor vicarious significance. 
Torrance's position that it was our actual fallen human nature that Christ 
assumed is supported by Gunton and Hart. Gunton comments that it was our sinful 
nature and not some idealised human nature that Christ assumed. Ile asks 'if Christ bore 
the flesh of unfallen Adam... what is his saving relation to us in our lostness? ' (Gunton 
1992: 52, emphasis Gunton). Hart comments that if Christ's human nature is such that it 
is not possible for him to sin then all talk of obedience and victory over temptation is 
emptied of meaning (Hart 1995: 380. He goes on to comment that the bearing of a 
human nature by Christ which is not exempted from the possibility of sin brings a risk 
of 'frustration and failure' to God's plan of redemption, but he asks: 
is it not at least worth posing the question whether some such almighty risk is 
not intrinsic in the scandal of the message of a God who empties himself and 
embraces the life of flesh in order to redeem it? (Hart 1995: 54). 
So while there is a gap in Torrance's argument he presents a strong case for an atoning 
incarnation which necessitates some form of the Barth/Irving position on the fallen 
humanity of Christ. 
1.7.3 The paradox of revelation in Barth's theology 
There are many similarities in the writings of Torrance and Barth on revelation 
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in Christ and Torrance is rightly regarded as a Barthian, yet, there are important 
differences between them. The most significant is that while Torrance emphasises that 
in Christ the hidden, unknown and unknowable God reveals himself, Barth draws back 
from such a position and more subtly, even paradoxically, stresses that in the human 
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person and nature of Jesus Christ God hides or veils himself (Barth 1933: 98). 
Commentators draw attention to this aspect of Barth's theology (e. g. Gorringe 
1999: 103). In Barth's theology God takes form for us in Christ, but as Hunsinger puts it, 
(without dissolving the divine hiddenness' (Hunsinger 1991: 76). 
In Barth's theology there is veiling in the act of revelation in Christ. Taking 
flesh as Jesus Christ both enables and limits God's self-revelation (Barth 1957: 52). This 
means that God cannot be possessed or colonised. He is always sovereign in and of his 
act of revelation (Gorringe 1999: 138,103). While the idea of God being hidden in 
Christ is not entirely absent from Torrance his overall emphasis is on the actuality and 
objectivity of divine revelation in Christ. In Christ we can know God as he is in himself, 
even though in all of our knowledge of him God remains the controlling subject. This 
actual and objective self-revelation in Christ forms the basis of Torrance's 
epistemology. Torrance writes: 
Christian dogmatics is the pure science of theology in which, as in every pure 
science, we seek to discover the fundamental structure and order in the nature of 
things and to develop basic forrns of thought about them as our understanding is 
allowed to be controlled by them from beyond our individualism (Torrance 
1969a: 338). 
Although God's self-disclosure in Christ differs from all other facts and objects of 
knowledge Torrance depends upon the objective nature of God's self-revelation for his 
placing of theology among the special sciences. In the context of a discussion of the 
nature of theological knowledge he speaks of 'the kind of knowledge that is forced upon 
us when we are true to the facts we are up against' (Torrance 1969a: 341). Despite this 
58 CE Mc Cormack 1997: 249f. 
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emphasis on objectivity Torrance argues that God remains in control of all of our 
knowledge of him (Torrance 1969a: 299f). 
Torrance is influenced in his understanding of revelation by his work on the 
relationship between theology and the natural sciences and although he is careful never 
to argue that God is an object of human enquiry he comes close to giving this 
impression (Torrance 1969a: 5 I f). 59 In emphasising the objectivity of revelation in 
Christ Torrance is in danger of giving God into our hands. In some places in his 
theology he recognises this problem and acknowledges that revelation is an act of God 
as sovereign lord (Torrance 1999: 140). He acknowledges that the truth of theological 
statements is beyond our control; they speak of a truth beyond human expression or 
knowledge (Torrance 1999: 146). The truthfulness of theological statements resides not 
in themselves but in God and part of their truthfulness is an acknowledgement of their 
essential inadequacy. The fact that theological statements do, indeed must, fall short of 
the reality of God is essential to their 'propriety and precision' for in their very 
inadequacy they point to their justification in and by God alone; this is another facet of 
the epistemology of grace. Torrance argues that the fact that our theological statements 
fall short of the reality to which they point enables them to be used by God 
(Torrance 1999: 156). The main difference between Barth and Torrance is one of 
language rather than substance. There is an untidiness, even a playfulness in Barth 
which is absent from Torrance. Despite this difference in tone and language their 
positions are close to one another. 
1.7.4 Discussion 
The importance of Torrance's assertion that it is fallen human nature that is 
assumed by Christ at the incarnation for his understanding of revelation lies in the unity 
of revelation and reconciliation in his theology. It has already been noted that for 
Torrancc rcvclation is pcrsonal rathcr than propositional and it is in itsclf thcrcfore 
59 Cf. Barth 1957: 22f. 
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reconciling. It is fallen humanity that is alienated from God and so divine revelation 
includes reconciliation with fallen humanity which takes place in the person of Jesus 
Christ. 
1.8 The historical Jesus and systematic theology 
Torrance argues that we can only know God in his self-revelation and that it is in 
Christ that God has revealed himself. We have noted that he develops this from his long 
and sustained engagement with Barth. For both theologians the basic datum with which 
all Christian theology must engage is God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ. We will 
argue in Chapters Two and Three that although this Christocentric understanding of 
revelation is a determining factor in Torrance's exposition of revelation in Scripture and 
nature, it points to a more fundamental gracing of our knowledge of God. 
Despite the Christocentric nature of Barth's theology he has been accused of 
making the historical Jesus little more than a cipher in his theology; of making the fact 
of Jesus more important than his person and life. For example Wright argues that 
although Barth's theology testifies to the importance of the historical Jesus: 'at no point 
... has the full impact of the historical evidence been allowed to influence very much 
the dogmatic conclusions reached' (Wright 1996: 26). McGrath makes the same point 
when he writes that: 'For Barth ... it is the risen Christ rather than the historical Jesus, 
who is central to theology' (McGrath 1994: 129). Again he comments that in the Church 
Dogmatics Barth's Thristology is construed with only the most superficial of contacts 
with human history' (McGrath 1994: 135). 
Whether this is ajustified critique of Barth's theology does not lie within the 
scope of this thesis. However, we have noted that Torrance's theology is also 
Christologically founded; therefore the question of the relationship of the historical 
Jesus to systematic theology is important in any attempt to understand Torrance's 
theology and epistemology. Torrance's conviction that theological epistemology is built 
upon Christological foundations originates in his engagement with Barth. When 
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Torrance develops the Christological. grounding of divine self-revelation in dialogue 
with the natural sciences he argues that Jesus Christ is the place within space and time 
that God reveals himself to creation. 60 
If, as Torrance argues, all of our knowledge of God comes from his self- 
revelation in Christ and if all theology must conform to the self-revelation of God 
(Torrance 1965: 128), then it follows that the person of Jesus Christ is of crucial 
importance for systematic theology. When Torrance addresses the relationship of the 
historical Jesus to systematic theology he comments that the phrase 'the historical 
Jesus' is ambiguous. He asks: 
Do we mean the Jesus as we reconstruct his life and teaching by historico- 
critical method from the evidence handed down to us? Or do we mean the Jesus 
who actually existed, the Jesus of history? ... It ought to be the case that the Jesus at whom we arrive through sifting the evidence handed down to us is 
essentially the same as the Jesus of history. But he is not (Torrance 1984b: 51 1). 
According to Torrance those who have undertaken a quest for the historical Jesus have 
in fact abstracted him from his theological context (Torrance 1984b: 515). He argues 
that this theological context is more than merely an interpretative gloss added on to 
Jesus by the evangelists; rather his theological context is intrinsic to the Jesus of history 
(Torrance 1984b: 524,520). Historical critics attempt to interpret Jesus apart from the 
culture and structure of meaning inherent to both Jesus and the gospels and in doing so 
they force Jesus into their own cultural context which is entirely alien to him (Torrance 
1984b: 515). Torrance argues that this abstraction of Jesus from his proper context is the 
result of a dualism in western thought whereby events are detached from their meaning 
and relocated into the alien context of the historical critic. He comments that the 
'historical Jesus' is a 'positivist construct' who bears little relation to the actual Jesus of 
history (Torrance 1984b: 5160.6 1 Torrance argues that this 'historical Jesus' is: 
60 See section 1.3.2. 
61 This is essentially the position of Martin Kahler in The so-called historical Jesus and 
the historic, biblical Christ. Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1964, translated and edited by 
C. E. Braaten. 
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a Christ who never existed, a Jesus clothed in alien conceptualities, indeed a 
mythological Christ who then needs to be demythologized, but who cannot be 
demythologized without inevitably being subjected to the same instruments to 
new mythologizing constructs, which just because they are artificial fail their 
authors again and again (Torrance 1984b: 518f). 
According to Torrance the dualism inherent in attempts to reconstruct the 'historical 
Jesus' originates in what Heidegger calls a 'secession of logos from being' (Torrance 
1984b: 5 19). 62 He argues that in modem scholarship, as represented by historical 
criticism, there is a disjunction of empirical from theoretical components; he further 
argues that this leaves us with a Jesus who has been removed from his own intrinsic 
meaning and significance. Torrance argues that: 
they [i. e. historical critics] seek to understand the historical Jesus apart from any 
inherent logos, apart from his intrinsic significance; and when they have 
produced their so-called "data ... .. the assured results" of their scholarship, they 
expect the theologian to build his theology upon them. But that is not something 
that the scientific theologian can do, for the "data" thus produced have been 
severely distorted by having their natural logos or intrinsic significance tom 
from them (Torrance 1984b: 520). 
As a systematic and 'scientific' theologian Torrance attempts to work 'with the 
inherence of logos and being' (Torrance 1984b: 521); that is he tries to keep together the 
theoretical and empirical components of knowledge. Torrance grounds his 
understanding of the Jesus of history in his understanding of the contingence of the 
universe. 63 Ile argues that historical events are part of the contingent processes of the 
universe and have their own contingent intelligibility in terms of which they can be 
64 understood (Torrance 1984b: 522). Torrance continues his argument by stating that the 
'historical Jesus' of the critics is in fact a flight from reality; that this is a figure 
'denuded of his intrinsic intelligibility' (Torrance 1984b: 524). He concludes by arguing 
62 Torrance does not supply the reference in Heidegger. 
63 See section 5.2.7 on contingence and rationality. 
64 Torrance writes about the 'besetting temptation of scholars to abstract the 
phenomenal surface from its objective or ontological ground, whether at the level of the 
biblical narratives or at the level of the Jesus to which they witness' (Torrance 
1984b: 522). 
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that the 'actual Jesus Christ is the Christ clothed with his own significance, the 
evangelical and theological Christ' (Torrance 1984b: 524). 
There is a problem with Torrance's position. He correctly criticises those 
approaches to the historical Jesus which abstract him from his historical and theological 
context, however, he simply assumes that the gospels present us with a Jesus in his 
intrinsic theological context and not with a context supplied by the evangelist or the 
early church. 
Despite this problem Torrance's reflections on the historical Jesus indicate how 
a Christologically founded theology represents a rapprochement between systematic and 
biblical theology. A recent work by Bauckharn makes a similar point to Torrance's 
argument from the perspective of biblical scholarship. Bauckharn argues that the 
gospels are close to the eyewitnesses of Jesus' life and teaching, and in fact represent 
eyewitness testimony. 65 He argues that this testimony conveys both fact and meaning, 
and that understanding the gospels as testimony 'enables us to surmount the dichotomy 
between the so-called historical Jesus and the so-called Christ of faith (Bauckharn 
2006: 473). In a comment which reminds us of Torrance's call to keep together the 
empirical and theoretical components of knowledge, Bauckham writes that in testimony 
'fact and meaning coinhere' (Bauckharn 2006: 505). 
The importance of Torrance's discussion of the relationship of the actual Jesus 
of history who comes with his own intrinsic theological context of meaning for his 
epistemology is that here we find an example of what Torrance calls scientific method 
at work. The role of the enquirer is to investigate the contingent reality of the universe 
as it is in itself, not abstracted from its proper context but in its inherent meaning and 
network of relationships. Torrance's point is that those who abstract the Jesus of history 
from his own context and re-present him in another are not engaging with reality but 
with something of their own creation. We will see in chapters four and five a similar 
insistence of interpreting the events in the universes in their own proper context in 
65 See especially Bauckham 2006 chapters five, six and seven. 
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Einstein's writings on scientific method. 66 
1.9 Revelation in Christ and the natural sciences 
There is a current renaissance of Torrance scholarship which focuses on the 
relationship between theology and the natural sciences in his writings. See for example 
the works by Weightman, McGrath and Colyer. 67 His attempt to set theology among the 
sciences as an equal is part of his larger project to think through the implications of the 
doctrine of revelation in Christ for every area of systematic theology. His placing of 
theology among the sciences is derived from his understanding of God's revelation in 
Christ; just as science progresses by the examination of given reality so theology 
progresses by considering God's actual self-revelation. 
Torrance develops his understanding of science and scientific method from 
Einstein and Polanyi. From Polanyi he takes the understanding that faith has an 
important role in the natural sciences for it is an important component in the ultimate 
beliefs which are part of the essential background to all scientific activity. He also takes 
from Polanyi an emphasis upon the personal dimension to all knowledge. 68 
Torrance first engages with the relationship between theology and science in the 
Hewett lectures of 1959. The published version of these lectures, Theological Science 
(Torrance 1969a), forms the basis of his engagement with the natural sciences, 
particularly physics. Torrance's attempt to position theology among the sciences is 
directly dependent upon his doctrine of revelation in Christ. 
Torrance defines scientific knowledge as that knowledge which comes from 
letting the realities under investigation disclose themselves to us; it is the disciplined 
attention of the mind to a given reality (See Torrance I 969a: 9). Given this definition of 
66 See section 5.3.1. 
67 Weightman, C. 1994, Theology in a Polanyian Universe; McGrath, A. 1998, The 
Foundations ofDialogue in Science and Religion; Colyer, E. M. 2001 a, How to Read T 
F. Torrance: Understanding his Trinitarian and Scientific Theology. 
68 See especially Torrance 1980c: 61-7 1, and Torrance 1984: 107-17 1. 
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scientific knowledge we can see why Barth's insistence that we begin our theological 
investigation not with speculative theology but with revealed theology is so important 
for Torrance. God's self-revelation is the given, the 'object' of the investigation for 
theological science. Torrance argues that Christian theology arises from the actual 
knowledge of God as he has made himself known to us in Jesus Christ, therefore 
theological method is positive or actual, and not speculative; it is a-posteriori rather 
than a-priorL A point which Torrance makes repeatedly in his works on science and 
theology is that theological science is a properly objective science. Objectivity is neither 
detachment from nor indifference towards the object; for detachment is neither desirable 
nor possible. Objectivity in a scientific context is a fidelity to the actual nature of the 
object (Torrance 1969a: 55). There is an obviously Christological element to theological 
science for its proper object is God as he has revealed himself in human being and in 
human history, that is in Christ (Torrance 1969a: 343). For Torrance Jesus Christ is the 
self-revelation of God within the structures of space and time, and it is therefore Jesus 
Christ who is the object of scientific investigation. When our knowledge of God is 
based upon Christ, i. e. God as he has revealed himself to us, we can know that it is 
based upon the reality of God as he is in himself (Torrance 1980b: 40), hence Torrance's 
insistence on theology focusing on the actual historical Jesus in his inherent 
intelligibility. 
We noted in section 1.8 that Torrance regards the Jesus of history as a 
contingent event in the created universe who is encountered by theology with his own 
contingent intelligibility by which he can be properly understood. Jesus is a contingent 
event or fact of the universe in which God has disclosed himself. The very contingence 
of the Jesus of history means that our knowledge of God rests on Jesus Christ only 
because he is the place in the universe of space and time where God has chosen to meet 
us. Our knowledge of God actually rests upon the decision of God to make himself 
known, and only contingently upon Jesus Christ. This may seem a small point but it 
becomes important when, in chapters two and four, we examine Torrance's exposition 
of revelation in Scripture and nature, for we will see that there is a contradiction at the 
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heart of his understanding of divine self-revelation; and that this contradiction is 
explained by our argument that the doctrine of justification by grace is more 
fundamental to Torrance's epistemology than revelation in Christ. 
1.10 Conclusion 
The great strength of Torrance's theology is that he works through the 
implications of revelation in Christ for all aspects of theology and theological 
epistemology; he does this in fruitful dialogue with the natural sciences, particularly 
with Einstein's general theory of relativity. 
Torrance's theological epistemology is founded on his understanding of 
revelation in Christ, but there is something even more fundamental to his theological 
epistemology. Torrance argues that God's revelation of himself in Christ in the universe 
of space and time is objective and gracious; and this forms the basis of his argument 
that a Christologically founded theology is a scientific theology. Revelation in Christ 
also shapes his understanding of revelation in Scripture and in nature. The doctrine of 
revelation in Christ in Torrance's theology is significantly influenced by his encounter 
with Barth, Einstein and Polanyi. He is thoroughly grounded in the reformed tradition 
and works through the epistemological significance of the reformed doctrine of 
justification by grace; he is no less grounded in the patristic tradition, particularly the 
Nicene fathers, and he works through the epistemological implications of the 
homoousion. 
From Barth Torrance derives the central importance of Christology for all 
human understanding of God. The unity of act and being in God, derived from Barth, is 
fundamental to Torrance's theology as it enables him to make a connection between 
history and eternity, between God and creation, in the life and person of Christ rather 
than by arguing for any logically necessary bridge. Another element of Barth's doctrine 
of revelation that is important for Torrance's theology is the notion of personal 
revelation: that what God reveals to us in Christ is himself and not propositions about 
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divine nature. Polanyi's work on the personal component of all knowledge is also 
significant for Torrance's epistemology. This leads Torrance to the unity of revelation 
and reconciliation in Christ. An important component of his Christology is the vicarious 
humanity of Christ. Torrance argues that Christ is not only God's self-revelation, the 
Word made flesh; he is also in his incarnate life humanity's response to the Father, flesh 
made word. Torrance follows Barth in arguing that it was fallen human nature that 
Christ assumed at the incarnation. While there are problems with this understanding of 
Christ's humanity Torrance argues that if the atonement is to be more than an external 
contract between the Father and the Son then an understanding of atoning incarnation is 
needed which entails Christ redeeming fallen human nature from within. There is a 
logical next step to universalism in Torrance's doctrine of the vicarious humanity of 
Christ which he refuses to take. 
Implicit in Torrance's understanding of the epistemology of grace is Calvin's 
doctrine of the total perversity of human nature. Torrance holds the doctrine of total 
depravity for the same reason as Calvin. Both men derive their anthropology from their 
understanding of grace; total grace implies a total fall. Torrance's anthropology is 
derived from and driven by his epistemology of grace. 
In Torrance's theology revelation is an act of God's sovereign grace. Human 
beings can only have knowledge of God because God has chosen to reveal himself in 
Christ. Like Barth Torrance operates with an epistemology of grace which means that 
God is always sovereign of his self-revelation. Torrance argues that although all human 
language is inadequate to the reality of God, yet it can be used by God to point to 
reality. 
Torrance's dialogue with the natural sciences has tended to give his writing what 
Hunsinger calls 'the atmosphere of the physics lab' (Hunsinger 1991: 11), there is an 
emphasis upon the objectivity of God's self-revelation which Barth avoids in talking of 
God's hiddenness in Christ. There is a sense of logical progression in Torrance's 
writing which is very different from the paradox and dialectics which pervade even the 
later Barth. 
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Two elements of Einstein's thought are particularly important for Torrance: the 
theory of spatial relativity and scientific objectivity. Torrance derives his relational 
understanding of space from his encounter with Einstein which provides further support 
for his Christocentric understanding of revelation. Torrance argues that Jesus Christ is 
the place within the universe of time and space where the transcendent God meets us. In 
terms of epistemology Torrance takes from Einstein a commitment to the object of 
enquiry, even if that object is unique, and argues that the method of enquiry is founded 
upon the reality of the object of enquiry; that is ontology is prior to epistemology. It is 
for this reason that Torrance argues that theology, when it proceeds by reference to the 
given reality of God's self-revelation in Christ, is a scientific activity. 69 In his very 
person Jesus provides the bridge between God and creation; this link enables our 
inadequate and creaturely language and ideas about the reality of God which are derived 
from his self-revelation in Jesus Christ to apprehend something of the reality of the 
transcendent God. 
The element of Polanyi's philosophy which has been of most use to Torrance is 
his understanding of the personal component of all knowledge, including scientific 
knowledge. Torrance does not deny the subjective pole in knowledge but he refuses to 
allow it to dominate his epistemology. 
A Christologically grounded understanding of revelation, such as that offered by 
Torrance, offers the beginning of a way of rapprochement between biblical and 
systematic theology. Torrance's critique of those reconstructions of the historical Jesus 
which remove him from his first century historical and theological context and present 
him in their own cultural context is important but needs to be supplemented by studies 
of the relationship between Jesus and the gospel traditions if his argument from Calvin 
that Jesus comes to us clothed in the gospel is to be substantiated. 
In his theological epistemology Torrance attempts more than a rapprochement 
between biblical and systematic theology; it will be argued that his Christologically 
69 Torrance writes: 'real thinking ... proceeds only by reference to the externally given 
reality' (Torrance 1969a: 288). 
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founded epistemology points to a gracing of all human knowledge and offers a 
rapprochement between theology and the natural sciences. His understanding of 
revelation in Christ is the foundation of his theology and of his work on theological 
method; therefore it significantly shapes his understanding of revelation in Scripture and 
in nature as well as his engagement with the natural sciences. 
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Chapter Two Revelation and Scripture 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter One established that Torrance understands revelation to be personal, 
Christologically founded, and objective. In chapters two and three we will investigate 
how he relates his doctrine of revelation to the Scriptures (chapter two) and to nature 
(chapter three). We have noted that Torrance operates with an epistemology of grace in 
which God is sovereign of his revelation. In his understanding of revelation in Scripture 
Torrance is influenced by the work of Barth as he is in his understanding of revelation 
in Christ. We have noted that Torrance's Christology provides a link between Scripture 
and doctrine in his theology. 70 
Kelsey (1975) notes that most theologians accept that the Bible is an 
authoritative source for Christian theology; however, they use this source in different 
ways. Ile argues that for Barth it is the biblical narrative that is authoritative and that 
this narrative provides theology with a 'nonnative link' to God's self-revelation (Kelsey 
1975: 44f). It is in Christ that God has revealed himself and Scripture is a witness to this 
self-revelation; therefore, Kelsey argues, its authority for Barth is functional (Kelsey 
1975: 47). The essential element missing from Kelsey's interpretation of Barth is 
Scripture as event. For Barth and for Torrance Scripture is more than a record of 
revelation in Christ; it is the divinely provided means used by God to speak his word to 
the church. The dynamic, sovereign and gracious element of Barth's doctrine of 
Scripture is absent from Kelsey's account. As we will see it is the sovereign, gracious 
70 See section 1.8 
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and dynamic elements in Barth's epistemology that are of importance to Torrance's 
development of Barth's doctrine of Scripture. 
Richardson comments that Barth rejects 'multiple sources' for theology. He 
argues that in the Church Dogmatics 'the source of theology is always singular' 
(Richardson 2004: 13). Torrance also holds that there is a single source for theology. For 
Torrance and Barth only God can reveal God. This is as central to Torrance's 
understanding of revelation in Scripture as it is in Barth. It is to God's gracious and 
sovereign self-revelation that we must look for the source of a properly dogmatic 
theology. This insistence upon the unitary source of theology leads to two fundamental 
questions of Barth and Torrance: firstly, what does the 'Word of God' mean for them; 
and secondly, what is the relation of the written Scriptures to the Word of God in their 
theologies? 
This chapter will examine the Barthian background to the way that Torrance 
understands the relationship between Scripture and revelation. We will then examine 
how Torrance approaches the doctrine of Scripture from a reformed perspective. This 
approach makes him sensitive to the dangers of both liberal and fundamentalist 
approaches to the Bible. We will also examine Torrance's understanding of how the 
Bible mediates the word of God; finally we will look at Torrance's understanding of the 
nature of the Bible and its relation to systematic theology. We will see that, despite his 
high regard for the Bible and its substantial role in divine self-revelation, Torrance does 
not attempt to circumvent the normal human processes of understanding which operate 
when any text is interpreted. We will also see that in Torrance's exposition of the place 
of Scripture in divine self-revelation he regards it as more than a record of revelation 
and witness to Christ; it also becomes a place where God encounters us. However, the 
Bible does not become a rival to Christ in God's self-revelation rather the God who 
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graciously reveals himself in the contingent creation in Christ also reveals himself in the 
Scriptures. These two places where divine grace encounters the contingent creation are 
neither rivals nor equals in Torrance's theology. 
2.2 Revelation and Scripture 
ZZI Barth an d Ili e th ree-fold Word of God 
Webster comments that, in his understanding of divine revelation and the 
relationship of the Scriptures to revelation, Barth attempts to bridge the gulf that existed 
in his day, and to a large extent continues, between two different ways of reading the 
Bible. One way is to treat the Bible as a timeless word of God to the church; a second 
way is to read it as a merely historical and human text like all others (Webster 
2000a: 65f). Barth attempts to find a way of reading Scripture that does justice to its 
historical character and its nature as Holy Scripture. For Barth the Bible is a human 
word, but a human word which speaks of God (Barth 1956a: 463). For Barth the Bible is 
a unique human word, it is not simply one religious text among many others; it is a 
human word which points beyond itself to God and to his self-revelation (Barth 
1975: 111). 71 The Bible does not witness to or speak of itself; it speaks of and witnesses 
to God's self-revelation (Barth 1975: 568f). 
McCormack notes that Barth's doctrine of the three-fold form of the word of 
God is first heard in his lectures at G6ttingen in the 1920's (McCormack 1997: 338). 
This concept is fully worked out in the Church Dogmatics. Busch writes that during this 
time Barth debated the understanding of Scripture and its relation to God's revelation 
71 Barth writes: 'What we have in the Bible are human attempts to repeat and reproduce 
this Word of God in human words and thought and specific human situations' (Barth 
1975: 113). 
72 
with members of the faculty at G6ttingen, notably with Emanuel Hirsch. 72 Torrance 
notes that in 1923 Barth entered into a debate with Harnack over his attempt to 
understand the Bible as a witness to God's revelation (Torrance 1962: 8 1). McCormack 
provides a useful summary of what Barth means when he speaks of the 'Word of God in 
its three-fold forin' in the Gbttingen lectures. For Barth the Word of God is first and 
foremost God speaking. McCormack writes: 
The Word of God is first of all the speaking of God which is identical with God; 
identical because it is a speaking by God. Barth calls this form of the Word 
'revelation' (Mc Con-nack 1997: 338). 
It is the second form of the Word of God, the witness of the prophets and apostles, 
which comes to us in the Bible. In the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments we 
find a witness to God's Word recorded by those who encountered divine revelation. The 
third fonn of the Word of God is faithful Christian preaching. For Barth Scripture is not 
itself divine revelation; yet it cannot be separated from revelation either. Rather 
Scripture 'proceeds from' God's self-revelation (Mc Cormack 1997: 339). 
According to Barth the Bible points to God's revelation in two related ways. It is 
the human record of and testimony to God's act of revelation; and it is a text used by 
God as an active witness to his self-revelation. According to Barth the Bible is a witness 
to God's self-revelation in Christ (Barth 1956a: 457). The language of witness is central 
to Barth's understanding of the nature of Scripture; as Webster notes, 'it has a double 
purpose: it gives full weight to the function of Scripture as the bearer of revelation, and 
it does so without taking away from the fact that the Bible is a collection of human 
texts' (Webster 2000a: 65). Barth also regards the Bible as an event (Barth 1975: 109). It 
72 Busch writes: 'Barth contrasted his view of the Bible as evidence of the concrete 
revelation of God with the view of the Bible as a general religious document' (Busch 
1976: 134). 
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is when the Bible truly points us to God's revelation and enables us to see and hear that 
revelation that it becomes one with the word of God. 
Barth takes great care to ensure that his doctrine of Scripture takes nothing away 
from the sovereignty and grace of God in his self-revelation. He does this by 
emphasising both the sovereignty of God in revelation and the role of the Holy Spirit in 
the witness of Scripture. It is only by God's gracious decision that the Bible becomes a 
true witness to God's Word. Barth calls the event by which the Bible becomes the word 
of God a 'miracle of divine grace' (Barth 1956a: 513; see also Barth 1956a: 528). 
Scripture only becomes a true witness of God's self-revelation 'by the Holy Spirit' 
(Barth 1956a: 457). Barth takes care to keep our attention fixed upon God in the act of 
revelation, even when we are considering the witness of Scripture to revelation. 
Barth regards the Bible as a 'sign', and he is determined to take it seriously as 
such (Barth 1956a: 457-459). Scripture is a sign which points us to the revelation of God 
and it is this revelation which is authoritative for the church and for theology. We have 
noted that Barth is trying to do justice to those two opposing ways of understanding the 
Bible. He wants to take it seriously as a human word written by real people in history he 
also wants to take it seriously as God's word. According to Barth the Bible is a human 
word which points beyond itself to God's self-revelation. Barth writes: 
when we... take the humanity of the Bible quite seriously, we must also take 
quite definitely the fact that as a human word it does say something specific, that 
as a human word it points away from itself, that as a word it points towards a 
fact, an object (Barth 1956a: 464). 
Barth treats the Bible as a historical and human text but refuses to treat it in a 
generic way: it is this particular text with which we have to do because it is this 
particular text which is the witness to revelation (Webster 2000a: 67). We see a clear 
parallel with Barth's understanding of revelation in Christ, for it is in this particular 
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historical person, Jesus Christ that God reveals himself, so it is in this particular text, the 
Bible that God witnesses to that self-revelation. 
Barth explores the attitude that this particular text calls for in its readers. He 
argues: 'What is required of readers is that they be shaped at the most fundamental level 
by the miracle of divine speech which encounters us through the text' (Webster 
2000a: 67). We do not master this text; rather the text grips us. Barth writes: 'In order to 
be understood by us, it wants not to be mastered by us, but to lay hold of us' (Barth 
1956a: 471). 
According to Barth the Bible is the historical, human witness of prophets and 
apostles to God's concrete self-revelation in history. More than this the Bible becomes a 
witness to the church of divine revelation by the work of the Holy Spirit. This text is 
one that calls for humility in its readers. Barth's understanding of the nature of Scripture 
allows him to take it seriously as both the word of God to the church and as a human 
and historical word, and thus he is able to bring together two conflicting ways of 
reading the Bible. The final and most important thing to say about Barth's 
understanding of the nature of Scripture is that he keeps our attention on God, not on the 
exegete, the church, or even the Bible itself. Barth's understanding of Scripture allows 
God to remain sovereign, and therefore he retains the gracious nature of God's act of 
self-revelation. 
Thiselton points to a problem with Barth's understanding of the relationship of 
revelation to Scripture and particularly with the role of the Holy Spirit in revelation. He 
comments that Barth's emphasis upon the 'sovereign transcendence of God' together 
with his opposition to the emphasis of Schlcicrmachcr and Ritschl on religious 
experience has led him to imply 'that the Spirit's communication of the Word of God is 
somehow independent of all ordinary processes of human understanding' (Thiselton 
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1980: 89). He quotes an essay on Bultmann in which Barth writes: 'This Word of God 
can only confront and illuminate man as truth and reality if it is seen to run counter to 
his whole natural capacity to understand' (Thiselton 1980: 89, emphasis Thiselton). 73 
The assumption which lies behind Barth's understanding of revelation is that the role of 
the Spirit will be in some sense diminished if it is regarded as working through the 
normal human processes of understanding. Barth simply circumvents the whole 
problem of hermeneutics and is in danger of turning the human authors and readers of 
Scripture into mere ciphers. 
ZZ2 Torrance's reading of Barth on revelation and Scripture 
Torrance formulated his understanding of Scripture early in his academic career 
while lecturing at Auburn seminary in 1938. His 1938 lectures show the marked 
influence of Barth on his understanding of revelation in the Bible (McGrath 1999: 52). 
Torrance notes Barth's doctrine of the three fold-nature of the word of God in 
revelation: namely revelation in Christ; revelation in Scripture and revelation in the 
church's proclamation (Torrance 1962: 109). 
Torrance deals in some detail with Barth's understanding of the relationship of 
revelation and the written Scriptures in his study of Barth's early theology (Torrance 
1962). Two themes from Barth's theology emerge as of importance for understanding 
how he relates the Bible to revelation; these themes are important for understanding 
Torrance's own doctrine of Scripture. These are the Bible as witness to revelation and 
the Bible as a miracle of God's grace. 
One element in Barth that particularly impresses Torrance is his attempt to take 
seriously the Bible as Holy Scripture. It is not only a witness to God's self-revelation; it 
73 Thiselton quotes from Barth's essay 'Rudolph Bultmann. - An Attempt to Understand 
Him' in Bartsch ed. Kerygma and Myth, volume 2 London 1962, pages 83-132. 
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is 'the original and legitimate witness' (Torrance 1962: 119). This text and no other is 
the means which God freely and graciously uses in order to communicate with 
humanity. Barth treats the Bible as an historical document and as Holy Scripture, as 
writings that originate in and bear witness to an act of divine self-revelation within 
history. The biblical texts are themselves a human witness to a divine act. They are not 
in themselves the revelation of God; instead their role is to point to God and his act of 
self-revelation in Christ (Torrance 1962: 8 1). 
Torrance argues that in Barth's doctrine of Scripture we find a dialectic of 
revelation and hiddenness. There is both an historical, hýman element and at the same 
time a divine element to the Scriptures. The Bible is not revelation; however, it is the 
gracious and divinely provided witness to revelation; no more but certainly no less. 
Torrance writes: 
The Church finds in the Bible the primary datum, which is not to be separated 
from it nor to be confused with it, which is veiled in the Bible as much as it is 
unveiled through it, which is both hidden and revealed, namely the Word of God 
in primary form, Revelation (Torrance 1962: 1 19). 74 
The reason for this dialectic in the doctrine of Scripture is the dual origin of the Bible. It 
is the writing of fallible and sinful people yet through these people and their writings 
God speaks. God speaks to us in the Scriptures, but not directly. Instead God 
communicates through 'a transient and imperfect human medium' (Torrance 1962: 120). 
God chooses a very human word as the form in which he communicates his divine word 
to us. Torrance captures the subtlety of Barth's doctrine of Scripture. The Bible is the 
divinely appointed means of God's self-revelation, yet by its very nature it also presents 
a barrier to revelation. Torrance writes of a 'wall' that exists in the Bible between the 
74 Note that when writing on revelation in the Bible Torrance uses language that is 
characteristic of Barth on revelation in Christ, namely veiling and unveiling. 
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reader and revelation (Torrance 1962: 121) and this wall is the nature of the Bible itself. 
Torrance maintains the personal rather than propositional nature of revelation in 
Scripture no less than in Christ. 
In his exposition of Barth's theology Torrance emphasises the sovereign grace 
of God as he reveals himself through the witness of the Scriptures. When God speaks to 
us out of Scripture it is not as a result of our wrestling with Scripture; rather it is 'the 
sovereign mystery, the downright miracle of God's grace' (Torrance 1962: 104). When 
God communicates with us out of the Scriptures he is lord, not only of the Bible's 
witness, but also of our hearing of that word from Scripture. This point is important in 
Torrance's dialogue with the evangelical tradition in North America where he takes 
great care to keep our focus upon God rather than upon the text of Scripture. 75 
Torrance and Barth attempt to hold together an understanding of the Bible as 
both an historical text and at the same time as the word of God to the church. They both 
resist treating the Bible as one religious text among many; rather they hold onto the 
unique place of the Bible in revelation without circumventing the sovereignty and grace 
of God in his self-revelation. Both emphasise the particularity of the Bible and its 
unique place in revelation that is analogous to, and derived from, the uniqueness and 
particularity of Christ in revelation. Torrance is clearly dependent upon Barth for his 
understanding of the nature and place of the Bible in revelation but he develops Barth's 
work in new and creative ways. 
ZZ3 Discussion 
Torrance clearly regards his own understanding of the role of the Bible in God's 
self-revelation as similar to, if not identical with, Barth's. Each lays stress on the Bible 
75 See section 2.3.2. 
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as a divinely provided human text which becomes the vehicle of revelation by which is 
meant a witness to Christ the living Word of God. Each lays stress on the particularity 
of the Bible; its place in the scheme of God's self-revelation does not lie in it being an 
example of religious literature, rather it lies in the divine decision that this text be a 
witness to the word of God. 
Barth has been criticised by Thiselton for circumventing the normal human 
processes of understanding in his exposition of the place of the Bible as witness to 
revelation. 
For this thesis it is important to note two particular emphases of Torrance's 
understanding of the place and role of the Bible in revelation. In his debate with 
evangelical fundamentalism he argues that God always remains sovereign of his 
revelation (see section 2.3.2); it is not something to be discovered but is the result of a 
divine decision and act to reveal himself. A second point to note is that when Torrance 
speaks of the nature of the Scriptures he does so in terms which are similar to those he 
uses of revelation in Christ, namely when he refers to the transient and imperfect 
medium that God uses when speaking through the Bible (Torrance 1962: 120) it is 
reminiscent of his insistence that it is fallen and fallible human nature that God the Son 
assumes at the incamation. 
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2.3 Scripture and revelation in Torrance's theology 
Z3.1 Torrance's early writing 
In Torrance's introduction to the catechisms of the reformed church he presents 
the reformed understanding of the relationship between Christ and Scripture and this 
76 See section 1.7.2. 
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informs his theology. His interpretation of the reformed understanding of the 
relationship between Christ and Scripture is shaped by Kierkegaard whose existentialist 
philosophy also influenced Barth. According to Torrance Christian truth is unique in 
nature because Jesus Christ is himself that truth. Torrance writes: 
As Kierkegaard put it, this is Truth in the form of personal being, Truth which is 
identical with the Person of the Teacher. But we must go further that that. It is 
Christ clothed with His Gospel who is the Truth, for this is unique Truth in 
which Christ's person and His Message are inseparably one (Torrance 
1959: xxxii). 
Torrance takes the phrase 'Christ clothed with His Gospel' from Calvin (Torrance 
1959: lxxxi). This is a succinct statement of the reformed doctrine that the Word of God 
refers primarily to Jesus Christ and only secondarily to the written Scriptures. This 
doctrine means that we can only know Jesus Christ the Word of God as he meets us in 
those Scriptures. Torrance argues that the clothing which Calvin refers to is not only 
Christ's human nature which he assumed at the incarnation (Torrance 1959: lxxxi); it 
also refers to the gospel which Christ proclaimed in his words and life. Torrance argues: 
The only Christ we know is Christ clothed with His Gospel, and that is Christ 
with all His human life and historical acts and His self-communication to us 
through them (Torrance 1959: lxxxiii). 
Torrance cites Kierkegaard again when he writes that in the incarnation of Christ 
'the Absolute fact has become a historical Fact' (Torrance 1959: xxxiii). The divine truth 
is communicated by contingent historical and personal means through the words and 
writings of human beings. We see here in Torrance the same concern that we saw in 
Barth -a determination to treat the Bible as a historical text while not forgetting that it is 
also God's word to the church. Torrance, like Barth, attempts to do justice to two ways 
of reading the Bible that are often set in conflict with one another. There is a parallel 
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here with the incarnation forjust as the particular, fallen human nature of Jesus is the 
self-revelation of God in history, so the particular, fallible human words of Scripture 
become the means of God's witness to that self-revelation. 
Z3.2 Theproblem offundamentalism 
In his treatment of revelation and its relation to the written Scriptures of the Old 
and New Testaments Torrance deals with the issue of fundamentalism in Christian 
theology. He is particularly concerned with the question of how revelation is mediated 
by Scripture in fundamentalist approaches to the Bible. For Torrance Christian theology 
must always be related in some way to the Bible; however this central role of the 
Scriptures for the church and theology brings with it the danger of focusing on the 
biblical text instead of God. Gray notes that Torrance criticises fundamentalism for 
tending to draw doctrines directly from the surface of the text of Scripture and failing to 
see that the text is supposed to draw the reader into a deeper reality (Gray 1980: 304). 
Fundamentalism tends to treat revelation as primarily propositional or doctrinal rather 
than personal. In the debate between 'liberal' and 'conservative' understandings of 
Scripture in Western theology Torrance manages to avoid the pitfalls of both 
approaches. Against liberal approaches he argues that when theology seeks to address 
God's self-revelation this revelation is mediated to us by the Bible (Torrance 1999: 84, 
94). He argues that the word of God comes to us clothed in the written text of the Bible; 
and so Christian theology cannot avoid a serious engagement with the Scriptures 
(Torrance 1959: lxxxiii). Against fundamentalism we have already noted that he refuses 
to allow the text of the Bible to replace personal encounter with the living Word as the 
primary meaning of revelation, for revelation according to Torrance is a personal self 
giving of God. 
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In Torrance's theology there is a real objectivity to revelation because the source 
of revelation is God, not our religious experience, not something that arises from the 
human mind; rather it is God revealing himself to us in an intelligible and articulate way 
(Torrance 1999: 85). Fundamentalist traditions within the Christian church affirm the 
objectivity of God"s revelation. In criticising a wrong emphasis on the Bible in 
fundamentalist theology, Torrance does not vitiate the objectivity of God's self- 
revelation as mediated in the Scriptures. He writes of God's revelation 'assuming the 
form of human speech and writing' (Torrance 1999: 85). The problem that Torrance 
identifies in Christian fundamentalism is that it sees revelation as being inherent in the 
text of the Scriptures rather than being an action of God to whom they point. The 
fundamentalist understanding of revelation is static and propositional rather than 
dynamic and personal. In place of God's self-revelation mediated through Scripture 
evangelical fundamentalism substitutes 'an infallible Bible and a set of rigid evangelical 
beliefs' (Torrance 1999: 17). Torrance's greatest criticism of evangelical 
fundamentalism is not the doctrines which are held by fundamentalists; rather it is they 
hold their evangelical beliefs in a manner which is inherently inconsistent with the way 
that those beliefs originated in God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ who is the incarnate 
77 Word (Torrance 1999: 16). 
Torrance acknowledges that there are strengths in the tradition he criticises; he 
recognises that evangelical fundamentalism 'is passionately dedicated to preserving the 
integrity of the biblical faith' (Torrance 1999: 16). However, he argues that 
fundamentalism 'rejects the fact that revelation must be continually given and received 
in a living relation with God' (Torrance 1999: 16). The living God is displaced by a 
written text and instead of objectivity in revelation we have the objectification of 
77 Torrance writes: 'revelation must be continually given and received in a living 
relation with God' (Torrance 1999: 16). 
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revelation. This is not a minor issue; for Torrance what is at stake is the sovereignty and 
grace of God in his self-revelation. For fundamentalism the source of revelation is not 
God but a written text whereas for Torrance the source of revelation is always God. 
Fundamentalism denies the sovereignty of God in his self-revelation (Torrance 
1999: 17). 
Torrance accuses those who hold a static understanding of revelation of 
epistemological dualism. He writes that: 
fundamentalism operates with a rigid framework of beliefs which have a 
transcendent origin and which are certainly appropriated through encounter with 
God in his self-revelation and as such have an objective pole of reference and 
control, but these beliefs are not applied in a manner consistent with their 
dynamic origin and nature. Instead of being open to the objective pole of their 
reference in the continual self-giving of God and therefore continually revisable 
under its control, they are given a finality and rigidity in themselves as 
evangelical beliefs, and are clamped down upon Christian experience and 
interpretation of divine revelation through the Holy Scriptures. Thus they are 
endowed with a fixity at the back of the fundamentalist mind, where they are 
evidently secure from critical questioning, not only on the part of skeptical 
liberals and other freethinkers, but on the part of a divine self-revealing which is 
identical in its content with the very Being of God himself. At this point the 
epistemological dualism underlying fundamentalism cuts off the revelation of 
God in the Bible from God himself and his continuous self-giving through 
Christ and in the Spirit, so that the Bible is treated as a self-contained corpus of 
divine truths in propositional form endowed with an infallibility of statement 
which provides the justification felt to be needed for the rigid framework of 
belief within which fundamentalism barricades itself (Torrance 1999: 16f). 
Torrance criticises fundamentalism for replacing trust in God with trust in the 
Bible thereby turning the Bible into a collection of infallible statements and excising 
God from having a continuing role in the church as the God who constantly reveals 
himself through the Scriptures. Fundamentalism gives the Bible primacy over God 
within revelation and therefore within Christian theology (Torrance 1999: 18). As 
Torrance argues fundamentalism sees doctrines as 'built up from ideas deduced from 
biblical statements regarded as logical propositions' (Torrance 1976: 7). 
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Torrance contrasts this propositional understanding of revelation with scientific 
theology which recognises that the text points the reader to a deeper reality (Gray 
1980: 304), the reality of God's own person. In Torrance's attempt to penetrate beneath 
the surface of the text to the reality to which it points we see the influence of the 
patristic homoousion, of Barth's insistence upon the unity of Act and Being in God, and 
of Michael Polanyi's epistemology. 78 Torrance argues that: 
In a scientific theology, ... we are concerned not with thinking thoughts, 
far less 
with thinking statements themselves, but with thinking realities through thoughts 
and statements, and with developing an understanding of God from his self- 
revelation mediated to us by the Holy Scriptures in the Church, in which the 
connections we think are objectively and ontologically controlled by the 
intrinsic connections of God's self- communication as Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit (Torrance 1976: 8, emphasis Torrance). 
Torrance argues that fundamentalism's static and dualist understanding of 
revelation has implications for Christology. He argues that in fundamentalist theology 
the Bible has precedence over the reality of God's self-revelation in Christ and in the 
Spirit. This impinges upon one of the key doctrines of the Christian faith, that Jesus 
Christ is consubstantial with God the Father. At the heart of the Nicene understanding 
of the Christian faith is the doctrine of the homoousion; the implication of which is that 
God is in himself what he is towards us in his self-revelation in Christ. 79 Torrance 
writes that the doctrine of the consubstantiality of the incarnate son with the Father 'was 
a hermeneulical as well as a theological instrument' (Torrance 198 8a: 129, emphasis 
Torrance); this means not simply that we apply the categories of divinity to Jesus Christ, 
rather we look to the person of Christ to understand who God is. It is in Jesus Christ the 
living Word that God has revealed himself to us. 
78 See for example Michael Polanyi, The Study ofMan Chicago 1959, cited by Gray 
1980: 303. 
79 Torrance writes: 'Everything depends ... on the relation that obtains between Jesus Christ the incarnate Son and God the Father' (Torrance 1988a: I 11). 
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Torrance argues that when fundamentalism looks to Scripture instead of to 
Christ for the source of God's self-revelation it makes the same mistake as theological 
liberalism; both repudiate the sovereignty of God and his self-revelation; both are 
unwilling to allow God to be the judge and source 'of human conceptions and 
statements about him' (Torrance 1999: 18). One implication of the epistemological 
significance of the doctrine ofjustification by grace is that even the Bible must submit 
to God. The Bible stands as a witness to revelation because it points those who seek to 
know God away from itself to Jesus Christ the living Word of God who is himself the 
truth of God to which the Bible stands as witness. 
A further problem with the fundamentalist understanding of Scripture relates to 
one of the central reformation doctrines, the free grace of God. Torrance draws 
epistemological conclusions from the reformation principle ofjustification through 
Christ alone. To be right before God is an act of pure grace. Torrance argues that this 
6means that we and all our vaunted right are utterly called in question before God' 
(Torrance 1999: 18). Ile draws the epistemological conclusion from this doctrine that 
truth or orthodoxy is not something that we can possess in and of ourselves. Our 
carefully and faithfully fonnulated beliefs are called into question by God's revelation; 
and the reason for this is that their truth resides not in themselves but in the one to 
whom they point, therefore they must be continually 'revised in the light of the Truth 
that Jesus Christ is in himself in God' (Torrance 1999: 19). For a fundamentalist reading 
of the Scriptures the propositions derived from the text of the Bible are not in principle 
revisable as their truth lies in themselves as statements and not in the God to whom they 
are supposed to point. 
The static understanding of revelation in fundamentalism means that it is the 
Bible and not the incarnate Son of God which is the ultimate revelation of God; the 
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Bible replaces Christ instead of witnessing to Christ. For Torrance as for Barth the 
unique authority and status of the Bible in relation to divine self-revelation is its 
authority and status as a witness to Jesus Christ. For Torrance the Bible is Holy 
Scripture, not because of what it is in itself, but because of the one to whom it bears 
witness. Jesus Christ is the Word of God incarnate. He is not a reflection of the divine 
light; he is not simply the mediator of that light; Jesus Christ is the light and the written 
Scriptures are only what they are 'as enlightened by him and as they ... bear witness to 
him beyond themselves' (Torrance 1999: 95). If we treat Scripture as the light itself then 
it loses its status because the light which we find in Scripture is a reflection of the light 
of Christ. Torrance explains what he means in this way: when we become obsessed with 
the Bible and lay stress upon the doctrine of inspiration then our attention becomes 
focused on the Bible instead of that to which the Bible is intended to point (Toffance 
1999: 96). When we focus our attention on the Scriptures instead of on the incarnate 
Christ, 'then the light that is in them is turned into a kind of darkness' (Torrance 
1999: 95). 
Torrance argues that we call the Bible Holy Scripture because it is the mediator 
not the originator of the divine light in our world. He writes that 'we rely upon the Bible 
for its guidance in directing our understanding to the Word of God which sounds 
through it, or the Truth of God which shines through it' (Torrance 1999: 96,107). 
Z3.3 The Bible as witness to the Word 
Torrance follows Barth and the reformed tradition in arguing that the Bible, as 
witness to the Word, is potentially the mediator of God's self-revelation. McGrath 
writes that 'Torrance follows the general Barthian approach of regarding the Bible as a 
witness to revelation, which may become the word of God' (McGrath 1999: 13 5 f, 
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emphasis added). Torrance compares the role of the Bible in revelation to a sign, for just 
as a sign performs its semantic function when we attend, not to it, but to the reality 
signified, so the Bible is only able to fulfil what he calls its 'semantic service' when 
subordinated to God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ (Torrance 1999: 96). 80 When the 
Bible intrudes and becomes the immediate object of attention, as in fundamentalism, it 
loses its proper semantic function. The Bible has authority only as mediator of divine 
self-revelation and witness to the Word and not in its own right. It is only as the Bible 
mediates Jesus Christ the Word of God to us that it becomes authoritative in our 
knowledge of God (Torrance 1999: 97). In Torrance's theology the Word of God cannot 
be equated with the biblical writings, 'because the revealing action of God always 
transcends its means' (Gray 1980: 306). However, the word of God is not entirely 
distinct from the written Scriptures either. Torrance argues that Scripture in itself is not 
God's self-revelation; but he argues that it is the graciously provided record of that self- 
revelation and the means by which God reveals himself. 
Torrance argues that God's self-revelation must meet with a faithful response in 
order to be revelation (Torrance 1999: 85). Revelation is only revelation when it is 
received as such .81 However, this recognition and reception must not be thought of as 
something that we can achieve for and of ourselves; this too is God's work and as such 
is a gift of grace. It is not 'an extension of our natural knowledge' (McGrath 
80 Kurt Anders Richardson writes of Torrance's approach to the Bible that 'Scripture is 
inspired, but the knowledge of God cannot be coterminous with a knowledge of 
Scripture' (Richardson 2001: 186). 
81 Torrance writes: 'By revelation is meant... an intelligible, articulate revealing of God 
by God whom we are enabled to apprehend through the creative power of his Word 
addressed to us, yet a revealing of God by God which is actualized within the conditions 
of our creaturely existence and therefore within the medium of our human thought and 
speech' (Torrance 1999: 85). 
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1999: 1340; 82 here we see an application of Torrance's understanding of the vicarious 
humanity of Christ (Torrance 1971: 145). 83 
According to Torrance our knowledge of God is always the result of God's 
creative action (Richardson 2001: 185). We know God only from his self-revelation, by 
his decision that we know him and by his action which enables us to know him. He also 
argues that we know God in the way that he has chosen to be known (Torrance 1995: 5). 
It was 'in the historical-theological context of the worshipping people of God, the 
Church of the Old and New Covenants' (Torrance 1995: 5) that God chose to reveal 
himself This is the situation which gave rise to the writings of the Bible as the divinely 
provided witness to revelation. As Torrance writes: 
They were composed under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and in the 
providence of God have been handed on to us as the written form of the Word of 
God. They are the Scriptures of the people of Israel, for Israel was the selected 
medium of God's revelation in which his Word operated prophetically in the life 
and understanding of a particular historical community in order to provide 
within mankind a place where divine revelation might be translated 
appropriately into human speech and where it might be assimilated and 
understood in a communicable form by all humanity. And they are the 
Scriptures of the Christian Church, for the Church was the appointed sphere in 
which the historical self-revelation through Israel, gathered up and transcended 
and fulfilled in Jesus Christ the Word made flesh, is given an evangelical form 
in the apostolic witness and tradition, kerygma and didache, through which the 
crucified and risen Lord Jesus Christ himself continues to meet men and women 
as the living Word of God and to impart himself to them as the Way, the Truth 
and the Life, apart from whom, as our Lord claimed no one has access to the 
Father (Torrance 1995: 5). 
For this reason the church must always turn to the Bible for the divinely provided 
witness to and mediator of revelation; in the Bible we encounter the word of God in the 
written form in which God has graciously provided it. The fallible human word of 
Scripture becomes the word of God to us. The Bible is both a product of and a witness 
82 McGrath is quoting from Torrance's unpublished lectures on the Christian Doctrine 
of Revelation, delivered at Auburn Seminary in New York State 1938 - 1939. 83 See section 1.5.3. 
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to God's self disclosure in history. Torrance argues that our doctrine of Scripture is 
important for our interpretation of Scripture; for although form and content must be 
distinguished from each other they cannot be separated (Torrance 1995: 6). It was God's 
decision not only that he be known in the life of Israel and the humanity of Jesus but 
also that there be a witness to that self-revelation in the Bible. In the self-revelation of 
God in history and in the divinely provided Scriptures we meet the gracious and 
sovereign God. It is God's sovereign and gracious decision to 'meet' us in the word of 
the Bible. As the divinely provided witness to revelation the Bible becomes a vehicle of 
revelation. The Scriptures are the place where the self-revelation of God is properly 
translated into human language and thought (Torrance 1995: 7, Torrance 1999: 94). 
Torrance often writes of the Bible as a witness to God's self-revelation but he 
also speaks of the Bible as the place where we continue to be able to meet God 
(Torrance 1999: 5). There is a parallel between the way that Torrance understands the 
nature of Christ and his understanding of the nature of the Bible. Just as Torrance 
understands Jesus Christ in his frail, fallible and particular human nature as the place in 
history where we meet God, so he argues that the Jewish and Christian Scriptures 
though a frail and fallible human word, are the divinely appointed and provided place 
where men and women have access to that self-revelation; the place where in fact 'the 
crucified and risen Lord Jesus Christ himself continues to meet men and women as the 
living Word of God' (Torrance 1995: 5). Thus Torrance works through the phrase from 
Calvin that Christ comes to us 'clothed in the Gospel' (Torrance 1959: lxxxi). 84 
84 See section 2.3.1. 
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23.4 Revelation as divine encounter 
As well as being dynamic and personal Torrance argues that revelation is a 
divine event and never an object. We have seen that he argues that the Scriptures 
mediate revelation and therefore while the Bible is not itself revelation, nevertheless 
revelation cannot be separated from Scripture. In this historical human artefact we may 
hear the word of God. Torrance writes that 'God's Word comes to us in a happening 
which is both divine and human in such a way that we hear the divine and the human at 
the same time' (Torrance 1995: 7). Although Torrance's theology is grounded in 
Scripture there is no danger of the Bible eclipsing or replacing the self revealing God. 
Torrance's model for understanding the relationshiP that exists between the 
divine and the human aspects of Scripture is the nature of Christ who, according to the 
definition of Chalcedon, is both human and divine. However, there is an important 
difference. In Jesus Christ the human and the divine are united within one person 
whereas 'in the Bible the divine Word and the human word are only united through 
dependence upon and participation in Christ, that is, sacramentally' (Torrance 1995: 7). 
There is no personal union between the divine and the human in Scripture; instead when 
God uses this human artefact as a means of revelation it remains outside of God's 
person. 85 
In Torrance's theology the written Scriptures have a paradoxical nature. God is 
able to take and use the human word of the Bible and in doing so it becomes the vehicle 
of revelation and reconciliation; however, it originates in and belongs to the human 
sphere which is in need of Christ's redemption (Torrance 1995: 9). God's use of 
Scripture as the instrument of self-revelation is an act of grace; he uses that which is 
'imperfect and inadequate ... faulty and errant' (Torrance 1995: 10) as the means of his 
85 See Luoma 2002: 13 1. 
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reconciling revelation. There is a clear parallel with the incarnation where it is in the 
fallen and sinful human nature assumed by the Son of God that revealing reconciliation 
occurs. Torrance argues that we truly hear the voice of God in the human word of the 
Bible and because the Bible is a truly human word we need no special hermeneutics in 
order to hear God's self-communication (Torrance 1995: 12). 86 
Torrance is rightly regarded as a Trinitarian theologian and his understanding of 
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revelation is not only Christologically founded it is thoroughly Trinitarian. In his 
understanding of divine self-revelation Father, Son and Holy Spirit all have key roles to 
play. The role of the Spirit in revelation is not only in the inspiration of the human 
authors of the biblical texts but also in the subsequent interpretation of those texts. 
Torrance insists that we can only know God through God. This is a constant theme in 
his writings and usually refers to God's self-revelation in Christ; however he also 
considers the role of the Holy Spirit in God's self communication. He writes: 
since God has irreversibly incarnated his self-revelation in Jesus Christ, the 
Word made flesh, there cannot be two ways to knowledge of God, one in Jesus 
Christ and another behind his back, but only one way, through Christ and in his 
Spirit (Torrance 1999: 34). 
In the same work he clarifies the nature of the part played by the Spirit in revelation. He 
argues that the Spirit has a three-fold role in revelation: in the incarnation of the Word 
(Torrance 1999: 15), in the inspiration of Scripture (Torrance 1999: 92f) and in the 
inspiration of the church as the Scriptures are read (Torrance 1999: 119f, 124). 
The statement in the Nicene Creed that the Word of God became incarnate 'by 
the Holy Spirit of the Virgin Mary' is an important part of Torrance's understanding of 
revelation (see for example Torrance 1988a: 61). Similarly, his understanding of the role 
86 Cf. Einstein's comment that the 'whole of science is nothing more than a refinement 
of everyday thinking' (Einstein 1982: 290). 
87 See for example Molnar 2002: 1. 
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of the Spirit in the inspiration of the Bible is also uncontroversial. He envisages Christ 
so inspiring the apostolic witnesses that their proclamation becomes an extension of his 
own, 88 and in their testimony Christ testifies to his work of redemption (Torrance 
1999: 92). Torrance comments that the Scriptures of the New Testament were bom 
within the church through the outpouring of the Holy Spirit and thus they constitute 'the 
divinely provided and inspired linguistic medium which remains of authoritative and 
critical significance for the whole history of the church of Jesus Christ' (Torrance 
1999: 93). It is clear then that Torrance holds a very high doctrine of the inspiration of 
the Bible. He argues that it enables us to 'stand with the original witnesses under the 
creative impact of the Word' (Torrance 1999: 93); however, despite his high doctrine of 
biblical inspiration Torrance does not allow the Bible to become a rival to God in any 
sense. The Scriptures do not represent an independent source of revelation; rather in the 
Scriptures God testifies to himself. 89 We noted that for Toffance as for Barth the source 
of our knowledge of God is unitary and this is not compromised by his understanding of 
the place of Scripture in revelation for the Scriptures are not treated as if they contain or 
embody the truth of God in any abstract form; rather 'under the leading of the Spirit of 
Truth' they point us to Jesus Christ the Word of God (Torrance 1999: 119); they are also 
the divinely appointed place where we are encountered by the Word of God (Torrance 
1995: 5). The Scriptures become a witness to Jesus Christ the Word of God by the 
operation of the Holy Spirit and it is through the Holy Spirit operating in the life and 
worship of the church that God reveals himself in the Scriptures (Torrance 1999: 120). 
88 Torrance can even speak of Christ putting his Word into the mouths of the apostles 
(Torrance 1999: 92) 
89 Torrance writes: 'All faithful interpretation must allow the Truth to assert itself in its 
own intrinsic weight and majesty and to maintain its own ground over against us and 
our prejudices, for in the last resort we have to reckon with the fact that God alone can 
name himself and bear witness to himself and thus prove himself to us' (Torrance 
1999: 119). 
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Torrance points out that some approaches to the Bible, notably those he calls 
fundamentalist, place the incarnation of the Word, God's actual self-revelation in time 
and space in the person of Jesus Christ, in second place to the written Scriptures. That 
which is supposed to witness to the Word, a sign pointing away from itself to the person 
of Jesus Christ, has usurped the place of Christ in God's self-revelation. Moreover this 
approach to Scripture ultimately harbours a false Christology for in its unwillingness 'to 
acknowledge the identity in being between what God is toward us in his revelation in 
Jesus Christ and what he is in his living Being and Reality in himself' (Torrance 
1999: 18); fundamentalism in practice denies the full consubstantial ity between the 
incarnate Son and the Father. 
Torrance argues that liberalism and fundamentalism equally refuse to allow God 
to be the lord of his self-revelation. He writes: 
This would mean that the decisive problem of fundamentalism is not so different 
after all from the problem of liberalism. Both appear to balk at the fact that God 
himself is the one ultimate Judge of the truth or falsity, the adequacy or 
inadequacy, of all human conceptions and statements about him. Even the holy 
Scriptures must submit to his judgement and thus point us away from 
themselves to the truth as it is in Jesus Christ (Torrance 1999: 18). 
Torrance's dynamic understanding of revelation in Scripture has two important 
strengths. The first is that his understanding of the role that Scripture plays in revelation 
preserves an essential mystery within God's self-revelation. In Torrance's reformed 
model of revelation in Scripture the Bible does not contain or embody the truth of God. 
Rather under the operation of the Holy Spirit in the life and worship of the church as it 
engages with the Scriptures, those Scriptures point to Jesus Christ who is himself the 
truth of God. The revelation of God to which the Scriptures point cannot simply be 
reduced to words for Jesus Christ the living Word of God 'infinitely transcends all our 
human conceptions of him' (Torrance 1999: 119). God's self-revelation consists of 
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much more than a series of propositions. The second strength of Torrance's dynamic 
understanding of revelation is that although he has a very high view of Scripture he does 
not allow it to encroach upon that which properly belongs to God. He is never in danger 
of replacing God with the Scriptures. God is still the one who is completely in control of 
all of our knowledge of him. Torrance's understanding of the place of the Bible within 
revelation still allows the sovereign grace of God to operate. 
We noted a problem with Barth's interpretation of the place of the Holy Spirit in 
revelation. 90 According to Thiselton. Barth uses the Holy Spirit as a way of 
circumventing the problem of hermeneutics, arguing that instead of working through the 
normal human methods of understanding the Spirit bypasses them. Although Torrance 
has been influenced by Barth in his understanding of revelation in the Scriptures his 
doctrine of the Spirit does not simply 'short-circuit the problem of hermeneutics' 
(Thiselton 1980: 91); rather in Torrance's theology the spirit works through human 
understanding, transforming but never bypassing hermeneutics (Thiselton 1980: 92, cf. 
Torrance 1971: 184). As Torrance argues: 
the Spirit of God is also the personal presence and action of God to the human 
creature both to give him rational life in sustained relation to Himself and to 
open his mind to receive and understand God's self-revelation and so to respond 
to him in faith and love. ... the Holy Spirit makes use of creaturely realities 
which God has made the media of divine revelation yet in such a way that in his 
response to it man's knowledge of God does not terminate on the media but on 
the Being of God himself (Torrance 1971: 183f). 
2.3.5 Revelation and reconciliation 
The theme of the interrelationship between revelation and reconciliation in 
Torrance's theology is more fully dealt with in sections 1.6 and 1.7. However, this 
90 See section 2.2.1. 
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relationship is an important aspect of how Torrance understands God's use of the 
Scriptures as a means of his self-revelation. 
In Torrance's study of patristic hermeneutics we find a clear expression of how 
he understands the relationship between the doctrines of revelation and reconciliation in 
Christian theology. Central to this relationship is Torrance's definition of knowledge of 
God as personal knowledge rather than propositional knowledge. Torrance sums up the 
relationship between the Scriptures and revelation/reconciliation in these words: 
The Word of God comes to us in the Bible and can be heard as such only within 
our experience of God's saving activity in the Lord Jesus Christ. He has come to 
redeem the very humanity to which he addresses himself. Therefore the act of 
his revelation is inseparable from the act of his reconciliation, and the act of his 
self-impartation is inseparable from the act of his atoning propitiation (Torrance 
1995: 9). 
We can understand why Torrance insists upon the inseparable nature of the 
relationship between revelation and reconciliation when we consider how he conceives 
of the dynamic relationship between Scripture and revelation. Torrance does not 
consider the text of the Bible to contain revelation. The written Scriptures are not a 
repository of revelation; rather the text is a record of God's words spoken through the 
prophets and apostles. God uses this text as a means of speaking to his people and 
pointing them to Jesus Christ the living Word of God. The Bible is the written word 
which God sovereignly and graciously uses to draw us into a revealing relationship with 
himself. For Torrance there is a sense of the Scriptures as the place where God 
graciously meets us. When God reveals himself in the Scriptures this is in itself an act 
of reconciliation. For according to Torrance's definition knowledge of God is not 
knowledge about God, it is a personal knowing; it is knowledge that comes from a 
relationship. Richardson sums up Torrance's position well when he speaks of Torrance 
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having a doctrine of 'the mystical communion of the redeemed with the Redeemer', and 
notes that: 
In this communion, the human knower is raised up through the statements of 
Scripture to a knowledge of God that grasps the Trinitarian whole ... of that 
which has been revealed by Christ, elicits a personal knowing that is 
interpersonal and inclusive of the creature, and results in true 1heologia, real 
knowledge of God in God's own Trinitarian reality (Richardson 2001: 1930. 
We can see here the influence of Polanyi's philosophy especially his theory of tacit 
knowledge. Torrance summarises Polanyi's theory of the tacit dimension to knowledge 
as a form of knowing: 
in which we come to know more than we can actually tell at the time, but in 
which we may begin to pass from implicit to explicit awareness through the 
process which he describes as indwelling (Torrance I 984a: 93). 91 
Torrance finds the concept of personal knowledge in Barth as well as in Polanyi 
(Torrance 1999: 14). Torrance's argument with evangelical fundamentalism is that it 
conceives of divine revelation as a set of infallible propositions about God. Whereas for 
Torrance, following Barth and Polanyi, what God gives to us in his act of revelation is 
himself. 92 This understanding of divine revelation as personal revelation also forms the 
essence of Torrance's argument with theological liberalism; a tradition which, like 
fundamentalism rejects the notion of God's self-revelation, and instead finds the source 
for theology in the 'autonomous religious reason' (Torrance 1999: 15). 
91 See also Torrance 1980a: I If. 
92 Torrance writes that fundamentalism 'rejects the fact that revelation must be 
continually given and received in a living relation with God - i. e., it substitutes a static 
for a dynamic view of revelation' (Torrance 1999: 16). 
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Z3.6 Discussion 
Although Torrance's understanding of the place of the Bible in revelation begins 
with Barth's definition of Scripture as witness to the Word, he develops his doctrine of 
scripture in a very different direction to Barth, and this points to his underlying 
epistemology. It is doubtful that Torrance regards his own position on the place of the 
Scriptures as being in any important way different from that of Barth. However, a close 
reading of his understanding of the Scriptures in revelation shows a distinction between 
them. 
Torrance criticises fundamentalism for compromising the sovereignty of God in 
his self-revelation by holding a static and propositional doctrine of revelation in 
Scripture. Torrance's emphases on the dynamic and personal aspects of revelation in 
scripture take him beyond the Bible as witness to revelation. It has been shown that in 
his writings the Bible, as a graciously provided witness to revelation, becomes itself a 
mediator of revelation and the place where God meets his creation in active and 
personal revelation. 
There are clear parallels as well as important differences between Torrance's 
exposition of revelation in Christ and revelation in Scripture. Just as Jesus Christ is the 
place in the universe of space and time where God is present to his creation, so the 
particular and human text of the Bible is the place where God meets his people. There is 
however, no personal union between God and the Scriptures, they are a record, a 
witness and a meeting place, but there is nothing equivalent to the doctrine of the 
homoousion in the doctrine of scripture. Nor is the Bible a rival or second source of 
revelation for the God who meets us in Christ is the same God who meets us in 
Scripture. The consubstantial relation between God and humankind in the incarnate Son 
means that revelation in Christ will always be normative for Christian theology's 
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understanding of God, but normative in terms of the content rather than the locus of 
revelation. 
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Torrance's doctrine of Scripture clearly goes beyond the Barthian concept of 
Bible as witness. The Scriptures are used by God as a means of personal and reconciling 
revelation within the contingent creation. In Torrance's doctrine of Scripture can be 
seen something more fundamental even than revelation in Christ, but something which 
is in no way a rival to revelation in Christ, and that is the principle of the sovereignty of 
God by whose will and act alone human beings may come to personal and therefore 
reconciling knowledge of him. 
2.4 The Bible as a divine and human word 
Z4.1 Theology and the Scriptures 
Torrance calls for an 'unashamed theological exegesis' of the Scriptures 
(Torrance 1999: 42). He argues that biblical exegesis has suffered from a separation of 
empirical and theoretical elements which characterises the historical-critical approach to 
interpretation. Ile argues that this separation can be seen in the way that the gospel 
traditions concerning Jesus are treated. Instead of the Scriptures being the essential 
source of systematic theology there is a separation between them in the modem 
academy with the questions directed to the text by exegetes being of little interest to the 
systematic theologian. Gray writes that 'Torrance finds that the abstraction of Scriptural 
hermeneutic from the apostolic tradition means that what is being produced is of no 
value to theology' (Gray 1980: 304). 94 
93 See section 1.2.2. 
94 See section 1.8. 
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Torrance argues that the fault is with the historical-critical method and its 
attempt to separate the theoretical and the historical elements within the gospel 
tradition. The problem with this approach to the Bible is that it is founded upon what he 
calls 'post-Newtonian' and 'Post-Kantian' science (Torrance 1999: 39f); it is built upon 
an outdated understanding of the nature of reality which sees interpretation as extrinsic 
95 to facts and events rather than intrinsic to them. Torrance argues that contemporary 
science has a different understanding of the relation between empirical and theoretical 
components of knowledge, 'for they are grounded upon the inherence of empirical and 
theoretical factors in one another in reality itself (Torrance 1999: 40). There are no bare 
facts or uninterpreted events; rather all facts are interpreted facts. Torrance believes that 
the integration of the empirical and theoretical components in knowledge in the sciences 
calls for a similar integration in theology. This is what he means when he calls for a 
6genuine yI eological approach' to the Scriptures. A theological approach to the Bible 
would take seriously the historical and occasional nature of these writings but it would 
take equally seriously the claim that it is in these historical and occasional writings that 
we have access to God's self-revelation in history. Historical-critical exegesis takes only 
one aspect of the Scriptures seriously namely their historical and human origin. 
Thiemann criticises Torrance's theological hermeneutics. He argues that 
Torrance's method is out of step with much contemporary theology in that it directly 
contradicts the modem epistemological 'turn to the subject' (Thiemann 1985: 34). 
Torrance's reply to this criticism would be that he believes that this (modern turn' is a 
wrong turn based on an outdated and dualist epistemology and that the integration of 
form and being represents a better understanding and a better way forward for both 
95 Ricoeur questions the psychological and existential prejudices which characterise 
much historical-critical exegesis of the Bible (Ricoeur 1976: 22f, see also Gray 
1980: 303). 
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biblical and systematic theology than Kantian subjectivity (Torrance 1999: 39). 
Torrance's call for a theological interpretation of the Scriptures complements his call for 
a Christocentric understanding of revelation and is another element in the argument that 
his theology can offer a means of rapprochement between biblical and systematic 
theology. 96 Furthermore Theimann's argument that Torrance ignores the subjective 
aspect in the production and reading of the Bible is ungrounded. Me Call notes that in 
Torrance's hermeneutics human subjectivity does have an essential role in revelation, 
however, that role is not 'constitutive' (Mc Call 2004: 152). Torrance takes full account 
of the subjective and human element in both the production of the biblical text and in its 
interpretation but he refuses to allow this subjective aspect to dominate. He argues that 
the subjective pole has dominated and the objective aspect has been neglected in much 
biblical interpretation. 
Z 4.2 Th e paradoxical nature of th e Scriptures 
Torrance attempts to find a proper balance between the subjective and objective 
elements in the theological interpretation of Scripture. In a 1956 essay he examines the 
nature of the Christian Scriptures. 97 He argues the Bible is a human text, the product of 
human writers and processes; moreover, as a human text the Bible belongs to the realm 
which is subject to sin and the fall and as such is in need of redemption. However, the 
Bible is also a vehicle of revelation and redemption. Torrance acknowledges that the 
Bible is a product of human history, with all that this entails in terms of 'inadequacy 
faultiness and imperfection' (Torrance 1965: 139), but it is also the divinely provided 
96 See section 1.8. 
97 The article was published in Essays in Christologyfor Karl Barth, ed T. H. L. 
Parker, Lutterworth Press, 1956, and is reproduced in Theolo'gy in Reconstruction, 
Torrance 1965: 127-149. 
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means of God's self-revelation. There is a paradox at the heart of Torrance's doctrine of 
Scripture which he expresses in this way: 
The Bible has to be heard, therefore, as Word of God within the bi-polarity of 
revelation and reconciliation, in which we acknowledge that in itself, in its 
human expression, the Bible is word of man with all the limitations and 
imperfections of human flesh, in order to allow human expression to point us 
beyond itself, to what it is not in itself, but to what God marvellously makes it to 
be in the adoption of grace (Torrance 1965: 139). 
For Torrance the 'limitations and imperfections' of Scripture are not a problem, they do 
not present a barrier to the Bible's communication of the word of God; rather it is the 
human, historical and occasional aspects of the Scriptures and their production which 
enables them to become vehicles of God's self-revelation. The human and historical 
aspects of the Bible, its very fallibility and fallenness, are essential to our ability to hear 
the word of God through it. Without that human, indeed fallen, aspect fallen humanity 
would be unable to encounter the word of God in the Scriptures (Torrance 1965: 140). 
The way that Torrance integrates the subjective and objective elements of Scripture is a 
good example of his whole approach to theology. He does not ignore the subjective 
aspect of the production or interpretation of the Scriptures. There is a human component 
to the Scriptures which Torrance relates to his underlying Calvinist anthropology. 
Torrance writes that the Bible 'belongs to the sphere where redemption is necessary' 
(Torrance 1965: 138). It is only through a miracle of divine grace that it is able to 
become for us the word of God. Furthermore Torrance argues that the very ambiguity of 
the Christian Scriptures are an element used by God in his act of self communication, 
for God uses this human, fallible and fallen word to communicate his divine word to 
human, fallible and fallen creatures: in speaking through this ambiguous medium God 
effects a fully human expression of his word. Torrance argues that: 
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The Word of God comes to us in the midst of our sin and darkness at once 
Revealing and reconciling, but it comes with strong crying and tears, pressing its 
way through the speech of our fallen flesh, graciously assuming it in spite of all 
its inadequacy and faultiness and imperfection, and giving it a holy perfection in 
the Word of God (Torrance 1965: 139). 
Torrance believes that his theological approach to interpreting the Bible 
provides a necessary corrective to the sort of historical criticism which deliberately 
avoids the theological questions raised by the person of Jesus Christ and the contents of 
the gospel (Torrance 1999: 4 If). Torrance's call for an integration of systematic and 
biblical theology is entirely characteristic of his approach to theology in general; the 
themes of integration and the rejection of dualism are found throughout his writings. 98 
Torrance believes that the historical-critical approach to hermeneutics cuts Jesus Christ 
off from his natural relationships, both his relationships within Israel and in the being of 
God (Luoma 2002: 13 1). Torrance writes that the effect of the historical-critical method 
'has been to detach Jesus Christ from God, to detach Jesus Christ from Israel, and to 
detach Christianity from Christ himself (Torrance 1999: 1). 
That God should choose to reveal himself in the text of the Bible is an example 
of economic condescension, of God stooping to make himself known. The fullest 
example of this is the incarnation, for while the incarnation is usually seen as God 
taking human nature in order to redeem it, it can also be seen as God adapting himself 
to human understanding. Torrance writes: 
'God the Word becoming man in order to adapt himself to man ... and to 
assimilate human modes of thought and speech to himself, and thereby to effect 
real communication between God and man and man and God' (Torrance 
1999: 108). 
98 See Luoma 2002: 13 If. 
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In Jesus Christ God adapts human forms of thought and speech to his self-revelation, 
and in this way the written Scriptures took shape (Torrance 1999: 109). There is a 
parallel between God's word coming to us through the human words of Scripture and 
the incarnation. In the Bible the divine and the human belong together so that while we 
can distinguish them we cannot separate them; so in the incarnation Jesus Christ unites 
the divine and the human in his own person. Torrance refers to an 'analogical likeness' 
between revelation in Scripture and the incarnation. However, there is an important 
distinction between Scripture and the incarnate Son. Torrance argues that: 
whereas in Jesus Christ the divine Word and human word are united within one 
Person, that is hypostatically, in the Bible the divine Word and the human word 
are only united through dependence upon and participation in Christ, that is, 
sacramentally (Torrance 1995: 7). 
There is no personal union between the human and divine components of Scripture as 
there is with the incarnation; rather God uses the human word which remains external to 
him. 99 
Ultimately in Torrance's theology there is true revelation in the Bible. Scripture 
is more than simply a witness to revelation; it is a means by which God effects a 
personal encounter within the contingent universe. Revelation in Scripture is dependent 
upon the sovereign and gracious decision of God to reveal himself through this human 
text. As the God who reveals himself through the Bible is the God who became 
incarnate in Jesus Christ, adapting human words and thoughts to his self-revelation, 
there is no possibility of contradiction between revelation in Scripture and revelation in 
Christ or of the Bible displacing Christ within revelation. Jesus Christ is the primary 
revelation of God and the Scriptures are so called only in a secondary sense. 
99 Torrance (1995: 7) quotes the words of Darwell Stone in support of his understanding 
of the union of divine and human in Scripture. 
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Torrance clearly has a high doctrine of Scripture but he is careful to avoid any 
hint of a static understanding of God's self-revelation in the Bible. He retains his 
dynamic understanding of revelation by emphasising that although God in his 
incarnation has adapted the human thought and speech which we find in the Scriptures 
to his revelation, yet these words are only able to become a meeting place for humanity 
and God by divine will and action. God is always lord of his self-revelation. The 
Scriptures are a divinely provided vehicle for God to address humanity (Torrance 
1999: 109). 
2.5. Conclusion 
For Torrance as for Barth the source of revelation is unitary, but there is a subtle 
though important difference between them. While in Barth revelation in Christ forms 
the foundation of his theological epistemology, in Toffance it has been shown to be the 
doctrine ofjustification by grace. This gracious self-revelation of God within time and 
space is seen supremely in the incarnation of the Son of God but it is also seen in the 
Scriptures. In Torrance the Scriptures are not only a graciously provided witness to the 
Word of God who is Jesus; they become by a sovereign act of divine will a meeting 
place within the creation where the God who meets us in the person of Jesus Christ 
encounters us. In Barth revelation in Christ is normative for both the content and the 
location of divine self revelation, whereas for Torrance it is normative only for the 
content of revelation. 
Following Barth Torrance treats the Bible as a human and historical word and 
also as the word of God to the church. Like Barth he refuses to identify the word of God 
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with the text of the Scriptures; instead he develops a dynamic understanding of 
revelation in the Scriptures. The Bible is the text which God has graciously provided as 
a record of revelation and it is also the text which God graciously uses to speak to his 
church. Revelation then is an event, an action of God. Neither Barth nor Torrance 
allows anything to encroach upon the sovereignty of God in his self-revelation, not even 
the Bible. For both writers there is a particularity about the text of the Bible; this text 
and no other becomes by the grace of God and the action of the Holy Spirit the effective 
witness to the Word. The Bible is both a product of and a witness to God's act of self- 
revelation. In a striking parallel to his understanding of Christ whose humanity is the 
place in time and space where God meets his creation, Torrance says that the Bible 
becomes a place where God meets us. Thiselton argues that Barth attempts to 
circumvent the normal processes of human understanding in his interpretation of the 
way in which the Bible becomes a vehicle of divine self-revelation, whereas Torrance 
argues that God utilises those normal human processes in order to reveal himself 
through the Scriptures. 
Torrance does not regard the frailty and fallibility of the human authors of 
Scripture to be a barrier to its effective communication of God's word. In using frail, 
fallible and fallen authors God effectively 'translates' his word into human categories; 
into a form that can be understood by frail, fallible and fallen men and women. The 
effective witness to God's self-revelation is a human artefact delivered to human beings 
which becomes by God's will and action a locus of divine self-revelation. There is 
further parallel to Torrance's understanding of revelation in Christ, for in assuming our 
frail and fallen nature God in Christ has revealed himself in human nature and thought 
forms. 
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Polanyi has been of influence on Torrance's understanding of revelation. 
Torrance derives his understanding of personal knowledge from Polanyi and Barth. In 
Scripture God does not reveal propositions about himself-, he reveals himself. This is the 
essence of Torrance's argument with Christian fundamentalism. He argues that 
fundamentalism's propositional and static rather than personal and dynamic doctrine of 
revelation leads to the Bible usurping the place of God in theology and in the church. 
By making the text itself revelation rather than a witness to and locus of revelation 
Torrance argues that fundamentalism subverts the sovereignty and grace of God in his 
self-revelation. In Torrance's theology the written Scriptures are not only the divinely 
provided witness to revelation, but are also the locus of revelation for the church; as 
such the Scriptures have an important role to play in the reconciliation of God and 
humanity. Because revelation is personal rather than propositional an effective 
revelation of God is also a personal encounter with God. In Torrance's personal and 
dynamic understanding of revelation in Scripture God is always in control of his 
revelation, he is not given into our hands as with a fundamentalist approach. 
In Torrance the Bible is not a second source of revelation for the God who 
reveals himself in Christ is the same God who reveals himself in Scripture; however, it 
has been shown that in his doctrine of revelation the Bible becomes a second locus of 
divine encounter. 
In his understanding of the role of Scripture in revelation Torrance is concerned 
to bring together areas of theology which are often separated, namely biblical theology 
and dogmatic theology. Torrance believes that their separation is the result of a distorted 
understanding of the relationship between form and being which is inherent in western 
thought. Torrance believes that this distortion has been successfully challenged in 
theology by Barth and in the natural sciences by Einstein. He is sceptical of the value of 
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the historical-critical approach to the Bible which has characterised much contemporary 
biblical exegesis. The historical Jesus to whom the Scriptures point comes with a 
theological context which cannot simply be removed without doing violence to proper 
historiography. Torrance's approach to revelation in the Scriptures attempts to avoid the 
problems of both fundamentalist and theologically liberal understandings of the Bible; 
for he takes the human and historically situated aspect of the Bible seriously and he 
argues that it is through this particular text that we meet God in his self-revelation. 
For Torrance the Bible is God's gift to the church in three different but related 
ways; firstly it is the divinely provided human witness to his self-revelation in Christ, 
secondly it is the witness through which God speaks to his church, and thirdly it is a 
place where God encounters his people. In all of his self-revelation God is supremely 
sovereign and revelation is an act of divine grace. 
According to Torrance the Scriptures exist to bring us into relationship with God 
and therefore revelation is always reconciling. The focus in Torrance's theology is 
never on the Scriptures themselves but on Christ to whom they witness and on the God 
who meets us through them, therefore knowledge of God and Christ cannot be reduced 
to knowledge of the text of the Bible. Just as God is always sovereign of his self- 
revelation so be is always greater than can be expressed or conceived. 
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Chapter Three Natural theology 1: Torrance and Barth 
3.1 Introduction 
In chapter one it was argued that revelation according to Torrance is unitary in 
its source and Christologically founded; but that underlying this is a more fundamental 
commitment to the gracious nature of all human knowledge of God. Chapter two 
demonstrated how this shaped his formulation of the place of the Scriptures in 
revelation. Chapters three and four will examine Torrance's understanding of natural 
theology and its place in his doctrine of revelation. Chapter three deals with the 
importance of Barth's 'no' to natural theology for Torrance's own work on natural 
theology. We will see that from Barth's rejection of traditional natural theology 
Torrance derives the basic principles of his theological epistemology. Chapter Four 
continues by examining Torrance's non-independent natural theology. 
Torrance first became acquainted with Barth's theology while a student at New 
College in Edinburgh from 1934 to 1937 in lectures by Macintosh (McGrath 1999: 32f). 
When he was awarded the Aitken fellowship in 1937 he studied with Barth in Basel 
(McGrath 1999: 42) where he attended Barth's lectures and seminars on dogmatics; he 
was also selected to be one of a dozen students for a weekly private seminar at Barth's 
home (McGrath 1999: 43f). For his thesis under Barth Torrance wanted to write on 'the 
scientific structure of Christian dogmatics' (McGrath 1999: 45) but Barth told him that 
he was too young for such a topic. Instead, at Barth's suggestion, he chose the doctrine 
of grace in the fathers of the second century. 100 
It could be argued that Torrance spent the rest of his career working on the topic 
that he had originally wanted to research for his Basel thesis; his transposition of natural 
100 His doctoral thesis was published in 1948 as The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic 
Fathers (Torrance 1948). 
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theology into the body of dogmatics and his work on theological science, two topics that 
occupied much of his later writings, together constitute 'the scientific structure of 
Christian dogmatics'. 
Torrance continued to engage with Barth throughout his career. He wrote in 
detail on Barth's theology at different times in his life and regarded some of his own 
work as a development of Barth's theology, not least his work on the relationship 
between theology and the natural sciences. In almost all of his writing there is some 
reference to Barth and so Torrance can be regarded as holding an ongoing conversation 
with Barth throughout his career. In Torrance's assessment Barth is more than an 
important twentieth century theologian; he is a church father alongside figures such as 
Calvin and Athanasius (see McKim 1986: 54-55). 101 
The most important areas of Barth's theology for Torrance are his work on the 
related areas of revelation in Christ and natural theology. Torrance regards his own 
theology, especially his engagement and dialogue with the natural sciences, as a 
development of Barth's rejection of natural theology in the 1930s. He interprets the 
Barth - Brunner debate on natural theology as being primarily about theology 
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holds that the main offence in natural theology for Barth is its independence of special 
revelation and its speculative nature. Torrance argues that Barth regards natural 
theology as an attempt to circumvent actual revelation. In this chapter we will examine 
Torrance's reading of Barth on natural theology. Torrance's development of Barth's 
work on natural theology is central to his own theology; his development of a non- 
101 Torrance writes: 'Barth must be accorded an honoured position among the greatest 
theologians of the Church - Athanasius, Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Luther and 
Calvin' (Torrance 1962: 15). 
102 Gorringe emphasises the political aspect of Barth's thought, and the social and 
historical context in which it was written. He writes to support the thesis that in Barth 
we find a source for a new liberation theology (Gorringe 1999: 1-5). McCormack (1997) 
and Hart (Hart 2001: 167f) give more balanced readings of Barth, treating his theology 
as responding to the political context without being determined by it. 
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independent natural theology is important for his work on epistemology, his account of 
critical realism and his theological science. 
In past centuries natural theology has been regarded as a complement to revealed 
theology; a book of nature to be studied alongside the book of Scripture. Traditionally 
natural theology's task has been to establish the knowledge of God, or at least an 
openness to and capacity for knowledge of God, which is common to all people and 
independent of special revelation in Scripture or in Christ. Natural theology has been 
seen as a preparation for revealed theology. The most succinct recent presentation of 
this position is found in The Catechism of the Catholic Church which argues that: 
Our holy mother, the Church, holds and teaches that God, the first principle and 
last end of all things, can be known with certainty from the created world by the 
natural light of human reason. Without this capacity, man would not be able to 
welcome God's revelation. Man has this capacity because he is created in the 
image of God (Catechism 1994: 16). 
This remains the official teaching of the Roman Catholic Church and has three 
components: that human beings have a natural knowledge of God independent of God's 
special act of revelation; that human beings have a natural capacity to receive revelation 
without which we would be unable to receive God's special revelation; finally that this 
knowledge and capacity are the result of our creation by God in his image. The 
Catechism goes on to note the 'many difficulties' which human beings face in coming 
to know God 'by the light of reason alone' (Catechism 1994: 17). Traditional natural 
theology assumes that common grace and general revelation make knowledge of God 
possible and that this is plain to all peoples everywhere. Natural theology is usually 
portrayed as a preparation for special revelation in which the general knowledge of God 
is modified and expanded. 
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Baillie, another of Torrance's Edinburgh teachers, sets out natural theology and 
revealed theology as they would have been understood prior to the nineteenth century. 
He comments that 'any child' would have been able to explain: 
that at creation God had endowed man with the power of reason, and that by the 
'unaided' exercise of this reason man had been able to find out some things 
about God; but that, at a later time, God had added to the knowledge thus at 
man's disposal by communicating to him certain further information which he 
could not possibly have found out for himself (Baillie 1939: 35f). 
It is noteworthy that Torrance does not engage with contemporary Roman 
Catholic theology in which eminent theologians such as Rahner develop traditional 
accounts of natural theology. He appears not to be interested in debating with Catholic 
theologians; rather his concern is with the theological liberalism of the western 
Protestant tradition. Torrance argues that the work of Barth on the unity of act and being 
in God and the work of Einstein on relativity undermine the philosophy upon which 
much recent liberal Protestant theology has been built. This chapter will examine 
Torrance's reading of Barth on natural theology and will then ask whether this reading 
can be substantiated. 
3.2 Torrance's reading of Barth on natural theology 
3. Z I Barth's 'No'to natural theology 
Torrance argues that the natural theology rejected by Barth in No! (Brunner and 
Barth 1946) and Church Dogmatics IIII (Barth 1957: 63-178) is not natural theology per 
se but is independent natural theology which is detached from special revelation. If this 
reading of Barth can be substantiated it would leave room for the kind of Barthian 
reworking of natural theology which Torrance pursues. Torrance records meeting Barth 
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in 1968 to discuss his interpretation; Barth agreed with his reading of his work on 
natural theology (Torrance 1976: ix-x). 
Torrance consistently interprets Barth's rejection of natural theology in the 
1930s, which culminated in the final breakdown in relations with Brunner, as being 
primarily for theological reasons. The debate between Barth and Brunner was conducted 
both in private correspondence as well as in publications, sermons and addresses. In 
1934 the debate came to a climax with the publication by Brunner of Nature and Grace 
and Barth's terse response No! (Brunner and Barth 1946). 
Barth's break with liberal theology occurred when he was pastor of Safenwil 
(Busch: 1976: 61) and was precipitated by his experiences as a pastor as he grappled 
with the Bible and also by the outbreak of the First World War. In August 1914 ninety 
three German scholars proclaimed their support of the war policy of the Kaiser; among 
these scholars were many of Barth's former university teachers. 103 McCormack notes 
that in a letter to Martin Rade written on the I st October 1914 Barth writes: 
Something of the deep respect which I felt within myself for the Gen-nan 
character is forever destroyed ... 
because I see how your philosophy and your 
Christianity breaks into pieces in this war psychosis (McCon-nack 1997: 114). 
At this time Barth's friend Thumeysen introduced him to the theology of the 
Blumhardts (Busch 1976: 84), the central point of which is the victory of Christ. From 
their writings Barth learned not to approach God from the perspective of the world or 
humanity but 'to begin with God'. 104 During the summer of 1916 Barth began to study 
Paul's letter to the Romans. He began to see the Bible in a new way no longer reading it 
103 On this see Barth 1969a: 2 I f; Torrance 1962: 3 8; Busch 1976: 81 ff; McCormack 
1997: 111-125. 
104 Smart, J. D. The Divided Mind ofModern Theology. Philadelphia 1967 page 60, 
quoted in Hart 2001: 9. 
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as a word about ethics or religion but as God's address to humankind. 105 
From the second edition of his commentary on Romans onwards Barth finds no 
place for natural theology. He focuses on what Torrance calls the utter 'godness' of God 
(Torrance 1962: 39); that is, upon the absolute subjectivity of God in his act of 
revelation, by which Barth means that in the act of revelation God reveals himself not 
something about himself (Torrance 1962: 45f). 106 His insistence that any true knowledge 
of God is a result of divine initiative and grace ensures this personal revelation. 
Two events, one internal and theological, the other external and political, led to 
the publication of No! The external events being the rise of National Socialism in 
Germany from the late 1920's onwards coupled with the inadequate response to these 
events from the churches and from many theologians; the internal and theological 
events are what Barth calls the 'deepening and the application of that knowledge which, 
in its main channels, I had gained before' (Barth 1969a: 42, emphasis Barth). 
The use made of natural theology by the German Christians led Barth to attack 
all natural theology as a transgression of the first commandment. ' 07 According to Barth 
natural theology is a form of idolatry which, in making human experience the starting 
point of theology, refuses to allow God to be God and instead displaces God enthroning 
human nature instead. This is the immediate background to Barth's response to 
Brunner's Nature and Grace. Barth felt that he had no choice but to respond in the 
105 See Barth's address "The Strange New World Within The Bible" delivered in 1916, 
Barth 1928: 28-50; cf. Torrance 1962: 49. 
106 Torrance writes: 'Much of the influence of Kierkegaard on him Barth sought later to 
tone down and sometimes to cut out altogether, but there is one important point which 
we must not fail to note: Kierkegaard's doctrine of the Truth in theform ofpersonal 
being, Truth as Subject... ' (Torrance 1962: 45 emphasis Torrance). 
107 Gorringe quotes Barth writing that '[i]t was on the truth that God is one that the 
'Third Reich' of Adolf Hitler made shipwreck ... Beside God there are only creatures or false gods, and beside faith in Him there are religions only as religions of superstition, 
error and finally irreligion', (quoted in Gorringe 1999: 117). 
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strongest terms. 108 Barth argues that revelation, if it is revelation, is always special, is 
always an act of grace, and is therefore always supernatural and miraculous. God needs 
no help from our side in order to reveal himself to us. The Holy Spirit has no need of a 
6point of contact' naturally or independently found within human beings in order to 
open to them the living word of God; if any such 'point of contact' is needed then the 
Spirit is able to establish this in the act of revelation itself. Barth argues that there is no 
natural point of contact in human nature, nor do we have a natural capacity to receive 
revelation. Barth compares the idea of human capacity for revelation with the idea of a 
drowning man's capacity for being rescued. He points out that if the notion of such a 
capacity is to have any meaning then it must contribute to our actual knowledge of God 
(Brunner & Barth 1946: 79). 
The disagreement between Barth and Brunner expressed in Nature and Grace 
and No fl was not new. Their theologies diverged before 1934 (see McCormack 
1997: 399) and continued on their different paths over the years since. The polemic of 
1934 is best seen as a clarification of the respective positions of the two theologians 
expressed at a time of crisis for Western society and church. Hart, in his analysis of the 
relationship between the two men based on their correspondence, writes that: 
Barth did not understand German - Christianity as anything unique; it was 
simply another form of the error of Neo-Protestantism with which Brunner 
consistently flirted - the desire to correlate God's revelation with a second 
criterion (Hart 2001: 168). 
In the section of the Church Dogmatics which deals most fully with natural 
108 For Barth, Nature and Grace created a fact to which he felt he must respond, 
namely, the approval of the German Christians. Barth wrote to Brunner: 'You cannot 
have ... the approval of these theologians and be my confederate at the same time' (quoted Hart 2001: 155). 
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theology (Barth 1957: 63-178)109 there is no change in Barth's position. The German 
edition of Church Dogmatics III] was published in 1940, only six years after No! For 
Barth there is not, nor can there be, any knowledge of God apart from his self- 
revelation. The capacity within human beings to receive God's revelation is not 
independent nor is it innate; this too is an act of God and a miracle of grace. I 10 Natural 
theology makes this capacity for, or readiness to receive, revelation independent of God 
and his actions. Barth argues that it is impossible for human beings to know God in a 
direct or unmediated way; to do so would destroy us (Barth 1957: 19). God's self- 
revelation must be mediated and this mediation takes place 'through the human nature 
of Jesus Christ' (Hunsingerl991: 89). 
Barth's theology is Christocentric because he grounds all knowledge of God in 
the divine initiative and grace in Jesus Christ. Gorringe calls this a 'theological castling 
move' which 'guards the freedom of God from any hostile human takeover' (Gorringe 
1999: 140). "' Barth understands human nature to be closed and even hostile to grace; 
this leads to his damning analysis of the position of natural theology in the church 
(Hunsinger 1991: 96). According to flunsinger Barth regards the persistence of natural 
theology in the church as a sign of the depth of human sin and rebellion against God. 
McGrath writes of Barth's concern 'to expose the myth of human autonomy and 
identify its consequences for theology and ethics' (McGrath 2001: 269). In natural 
109 For discussion of this passage of the Dogmatics, see Hunsinger 1991: 76 ff, Hart 
2001: 202; Gorringe 1999: 138-140. 
110 See Gorringe 1999: 139f. 
111 Cf. Torrance who writes: 'What had to be asserted again was the transcendence of 
God over all our conceptions and formulations, his freedom from the control of all our 
analogical constructs and arbitrary impositions, his refusal to be bound within any frame 
of reference we can desire, and his implacable opposition to every form of idolatry' 
(Torrance 1962: 102 emphasis Torrance). 
115 
theology we deny and oppose grace and in doing so we deny and oppose God. ' 12 
3. Z2 Torrance: Barth as preacher of the Word 
Torrance argues that Barth's theology is primarily a proclamation of the word of 
God and he resolves to take him seriously as a theologian and preacher of the word. 
This reflects Barth's own assessment of his work (Barth 1969a: 68). While Torrance 
makes some reference to the context in which Barth's theology was forged' 13 his 
interest in Barth is theological. He points out that Barth's rejection of the liberal 
theology of his teachers came not only the result of the outbreak of the First World War 
and their response to it (Torrance 1962: 37f) but it was the result of his weekly struggle 
as a preacher with the Scriptures on the one hand and the life and struggles of the people 
around him (Torrance 1962: 36). 
According to Torrance the first great shift in Barth's theology is his break with 
the theological liberalism of his teachers which had its origins before the outbreak of the 
war but can be conveniently dated to 1914. This is documented in the first edition of 
Romans. The second shift is Barth's move to dialectics which coincides with the rest of 
his time in Safenwil and is seen in the second edition of Romans in which Barth throws 
off all philosophy and all positive assessments of religion. The two great influences on 
Barth in this period are Overbeck and Kierkegaard. The third movement in Barth's 
theology is the more gradual shift from dialectics to dogmatics (Torrance 1962: 37f, 48). 
Torrance reminds us that Barth's theology is proclamation. It is not an attempt to 
respond to the movements in the church and society of his day. Nor is it an attempt to 
construct an abstract work of theology; nor is it an engagement in apologetics. Rather 
112 Torrance's reading of Barth's rejection of natural theology on the grounds of its 
independence is supported by McGrath (McGrath 2001: 269,28 If. ). 
113 Torrance acknowledges the importance of the outbreak of the First World War and 
the rise of National Socialism to Barth's theology. 
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we find in Barth both a distancing from the world and an engagement with the world so 
that the gospel can be brought to 'bear upon the world in all the power of its newness as 
messageftom God to men' (Torrance 1962: 47). Torrance reminds us that Barth is above 
all a preacher and that the whole of his theology is to some extent proclamation 
(Torrance 1962: 47). 
3.2.3 Torrance's interpretation of Barths position 
Torrance consistently argues that Barth's rejection of natural theology is on the 
grounds of its independence of God's actual self-revelation in Christ (Torrance 
1980b: 87; Torrance 1962: 114f). This is not the usual interpretation of Barth, but it is 
supported by Barth's own comments (Barth 1962b: 342). Hauerwas also interprets Barth 
in this way (Hauerwas 2002: 1580, as does McGrath who argues that Barth's 'hostility 
towards natural theology ... rests on his fundamental belief that it undermines the 
necessity and uniqueness of God's self-revelation' (McGrath 2001: 269). 
Luoma argues that Torrance's main objection to independent natural theology is 
that it attempts to build a logical bridge from humanity to God. This is certainly one 
factor in Torrance's rejection of traditional natural theology. Torrance rejects 
independent natural theology for several reasons: it introduces dualism into the being of 
God, separating the doctrine of God from the doctrine of the Trinity; it attempts to usurp 
the place of God in revelation; and it violates the sovereignty of God in his self- 
revelation. 
Knowledge of God that is independent of God's act of self-revelation puts God 
into our hands; it takes from God's control the decision of if, when, where, and under 
what conditions God is known. Knowledge of God which begins with the a priori 
reasoning of the enquiring subject does not pay attention to external reality, to the actual 
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revelation of God within the contingent universe. It is the equivalent of a science which 
rejects empirical methods and instead attempts to come to knowledge of the world by 
logical reasoning from first principles. 
In his time in Basel in the academic year 1937 - 1938 Torrance attended the 
lectures that make up Church Dogmatics III] which deal with knowledge of God and 
natural theology (McGrath 1999: 45). In his own work on theology and theological 
epistemology Torrance builds on several areas of Barth's theology which emerged in 
the debate with Brunner. Like Barth he argues that God's self-revelation is not 
grounded in anything external to or other than God but is self grounded (Torrance 
1962: 114f, 137). Torrance, again following Barth, understands the absolutely central 
place of Christ in God's self-revelation. Christ is the mediator; he is both the revealing 
God and the human who receives and responds to that self-revelation (Torrance 
1992a: 77ff; Torrance 1962: 115-117). Both Barth and Torrance view revelation as 
supernatural, as a miracle of grace. Barth and Torrance are both from the reformed 
tradition and in their understanding of revelation the 'reformation solas' are central; 
revelation is: through Christ alone, in Scripture alone, and above all by grace alone, 
especially this latter (Torrance 1984a: 291). The independent character of natural 
theology undermines the epistemology of grace and the sovereignty of God in his self- 
revelation, for if it is possible for humanity to arrive at true knowledge of God in 
independence of his self-revelation, then it means that human beings are able to 
determine the conditions upon which they can achieve knowledge of God (See McGrath 
2001: 269). The notion of independent knowledge of God becomes even more 
problematic when, with Barth and Torrance, we define knowledge of God in personal 
rather than propositional terms. 
Traditional natural theology begins by establishing the doctrine of the one God 
,, I 
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on the grounds of natural theology, 114 and then proceeds to the doctrine of the Trinity 
which is established by special revelation. In this approach there is no intrinsic link 
between the doctrine of the one God and the doctrine of the Trinity. Torrance regards 
this as a dualist approach to the knowledge of God which he believes is characteristic of 
western theology both Protestant and Catholic. The term which Torrance 
charateristically uses to refer to God is neither Unity nor Trinity but Triunity. 115 Ile 
defines Triunity as 'Trinity in Unity and Unity in Trinity' (Torrance 1988a: 10). 
In the Catholic tradition of 'text-book' theology developed under the influence 
of Aquinas' Summa there is what Barth calls a 'split concept of God'. ' 16 Aquinas first 
establishes the doctrine of the one God in questions 2 to 26 of part one of the Summa, 
and then in questions 27 to 43 he presents the doctrine of the Trinity. This theology 
arrives at the idea of the oneness of God, and then subsequently gives an account of the 
Trinity; however, Torrance points out that Aquinas fails to establish any intrinsic 
connection between these two doctrines (Torrance 1992: 100). The effect of this is to 
isolate the doctrine of the Trinity from the rest of theology. The doctrine of God 
becomes abstract and detached from the history of salvation (Torrance 1992: 100). 117 
This traditional argument that Aquinas sets forth in the Summa natural theology 
as an antecedent and independent means of establishing the doctrine of the one God has 
been challenged in recent years (see Hauerwas 2002: 22-37). Barth, followed by 
Torrance, understands the first part of the Summa to constitute an independent natural 
theology, yet Aquinas himself never calls it natural theology. The longstanding 
114 John Baillie notes that for over a thousand years in Christian thought, it was accepted 
that there are 'Two quite distinct avenues to the knowledge of God' (Baillie 1939: 36), 
that is the knowledge of God that human beings are able to discover for themselves, and 
revealed knowledge. 
115 See the introduction to Torrance's work on the Nicene Creed, Torrance 1988a: I- 11. 
116 Quoted in Torrance 1992: 99. 
117 See also Rahner 1970: 117f who makes the same point. 
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assumption that Aquinas' 'five ways' are natural philosophical arguments for the 
existence of God has come under attack in recent years. Citing the work of George 
Hendry Hauerwas states that 'it is seldom noticed that the so-called proofs for the 
existence of God were perfected at a time when the existence of God was barely 
questioned' (Hauerwas 2002: 26). 1 18 For Aquinas the existence of God is unproblernatic 
and so he does not attempt to construct proofs for the existence of God. Nevertheless 
the 'five ways' were regarded and used by later apologists as proofs for God's 
existence. Aquinas' purpose in the early sections of the Summa is to relate God to 
nature; it is not to ground our knowledge of God in nature. Hauerwas writes: 
The existence of God, then, which can be known by natural reason, is rightly 
understood as a preamble to the articles of faith, but 'preamble' does not mean 
that the truthfulness of the articles of faith must await for such preambles to be 
established before their truth can be known (Hauerwas 2002: 30). 
The problem arises in later centuries when the existence of God is called into 
question. In this new situation Aquinas' theology is used to independently establish the 
existence of the one God. When this happens a dualism is introduced into the doctrine 
of God and the doctrines of the Trinity and the unity of God become separated. While 
this is a misinterpretation of Aquinas it is how his work has traditionally been 
interpreted and used. His 'five ways' have been regarded as an independent means for 
human reason to establish the existence of God and Torrance would have encountered 
this in Baillie's lectures. 119 
Torrance notes that the duality in the concept of God which arises in the 
traditional reading of Aquinas in the Catholic tradition is also found within the 
Protestant tradition as represented by the Westminster Confession; for the same 
118 See George Hendry, Theology offature, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 
1980: 14, cited by Hauerwas 2002: 26. 
119 For such a reading of Aquinas, see Baillie 1939, Chapter Nine passim. 
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detachment of the doctrines of God and the Trinity is to be found there (Torrance 
1992a: 100). Building on his reading of Barth, who insists that the self revealing God is 
Trinity (Barth 1975: 296-304), Torrance's case against traditional natural theology is 
that it displays both epistemological and ontological dualism. The epistemological 
dualism arises when the unity of God is derived from natural theology and the doctrine 
of the Trinity is developed from revealed theology; and the ontological dualism arises 
when no intrinsic connection is made between the doctrine of the unity and Trinity of 
God (Toffance 1992a: 1000. 
The concept of God which emerges from an independent or traditional natural 
theology is rejected by Torrance as an abstraction which falls short of the reality of God 
as he has revealed himself in Christ. In independent natural theology God's being 
becomes separated from his actions and the doctrine of God from the history of 
salvation. Once we follow the usual western approach to the doctrine of God, then the 
Trinity becomes a second stage; something 'added on' which is not essential to our 
understanding of God's being. For Torrance this independent natural theology merely 
muddies the waters. Instead of providing light in humanity's search for understanding it 
serves to drive a wedge between the being and the action of God. 
3. Z4 The unity of act and being in theology and the sciences 
According to Torrance Barth's formulation of the unity of God's act and being is 
one of his most important contributions to twentieth century theology. Its place in 
theology is likened by Torrance to the place of Einstein's theory of general relativity in 
physics (Torrance 1990: 129-30, see also page 18). Traditional natural theology does not 
emerge from an actual revelation or experience of God. It is an a priori concept; an 
abstract notion which asks how God might be known in theory. In his work on 
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epistemology in theology and in the natural sciences Torrance lays great emphasis on 
the fact that the natural sciences proceed by a posteriori rather than a priori means. 
Scientific method is empirical. Torrance notes that an a priori epistemology introduces 
an element of dualism into scientific method by separating the formal from the 
empirical components of knowledge; whereas an a posteriori epistemology holds these 
two elements together (see Torrance 1984a: 1-59,61-105). This is one of the key 
elements in the realist epistemology which emerges from Torrance's doctrine of 
revelation. 
Barth and Torrance emphasise the importance for theology of holding together 
God's act and being; this undergirds their understanding of revelation and prevents a 
separation of the doctrines of the immanent or ontological Trinity from the economic 
Trinity. The approach of Torrance and Barth ensures that 'theoretical' components of 
the doctrine of God are properly coordinated with empirical components. An important 
component of Barth and Torrance's theology is the argument that what God reveals to 
humankind in revelation is himself. Torrance writes: 'The content of Revelation is God, 
for what God gives is identical with the Giver' (Torrance 1962: 145). 120 In the 
contingent historical reality of Jesus Christ the transcendent God is present within his 
creation (Torrance 1962: 146, cf Barth 1957: 257-272). 
3. Z5 God's creative relation to the universe 
Torrance rejects all approaches to the knowledge of God which are independent 
of actual self-revelation in Christ. Athanasius is another important source for Torrance's 
doctrine of revelation. According to Torrance Athanasius argues that the Father/Son 
relationship is intrinsic to God's being in a way that the creator/creation relationship is 
120 Cf. Barth 1975: 2657,295ff. 
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not (Torrance 1988a: 49). God is the Father of the Son and this relationship is, according 
to the Nicene Creed, eternal. God is eternally the Father of the Son; by contrast he is not 
eternally the creator. The Father/Son relationship not only precedes God's relationship 
to the creation; it is inherent to the very being of God. 12 1 Torrance's point is that 
although God is Father he became creator (Torrance 1988a: 87). 122 
When Torrance discusses the relationship between God and the creation he notes 
with approval Hilary of Poitiers' argument that time is an element of the created 
universe (Torrance 1988a: 81); however, he also notes that in arguing that while God is 
eternally Father he was not always creator, the Creed introduces into God's eternal 
being something akin to temporal relations (Torrance 1988a: 87f). Torrance argues that 
words such as 'before' and 'beginning' are temporally conditioned and must therefore 
mean something different when applied to God than when applied to events within the 
universe; however, he argues that God is free to act in a new way, even to 'be other than 
he was eternally' (Torrance 1988a: 89). Torrance therefore grounds the temporal change 
which characterises creation in the being of God (Torrance 1988a: 94). 
The inner relationship between the Father and the Son, defined in the Nicene 
formula that the Son is homoousios t6 patri, means that we come to knowledge of the 
Father through the Son in a way which is a more direct and accurate than to approach 
him through creation and arguing back to the uncreated creator (Torrance 1988a: 49). 
This means that revelation in Christ has precedence over revelation in creation, but only 
in terms of the content of revelation, that is to say that the God who meets us in Christ is 
God as he is in himself. The relationship between the Father and the creation is not only 
of a different scale or magnitude to that between the Father and the Son; it is of a 
12 1 This is 'what Torrance calls an onto-relation or being-constituting relation which is 
basic, characteristic or defining of what the realities implicated in the relation really 
are. ' (Colyer 200 1 a: 129). 
122 See section 5.2.2. 
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different order. There is no consubstantial relationship between God and creation. The 
creation is not God, it is not divine; it is external to the being of God and it cannot tell 
us who God is in himself. When we approach God from the perspective of his relation 
to the world as its creator we can at best only know of him 'in vague, general, and 
negative terms' (Torrance 1988a: 50) because the distinction between the creator and the 
creation is infinite. From the relationship of creator to creation we cannot know God as 
he is in himself but only in his absolute transcendence (Torrance 1988a: 50 cf. Torrance 
1999: 24f). Contrast this approach with that of Bernard Lonergan. a contemporary of 
Torrance's, who writes that human reason aided by creation is able to achieve 
knowledge of God, however, this knowledge is 'not immediate, face to face, but 
through a glass darkly' (Lonergan 1974: 118). 
What is not clear in Torrance's writing is that because Jesus Christ is a 
contingent fact or event of the created universe through whom the eternal and uncreated 
God becomes present there is both contingence and absoluteness about revelation in 
Christ. In terms of the content of revelation the doctrine of the incarnation means that 
there is no other God than the God who has revealed himself in Jesus Christ. In this 
sense revelation in Christ is nonnative for theology, but the God who has fully revealed 
himself in Jesus is free to reveal himself in other places and events of the contingent 
creation, such as in Scripture or in the creation itself. 
There a stark contrast between knowing God as he has revealed himself in Christ 
and God as we know him by logical inference from the creation, and however revelation 
in creation works it is not by human discovery or inference but is an act of revelation 
and as such originates with God and not with humanity. Torrance argues that: 
if we try to reach knowledge of God from some point outside of God, we cannot 
operate with any point in God by reference to which we can test or control our 
conceptions of him, but are inevitably flung back upon ourselves. Even if we 
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relate God negatively to what we are in ourselves, we are nevertheless quite 
unable to escape using ourselves as some sort of measure for what we think or 
say of him. Thus in the last resort it is with reference to our private opinion... 
and what we arbitrarily think up or devise... from ourselves, that we form 
judgements about both the Son and the Father... (Torrance 1988a: 51). 
This is not simply seeing 'through a glass darkly'; for Torrance there is no possibility at 
all of knowing God apart from his self-revelation but his doctrine of revelation leaves 
open the possibility of God's self-revelation in creation. 
3. Z 6 The 'unscientific character'of independent natural theology 
Torrance argues that independent natural theology is imprecise and unscientific 
(Torrance 1988a: 5 1). His definition of 'scientific' knowledge is knowledge which 
results from enquiry which is in accordance with the nature of the reality under 
investigation (Torrance 1969a: Xi). 123 This definition of scientific enquiry is important 
for Torrance's argument that theology is a scientific discipline in the same way as the 
natural sciences, Torrance argues that it is the methodology that makes theology a 
science rather than the matter under investigation. Although he admits that theology 
differs from the other special sciences he argues that these differences are due to the 
unique subject matter of theological science and arc similar to the ways in which the 
methodologies of the various natural sciences differ from one another. Torrance writes: 
There are of course essential differences between every special science, and it is 
upon those differences that they depend as separate sciences in their own 
123 Barth also calls theology a science for the same reason: 'Theology is one among 
those human undertakings traditionally described as 'sciences'. Not only the natural 
sciences are 'sciences'. Humanistic sciences also seek to apprehend a specific object 
and its environment in the manner directed by the phenomenon itself-, they seek to 
understand it on its own terms and to speak of it along with all the implications of its 
existence. The word 'theology' seems to signify a special science, a very special 
science, whose task is to apprehend, understand, and speak of 'God" (Barth 1979: 3); 
notice, however, that Barth adds the qualifier 'humanistic' to 'science'; cf Einstein 
1982: 226. 
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right.... While this certainly applies to the place of theology among the special 
sciences, there are differences between theological science and every other 
science due to the fact that theology has for its proper and primary object God 
Himself in His speaking and acting. All the other sciences deal with creaturely 
realities and only with aspects of being, whereas in theology we have to do also 
with the creative Source of all being (Torrance 1969a: 295). 
Torrance's case is that in any enterprise that is properly scientific ontology precedes and 
determines epistemology. 
In a review of Theological Science Hick questions Torrance's use of the word 
Gscience' to describe the discipline of theology (Hick 1969: 57-58). He argues that what 
Torrance has demonstrated is that theology is scientific in the sense of the German word 
wissenschaftlich; and this is 'at its best an exact and disciplined study' (Hick 1969: 57). 
However, Hick argues that this is not 'science' in the same way that the natural sciences 
are 'scientific'. flick is correct in noting that the German terin wissenschaftlich often 
has a wider application than the English word 'scientific', nevertheless Torrance is 
clearly arguing that theology is more than a rigorous discipline in the sense of what 
flick means by wissenschaft. Torrance clearly argues that theology properly pursued is 
scientific in exactly the same way that the other special sciences are scientific 
(Torrance I 969a: 286-295). Torrance regards wissenschaft as much more than 'an exact 
and disciplined study'. Torrance argues that to be scientific a discipline must be 
grounded in the reality of its object of enquiry (Torrance 1969a: 279). He argues that: 
A scientific theology is what the Gen-nans call wissenschafilich, that is, a 
rigorous, disciplined, methodical and organized knowledge. It is knowledge that 
insists upon the truthfulness of its undertaking and is dedicated to the detection 
of error and the rejection of all that is unreal. It will have nothing to do with a 
method that is not governed by the material content of its knowledge, or with 
confused, disorderly or loose thinking, or with hypothetical objects (Torrance 
1969a: 116). 
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For Torrance the most important concept is that theology's method is governed by the 
content of its knowledge; and this is what makes theology a science. Torrance rejects 
independent natural theology as 'unscientific' because its method is not governed by the 
nature of its object instead it proceeds by speculation and logical deduction. He regards 
independent natural theology as speculative and unrelated to God's actual self- 
revelation in Christ (Torrance 1969a: 1740. 
According to Torrance the only reliable source of knowledge of God is God in 
his self-revelation in Christ; in the incarnation God gives us knowledge of himself and 
he gives more than knowledge. He gives himself. 124 Torrance is not interested in the 
possibility of our knowing God, but in actual knowledge which comes from God's self- 
revelation. This is in part an issue of sovereignty: God as God must remain lord in all of 
our knowledge of him (Torrance 1969a: 299). We can only know God as He has 
revealed himself to us; and because he is God he remains in control of all of our 
knowledge of him. 125 Torrance goes on to argue that because our knowledge of God 
depends entirely upon God's sovereign act it is also an issue of grace. He writes that 
God: 
gives Himself to our thinking; He objectifies Himself for us, in an act of pure 
freedom and Grace, and therefore in such a way that He does not resign that 
freedom and Grace, but remains free to give Himself to us as He pleases, or even 
to withdraw Himself (Torrance 1969a: 37f, cf. Torrance 1962: 146f ). 
Torrance has a strong doctrine of the sovereign and gracious God who in Christ 
acts to reveal himself to his creatures. This is the reason why he has no time either for 
124 Torrance writes: 'In grace the Gift which God bestows is identical with himself the 
Giver - concretely, this meant Jesus Christ, for he is the Deed of God identical with 
himself, and in him God gives none other than himself to men for their salvation and 
ustification' (Torrance 1962: 146). 
25 Torrance writes: 'Knowledge of this God cannot be moulded according to our 
plastic ideas or controlling archetypes; that would be idolatry' (Torrance 1969a: 37). 
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traditional natural theology or for approaches which see natural theology as a preamble 
to theology proper; a preparation for revealed theology. 126 Our argument is that God can 
be known apart from revelation in Christ, and that this is clear even in Torrance's own 
writings, however the God who is known is the same God who has supremely revealed 
himself in Jesus by becoming incarnate, and all knowledge of God, whether in Christ, 
Scripture or creation is an act of gracious and sovereign self revelation. 
3.3 Torrance's explanation of Barth's rejection of natural theology 
Torrance does not simply repeat Barth's rejection of natural theology, he 
develops it extensively according to his own interest in theology as a science' 27 thereby 
bringing what he believes to be a proper, that is non-independent, natural theology 
within the scope of dogmatics. This is one of Torrance's major theological 
achievements and in this work he 'stands on the shoulders' of Barth. Torrance argues 
that there are two fundamental theological reasons for Barth's unequivocal rejection of 
natural theology: the first is the doctrine of grace (Torrance 1962: 23); the second is the 
objectivity of God's self-revelation in Christ (Torrance 1962: 61 ). 128 
3.3.1 Natural theology and the doctrine ofgrace in Barth 
When applied to revelation the doctrine of grace tells us that all of our 
knowledge of God arises from God's decision to reveal himself to us. We do not 
stumble onto knowledge of God, nor is it the result of an innate ability on our part 
126 On the implications of Torrance's theological epistemology for all human ways of 
knowing see section 5.3.2. 
127 Torrance's interest in theological science was also kindled whilst he was a student in 
Edinburgh by his teacher Daniel Lamont (McGrath 1999: 34). 
128 Torrance quotes The Word of God and the Word of Man in support of this point 
(Barth 1928: 181). 
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(Torrance 1962: 69). This emphasis on grace implies a Calvinist anthropology. 129 We 
have seen that Torrance follows Barth in emphasising the total objectivity of God's self- 
revelation in Christ. In his act of revelation God reveals himself, not something about 
himself. 130 
Torrance argues that for Barth the decisive factor in rejecting natural theology is 
God's actual self-revelation in Christ (Torrance 1990: 141). He notes that as Barth: 
looked out from the perspective of Christian theology upon natural theology he 
did not reject the existence of natural theology as such or commit himself to any 
metaphysical refutation of it, but found himself trying to understand it as 
something that is 'impossible' and nevertheless 'exists', i. e. something that 
exists in opposition to the actual knowledge of God mediated through his Word, 
and which must therefore be called in question by it as illegitimate and invalid in 
so far as it claims to be knowledge of God as he really is (Torrance 
1990: 14 1). 131 
Torrance notes that in the grace of God which is seen in Christ there is a solid 
epistemological structure which is integrated with the actual knowledge of God in his 
self-revelation in Christ; and this structure, which lies at the heart of Barth's theology, 
gives rise to his rejection of natural theology (Torrance 1990: 143). Torrance argues that 
according to Barth our actual knowledge of God in Christ allows 'no place for an 
independent natural theology in the body of theology proper or even as a preamble to 
the faith' (Torrance 1990: 145, emphasis Torrance). Torrance argues that when Barth 
rejects all natural theology he stands in the reformed tradition for this is a corollary of 
the reformation doctrine of sola gratia (Torrance 1990: 143). As we noted Barth's 
questioning of the legitimacy of natural theology was reinforced by events in Germany 
in the 1930's (Torrance 1990: 1420. Nevertheless, Torrance contends that Barth's 
grounds for rejecting natural theology were primarily theological and epistemological 
129 See section 1.4. 
130 See section 1.6.1. 
13 1 Torrance cites Barth 1957: 63-254 in support. 
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(Torrance 1990: 144). 
Toffance notes that Barth has been accused of stating the case for the distinction 
between God and humanity in such strong terms that his position has become dualist 
(Torrance 1990: 137f). In Barth's early writings, especially in Romans, we see evidence 
of the influence of Kierkegaard on his dialectical theology. He speaks of the infinite 
qualitative difference between the transcendent God who is wholly other and 
humankind. Torrance argues that when Barth uses such absolute language to emphasise 
the distinction between God and humanity he is reacting against contemporary liberal 
Protestantism which so blurred the distinction between God and humanity that in its 
thought God was assimilated to nature, revelation to history, and theology to 
anthropology (Torrance 1990: 137). For Barth it cannot be a case of Christ and 
something else, for the something else will eventually usurp the place of Christ. This is 
what Barth saw in the theology of the Gennan Christians and it is why he is so critical 
of Brunner and the other 'dialectical theologians' Gogarten and Merz. Barth's position 
was worked out against the German liberal Protestant tradition that he had recently and 
decisively rejected. For Barth there can be no bridge between earth and heaven based 
upon nature; there can be no way for human beings to reach God. The bridge between 
God and humankind was made by 'the invasion of God in his Godness into time and 
human existence and his activity within them' (Torrance 1990: 13 7), i. e. by Christ who is 
the bridge between God and creation. Torrance argues that for Barth the difference and 
distinction between God and his creation is not some sort of deistic dualism in which 
God and creation do not interact, rather it serves to emphasise that in revelation, as in 
every other aspect of his relation to the creation, God is sovereign; he is not at our 
disposal. All revelation is an act of the gracious God and as such it is a gift, not 
something that can be demanded as a right. Nor is knowledge of God something that 
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can be achieved by our own efforts. This emphasis upon the utter grace of God which 
Torrance found in Barth is characteristic of his own theology and theological 
epistemology. 
3.3.2 The objectivity of God's self-revelation and natural theology in Barth 
Torrance argues that a second, related, factor in Barth's rejection of natural 
theology is his emphasis on the objectivity of God's self-revelation. According to 
Torrance this was a result of Barth's encounter with the Blurnhardts and their theology 
(Torrance 1990: 139). The objectivity and realism in Barth's interpretation of the Bible 
ran counter to the sub ectivity of both contemporary liberal theology and pietism. j 
Barth's understanding of the objectivity of revelation is informed by the reformation 
concept of the word as grounded in God's being; 132 thus in his Word who is Jesus Christ 
God communicates himself. 133 This self-communication of God invalidates any 
knowledge of God which may be reached apart from his word (Torrance 1990: 139f). 
Barth's rejection of natural theology is not, argues Torrance, for abstract or 
theoretical reasons; it is instead a corollary of the actual knowledge of God in Jesus 
Christ. The knowledge of God which is based on self-revelation in Christ invalidates 
and calls into question any other source of theology. However, Torrance notes that 
Barth's concession that (independent) natural theology does exist as something 
impossible. For Barth natural theology is: 
something that exists in opposition to the actual knowledge of God mediated 
through his Word, and which must therefore be called in question by it as 
illegitimate and invalid so long as it claims to be knowledge of God as he really 
132 See above Chapter One Revelation in Christ. 
133 Torrance writes: 'If the incarnation means that the eternal truth of God has entered 
time and for ever assumed historical form in Jesus Christ, how can we know the truth 
except by entering ourselves into historical relation to its incarnate reality in tirneT 
(Torrance 1990: 140). 
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is (Torrance 1990: 141). 
Torrance argues that for Barth natural theology originates in our desire for autonomy 
from God. It is part of our attempt to justify ourselves 'over against the grace of God' 
(Torrance 1990: 142). The ground upon which Barth, followed by Torrance, takes his 
stand against natural revelation is the grace of God in Jesus Christ. In Christ, especially 
in his vicarious self-sacrifice, God has done something for us that we cannot do for 
ourselves: he has reconciled himself to us. According to Torrance this is not only of 
importance for our understanding of reconciliation; it is of epistemological significance. 
It means that we cannot of ourselves by nature achieve the 'cognitive union with God 
which true knowledge of him requires' (Torrance 1990: 143). This principle implies 
both the fall of humankind and original sin. The fall affects our mental capacity as much 
as it affects our moral nature, and in order to know God we must be redeemed from our 
mental alienation; 134 our minds must be renewed and reconciled by God's grace. In 
Christ God has acted to reconcile himself to our fallen and alienated human nature 
which includes our minds and he has done this in his saving death and resurrection in a 
way that precludes and invalidates any other possible way of reconciliation. We have 
seen that in Torrance's theology reconciliation and revelation are two sides of the same 
coin. Revelation is reconciliation because in his act of reconciliation, God in Christ 
reveals himself to us, not merely something about himself. 135 Here Torrance agrees with 
Barth, and writes: 
That is why Barth insists that in the face of the cross of Christ we are bound to 
say that all natural theology perishes at the point where the knowledge of the 
one and only God is gained in the face of Jesus Christ and by the renewing of 
134 We saw above in Chapter One that when we look at Torrance's implied theological 
anthropology, that the theme of our mental alienation is an important one in his 
theology, see section 1.4. 135 See chapter one. 
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human beings in the Holy Spirit (Torrance 1990: 144). 
The doctrine ofjustification by grace alone has profound epistemological 
significance for Torrance and Barth. It circumvents natural, independent, knowledge of 
God by arguing that we know God by his act alone and not through our own efforts. It is 
for this reason that Torrance follows Barth in rejecting any independent source of 
knowledge of God. This is not simply on the grounds of God's self revelation in Christ; 
it is on the more basic grounds of the doctrine of justification by grace alone. The actual 
knowledge of God in Christ, together with the epistemology of grace, renders any 
independent knowledge of God, or even an independent ground of the knowledge of 
God, unnecessary, irrelevant, and something which distracts from actual revelation. It is 
because of the gracious nature of all our knowledge of God, witnessed supremely in the 
incarnation of the Word in Jesus that the theology of those twentieth century 
theologians who argue that knowledge of God is founded upon some aspect of human 
nature, such as we find in Brunner's eristics or in Karl Rahner, 136 runs aground. 
136 Karl Rahner investigates the possibility of our knowledge of God, and of the 
possibility of our reception of God's revelation. He argues that there must be something 
within human nature which makes such knowledge of God possible. Rahner argues that 
the human mind is structured in such a way that it is by nature directed towards God. 
Like Brunner, Rahner's theology has been greatly influenced by existentialist 
philosophy and anthropology. Rahner spent time studying with Martin Heidegger, and 
we can see his influence on Rahner as he tries to make theology accessible to the 
modem human mind, especially with his understanding of the pre-apprehension of 
being. There are parallels with Brunner's eristics, which is hardly surprising, as his 
theology is also rooted in an existentialist anthropology which is derived from his 
reading of Kierkegaard. In his theology, Brunner tried to account for the existential 
crisis which arises from what he perceived to be the universally felt contradiction 
between what we are and what we feel that we ought to be. Rahner sees not so much an 
existential crisis as a striving towards the infinite which he says is inherent in all of our 
striving for understanding. In both Brunner and Rahner we find the use of existentialist 
anthropology to explain what they believe to be a natural openness towards God and his 
revelation inherent in all people. 
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3.4 Torrance's development of the critique of natural theology 
Torrance follows Barth in insisting that in all our knowledge of God we begin, 
not with speculation, but with how God has actually revealed himself. It is for this 
reason that the doctrine of revelation in Christ is so central to his theology and his 
epistemology. It is also the main reason for his objection to traditional or independent 
natural theology. The attempt to construct a theory of how one might come to know 
God apart from the actual knowledge of God given in his self-revelation in Christ is, 
according to Torrance's definition, unscientific (Torrance 1980b: 89; cf. Torrance 
1969a: 10 1-105,3390. Any attempt to impose an a priori epistemology on theology in 
which theory precedes experience is a reversion to idealism, to the days before the 
empirical sciences. If theology is to be regarded as a science then its method and content 
must be integrated. Traditional natural theology attempts to develop an account of how 
we know God independently of our actual knowledge of God, its method and content 
are not integrated. In support of this point, Torrance often cites the analogy of the 
relationship of geometry to physics. 137 Briefly, Torrance argues that before Einstein 
Euclidean geometry was regarded as a logically necessary science and independent of 
actual physics. Since Einstein it has come to be realised that geometry is part of physics. 
Euclidean geometry has its origins in experience, in empirical reality, but it has been 
abstracted from the empirical realm and is now regarded as an abstract and necessary 
system which is prior to empirical knowledge. 
Torrance argues that Christian theology knows nothing of God in general or in 
abstract; rather it knows about the God who is Father, Son and Holy Spirit; the creator 
who in Christ has revealed himself to us. When Christianity speaks of God it does so as 
137 See Torrance 1980b: 91-93; Torrance 1985b: 40f-, Torrance 1990: 148f-, Torrance 
1976: ixf; Torrance 1999: 32f; see section 4.3. 
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a short-hand for the Trinity and not for some sort of prior non-Trinitarian monotheism 
or for a divine essence. Torrance cites Athanasius in support of his thesis that the 
Father's relation to the Son is eternal and intrinsic to his very nature. 138 God is Father, 
he became creator; therefore his relationship to the creation is of a fundamentally 
different order. 139 As we have seen Torrance understands the patristic homoousion to 
imply that in Christ God has revealed himself within the creation to us as he really is; 
therefore it is hard to see how any theology which is not Trinitarian and Christocentric 
can be regarded as a Christian theology. 140 If God is truly Trinity; if, as Torrance 
repeatedly asserts, the economic Trinity is the immanent or ontological Trinity 
(Torrance 1988a: 135, c. f. Barth 1957: 250) then there could not be a theology 
independent of God's actual self-revelation. There could not be a legitimate theology 
which brings us, not to the Trinity, but to some general divinity. The effect of having an 
independent natural theology and a revealed theology would be to introduce confusion 
and division into our knowledge of God; we would be left with a natural knowledge of 
the one God and a revealed knowledge of the Triune God (Torrance 1980b: 90f, 
Torrance 1990: 15 If). This confusion arises when theology attempts to give an account 
of how we can know God in isolation from our actual, revealed, knowledge of God 
(Torrance 1980b: 90). Torrance argues that a scientific theology grounded in God's 
actual self-revelation excludes natural theology 'as a sort of 'foreign body" because a 
scientific theology is determined to act 'in strict conformity with the nature of its proper 
object, and to behave toward God as He has actually chosen to reveal Himself 
(Torrance 1969a: 103). 
Perhaps more than anything else what Torrance has taken and developed from 
138 See section 3.2.5. 
139 Torrance's doctrine of creation is both Christologically grounded and integrated with 
his understanding of redemption see section 4.6.1. 
140 See section 1.2.2. 
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Barth's approach to theology is the emphasis on the objectivity of God's self-revelation. 
In Theological Science Torrance outlines the necessary conditions of any theology 
which claims to be Christian (Torrance 1969a: 37-43). The influence of Barth is obvious 
here and we will see from Torrance's approach to all theology why he insists that a 
proper natural theology is not a prelude to or precondition of dogmatic theology. Rather 
the only permissible natural theology would be, according to Torrance, an element of 
Christian dogmatic theology. Moreover as we have seen Torrance claims that this new 
approach to natural theology is a development of Barth. 14 1 Torrance will not let us 
forget that in addressing God in his self-revelation theology is dealing with an utterly 
unique object of enquiry. Therefore, although there are elements of theological science 
which are analogous to the other special sciences there are necessarily elements which 
are unique. All branches of the natural sciences differ from one another in their method 
of investigation as their respective epistemologies arise from their object of enquiry 
(Torrance 1969a: 110- 115). One important difference between theology and all other 
sciences is that in theology the object of our knowledge remains sovereign of all our 
knowledge of him. As Torrance writes: 'our knowing of God [must] be brought into 
conformity with what He reveals of Himself, and under the control of what lie gives of 
Himself' (Torrance 1969a: 37). This means that there is an essential givenness about our 
knowledge of God. We do not and we cannot discover God by our own work or effort. 
True knowledge of God is a gift. In one of his earliest writings on the reformed creeds 
Torrance states that the founding principle of all theology is the covenant of grace 
(Torrance 1959: 1-lv). Furthen-nore not only does God never cease to be lord of all our 
knowledge of him; he also never ceases to be a person. One implication of this is that 
theology is a mutual relationship and a dialogue. As Torrance writes: 
141 On Torrance's new approach to natural theology as an element of dogmatics see 
section 4.2. 
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theological knowledge is not reflection upon our rational experience or even 
upon faith; it is reflection upon the object of faith in direct dialogical relation 
with that object, and therefore in faith - i. e. in conversation and communion with 
the living God who communicates Himself to us in acts of revelation and 
reconciliation and who requires of us an answering relation in receiving, 
acknowledging, understanding, and in active personal participation in the 
relationship He establishes between us. (Torrance 1969a: 39). 
We have seen that Torrance places great emphasis upon the objectivity of God's 
self-revelation; it is one of the central elements of his theological epistemology. We 
have also seen that he is careful not to confuse the word of God with the human words 
which are used to communicate God's self-revelation. The word of God is neither 
limited nor defined by our words, rather it always transcends them (Torrance 
1969a: 39f). Finally Torrance reminds us that God is active and that his act of self- 
revelation is not isolated from the whole of his activity towards us; rather his revelation 
is part of his act of redemption and reconciliation. There is a purpose in all of God's 
dealings with humankind including revelation; therefore Torrance can write that the 
'truth with which we are concerned in theology is teleological truth ... truth 
laying hold 
upon us for a divine end' (Torrance 1969a: 41). For Torrance theological truth is saving 
truth and divine revelation is divine reconciliation. 
3.5 Discussion and conclusion 
Barth's rejection of natural theology and his subsequent Christological 
grounding of revelation is of fundamental importance for Torrance's theology and for 
his theological method. Barth emphasises the unexpected and unnatural nature of 
revelation. It exists, not as something for which human beings have a natural capacity 
but as a miracle of grace. Torrance argues that Barth's rejection of natural theology is 
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primarily for theological reasons. The polemical nature of his writings on natural 
theology was influenced by events in Germany in the 1930's, but that rejection itself 
was for predominantly theological principles. Barth's emphasis on the absolute 
sovereignty of God in his self-revelation supports Torrance's interpretation of Barth, for 
he has always emphasised that what Barth finds most offensive in natural theology is its 
independent status. Torrance, following Barth, has always laid great emphasis upon the 
sovereignty of God and upon the gracious, even miraculous nature of God's self- 
revelation. Barth's insistence that all revelation is mediated through the Son has led to 
him being charged with reducing the totality of God to what is revealed in Christ (e. g. in 
Muller 1990). 142 
Throughout his career Torrance carried on dialogue with Barth and his theology, 
both in person and through commenting on Barth's writings. From Barth's rejection of 
natural theology Torrance takes some basic principles which inform his own approach 
to revelation and knowledge of God. They are that knowledge of God is grounded in 
God; that Christ has a central place in our knowledge of God; and that revelation is 
supernatural and a miracle of grace in which God is always in control. The concePt of 
an independent source of knowledge of God is questionable even when applied to 
propositional knowledge of God. Barth and Torrance, however, conceive of knowledge 
of God in primarily personal terms which renders the notion of independent knowledge 
of God meaningless. For Torrance as for Barth a non-independent knowledge of God 
means knowledge that is Christologically grounded for both argue that it is in Christ 
that God has actually revealed himself in the universe of space and time. 
The actual self-revelation of God in Christ is at the heart of Torrance's argument 
142 Muller notes that this 'Christological reductionism' is sometimes called 
'Christomonism' (Muller 1990: 690), a view that reduces all that can be known or said 
of God to what is revealed in Christ. 
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that Christian theology is to be regarded as a science. However, by Christian theology 
he means theology which begins with our actual knowledge in God's self revelation in 
the incarnation of the Word. He argues that the natural sciences follow an a posteriori 
method, that is, ontology precedes epistemology. This means that for Torrance as for 
Barth, the only reliable source of knowledge of God is his self revelation in Christ. We 
will see in Chapter Four that Torrance's insistence on the 'thinking after' God's actual 
revelation of himself allows him to draw together theological and scientific 
epistemologies. 
In his writing on revelation and Scripture Torrance in reality finds in the Bible 
another source or place of divine self-revelation, one that is not the same as revelation in 
Christ, but which is not distinct from it either. Our argument is that a close reading of 
Torrance's theology reveals that there are other loci of revelation than Jesus Christ, 
namely nature and scripture, but the God who encounters us in the Bible and in the 
creation is exactly the same God who is revealed in the incarnation of the Word. It is 
our argument that the content of divine revelation in Christ is normative because, unlike 
the other loci of revelation, Jesus Christ, a contingent 'event' of the space time universe, 
is also of one being with the Father. These other loci of revelation pass the test of 
Barth's rejection of independent sources of knowledge of God because as acts of divine 
self-revelation they are therefore under the sovereign control of God and do not in any 
way usurp the central place of Christ in revelation. 
In chapter four we will examine how Torrance redefines natural theology to 
bring it within the body of systematics rather than being a separate entity, and without 
compromising his Christocentric understanding of divine self-revelation. 
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Chapter Four Natural theology 11: non-independent natural theology 
4.1 Introduction 
Torrance operates with a Christologically founded epistemology of grace. This 
leads him to reject traditional natural theology on the grounds that its independent 
character impinges upon the sovereignty of God in his self-revelation (chapter three). 
Chapter four considers Torrance's attempt to integrate a re-fon-nulated, non-independent 
natural theology into the body of Christian doctrine. It was noted in chapter three that 
Barth's rejection of natural theology is a rejection of its claim to independence of 
special revelation and that this leaves open the possibility of a non-independent natural 
theology which Torrance pursues (Torrance 1976: ix f). 
Torrance attempts to relocate natural theology within the body of systematics. 
He then argues that a non-independent natural theology is central to Christian 
theological epistemology. He finds support for this theological epistemology in the 
natural sciences, particularly in the work of Einstein and Polanyi. Natural theology is 
the place in Torrance's work where theology and the natural sciences meet. We will see 
that he finds in his redefined natural theology the epistemological structure of the 
knowledge of God and that he argues that this epistemological structure is scientific in 
the same way that the epistemological structure of physics is scientific. We will also see 
that he also finds in the epistemology of the natural sciences support for his attack on 
theological liberalism: he argues that the sciences undermine the dualism which is 
inherent in liberal theologies. A further reason for the importance of natural theology in 
Torrance's epistemology is that revelation occurs not in abstraction from reality but 
within the universe of space and time; and natural theology is the place in Torrance's 
work where theological science meets the natural sciences. Torrance's redefined natural 
theology is therefore important for his understanding of divine self-revelation within the 
creation. 
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4.2 Torrance's relocation of natural theology within dogmatics 
4. Z I Natural theology as a dogmatic science 
We have noted that Torrance takes Barth's rejection of natural theology to mean 
the rejection of the independent character of traditional natural theology. His distinctive 
reading of Barth's position on natural theology was the subject of his last meeting with 
Barth in the summer of 1968 when he sought Barth's opinion on the relation of theology 
and the sciences and of the possibility of a non-independent natural theology. Barth 
agreed with this interpretation of his writings (Torrance 1976: x). Torrance's argument 
that Barth in rejecting independent natural theology has left open the possibility of a 
non-independent natural theology is unusual and questions have been raised about 
Barth's ability to understand Torrance's point and also about Torrance's memory of the 
occasion. 143 However, Torrance is not the only theologian to read Barth in this way: in 
his Gifford lectures flauerwas argues that 'Barth is the great "natural theologian" of the 
Gifford Lectures because he rightly understood that natural theology is impossible 
abstracted from a full doctrine of God' (Hauerwas 2002: 9f). 
Torrance's interpretation of Barth on natural theology finds support in Barth's 
G6ttingen lectures on dogmatics. In writing on God as the subject of revelation Barth 
states that although natural theology has traditionally been regarded as a preliminary to 
Christian revelation (Barth 1991: 91) he rejects natural theology as 'a contradiction in 
terms, an anthropomorphism, a basic naturalizing of revelation' (Barth 1991: 93). He 
continues by stating that natural theology 'has no independent existence' (Barth 
143 Weightman writes: 'since Barth died only a few weeks after this conversation it does 
not seem likely that Barth was able to subject Torrance's thinking here to close analysis. 
... My own (uncorroborated) feeling is that on further reflection Barth may well have 
expressed reservations about Torrance's use of Einstein here' (Weightman 1994: 177, 
note 112). 
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1991: 93 emphasis added). Barth's Gifford Lectures of 1937 also show support for 
Torrance's contention that it is the independence of natural theology which Barth rejects 
(Barth 1938: 30. Torrance's development of a non-independent natural theology is a 
legitimate development of Barth's position, albeit one that Barth did not pursue. 
According to Torrance when Barth rejects natural theology as an independent or 
antecedent branch of theology he opens up the way for it to be reinstated as an element 
of dogmatic theology (Toffance 1980b: 89f; 1985b: 400.144 Toffance defines dogmatic 
theology, which he argues is a science in the wider sense of the word, as: 'the kind of 
knowledge we get when we seek to know something in accordance with its own nature 
and activity' (Torrance 1964: 149; see also Torrance 1980b: 49-52). According to 
Torrance there is no single scientific method. In the natural sciences the method of 
enquiry is developed according to the object under investigation and therefore each 
science has its own peculiar methodology and what makes a discipline scientific is a 
commitment to the reality of the object. 145 Torrance argues that dogmatic theology, as 
developed in the refonned churches, is a science because it is 'bound to its given object, 
God's Word addressed to us in Jesus Christ' (Torrance 1964: 150-5 1, emphasis added). 
When Torrance relocates natural theology into the body of revealed theology he brings 
it within the scope of the scientific. According to Torrance dogmatic theology is 
Christologically grounded and based on God's self-revelation in Christ; it is the 
theology which this self revelation compels upon us (Torrance 1980b: 50). In 
144 Morrison commends 'Torrance's useful Christological interactionist incorporation of 
natural theology within and under the unique, specific Word of God in Jesus Christ' 
(Morrison 2001: 74). 
145 John Iledley Brooke writes: 'Many refer to some unique 'scientific method' to which 
exemplary science is supposed to conform. ... as the Cambridge philosopher William Whewell observed... the history of science already showed that each new branch of 
scientific inquiry had required its own distinctive methodology' (Brooke 1991: 6f). 
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transposing natural theology as an element of dogmatics Torrance brings it into 
correlation with revelation in Christ. 
4.2.2 The a posteriori nature ofscientific method 
Torrance argues that his redefined natural theology is scientific because its 
methods are developed in response to God's self-revelation. On Torrance's 
understanding traditional natural theology is neither dogmatic nor scientific because its 
methods are an a priori attempt to know God; it tries to construct a theory of how we 
could or might know God in abstraction from the actual knowledge of God in Christ. 
Torrance's criticism of traditional natural theology as unscientific is based upon his 
interpretation of Barth who insists that we can only know God in his actual self- 
revelation. When Torrance places theology among the natural sciences he argues that it 
differs from them in the same way as, for example, chemistry differs from physics. 146 
The natural sciences proceed by aposteriori method; scientific epistemology is 
determined to a large extent by its object of enquiry (Torrance 1971: 52-54). 147 In this 
respect theology is no different from the other sciences; however, Torrance argues that 
the 'object' of theological science is utterly unique and can never be regarded as an 
object of enquiry. Ile notes that the: 
Special sciences by their very nature deal with multiplicity and are properly 
separated off from each other in accordance with the particular aspects of being 
to which they are devoted and the nature of the evidence that obtains in each 
field of inquiry, so that direct criss-crossing from the one to the other violates 
146 See section 3.2.6. 
147 Torrance's definition of what constitutes a scientific epistemology finds support in 
Thiselton who argues: 'True "objectivity, " if this is the right word at all, depends on the 
appropriateness of the methods of inquiry to the object of inquiry. We do not prescribe 
the same methods in advance for all inquiries, on the assumption that one particular 
model of the act of knowledge is the only "objective" one' (Thiselton 1980: 188, 
emphasis Thiselton; cf. Torrance 1969a: 139). 
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their scientific procedure. But theological science has for its primary object the 
one God who is the source of all being and the ground of all truth, and as such it 
is concerned with a wholeness and unity that does not characterize any other 
special science. It is only within that wholeness that theology as a science has its 
right place, but it is no less scientific because it must operate within the total 
response of the believer to God, for to do anything else would mean a refusal to 
behave faithfully in terms of the nature of its proper object and therefore a 
betrayal of its true objectivity. This alone makes theological science unique 
among the sciences because it is more than a particular science, more than 
disciplined, controlled, accurate knowledge within some limited field, but it can 
be scientific knowledge of God, only if it is more than scientific knowledge in 
the ordinary sense. That is to say, theological science is not simply explanatory 
in terms of itself as a special branch of knowledge among others, but is 
explanatory only in relation to the one Truth of God in His total claims upon us 
and in His ultimate purposes for us and all creation (Torrance 1969a: 282f, cf. 
Torrance 1984a: 275f). 
When Torrance places natural theology within revealed theology there are two 
consequences which are important both for Torrance's theology and for our thesis. 
Natural theology is now correlated with God's actual self revelation and can be 
regarded as part of a scientific discipline. A second consequence is that natural theology 
when integrated with revealed theology correlates revealed theology with the creation; it 
brings theological science into relation with the natural sciences. 
According to Torrance, theology is a dogmatic science. All of the disciplines 
which are rightly called sciences are dogmatic sciences. Although in common use the 
term dogmatic has negative connotations, for Torrance it means systematic knowledge. 
He looks at the origins of the word dogmatic in the history of philosophy, and finds it 
used to refer to non-abstract thinkers, thinkers who ask questions of the world as they 
find it (Torrance 1980b: 50). Torrance notes the irony of the popular use of the word 
dogmatic today when it refers to ideas which are laid down authoritatively without 
reference to any supporting evidence. Such use of the term dogmatic is the opposite of 
its original meaning. 
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4. Z3 The unscientific nature of traditional natural theology 
Torrance argues that, in the original sense of the word, the natural sciences are 
dogmatic (Torrance 1964: 150). Scientific method is empirical; it asks questions of the 
world and in asking such questions 'nature is allowed to disclose itself and ... science 
is 
allowed to discern nature's inner form and order' (Torrance 1980b: 5 1). The 'laws of 
nature' can be regarded as dogmas which are disclosed by the universe to scientific 
enquiry; they are not rules imposed upon the universe in advance of its empirical 
investigation. Torrance argues that in the empirical investigation of the universe by the 
natural sciences the 'immanent rationality of the universe' is disclosed (Torrance 
1980b: 5 1). In terms of Torrance's definition of science, which is current in the post- 
Newtonian natural sciences (Thiseltonl980: 188), a major problem with traditional 
natural theology is that it is neither dogmatic nor scientific; it does not arise from the 
subject under observation. Traditional natural theology is an abstraction which is prior 
to and independent of God's act of self-revelation in Christ; it is an a priori approach 
imposed upon its subject. 
Torrance argues that traditional natural theologies arise in periods in western 
thought which are dominated by cosmological and epistemological dualism. There is a 
counterpart to traditional natural theology in the pre-Einsteinian approach to natural 
science which divides the world into the real and the phenomenal. There is the abstract 
and logically necessary realm of the 'real' which dominates the actual and occasional 
world of phenomena. Einstein's theories of relativity overturned the dominance of the 
abstract over the empirical and undermined both the cosmological and epistemological 
dualisms that had previously dominated the natural sciences. Torrance believes that 
traditional natural theologies are founded upon the same dualisms that dominate the 
natural sciences in the centuries before Einstein (Torrance 1980b: 76) and therefore 
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these natural theologies are undermined by Einstein's theories. Torrance argues that the 
criticism of natural theology in Barth prepares the ground for the restoration of natural 
theology to its proper place within the body of Christian theology. 148 
Torrance seeks to put theology on the same epistemological foundation as the 
natural sciences. We have seen that in his interpretation of revelation in Scripture and in 
nature ontology is always prior to epistemology; that is his theological method follows 
and is shaped by God's actual self-revelation in time and space. 
4.2.4 The relocation of natural theology within revealed theology 
Torrance takes Barth's rejection of independent natural theology as an 
opportunity to transpose it into the body of dogmatics, rather than being a preamble or a 
preface to revealed theology (Torrance 1976: ix). 149 Torrance regards his own 
development of natural theology as a natural continuation of the work of Barth and 
other great theologians in the history of the church. He argues that in Athanasius we see 
an example of non-independent natural theology (see Torrance 1980b: 76-78). However, 
Muller argues that Athanasius' writings support a traditional approach to natural 
theology and he uses his reading of Athanasius as the basis of his critique of Barth and 
Torrance on natural theology (Muller 1990). It is in those writings in which Athanasius 
addresses the non-Christian world that support for an independent natural theology has 
been claimed. For example, Torrance writes that in the Contra Gentes Athanasius has 
shown 'that as we let our minds tune in to the rational order that pervades the universe' 
(Torrance 1980b: 76) they are on a path to the true God. While this may appear to 
provide support for traditional natural theology Torrance points out that Athanasius 
148 For Torrance's critique of epistemological and cosmological dualism in science and 
theology, see section 4.5. 149 See section 4.2.1. 
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makes no attempt here to reach God by rational means; rather he is showing us 'a way 
of communing with the regulative and providential activity of God in the rational order 
of the universe' (Torrance 1980b: 76). Torrance argues that while Athanasius holds that 
the relationship between God and creation, including humankind, is real and actual as 
well as deeply rational being the work of the divine Logos, it is not, however, logically 
necessary. 150 As Torrance argues: 
This order pervading the universe does not derive from some immanent 
cosmological reason, or logos, such as the philosophers envisage, but from the 
uncreated and creative Logos of God, in whose image, by the grace of God, we 
ourselves have been created, so that as we contemplate the rational order in the 
creation, we are directed above and beyond ourselves to the one God, the Lord 
of creation (Torrance 1980b: 77). 
The rational order of the universe, a fundamental belief upon which the natural sciences 
are founded, is contingent upon the creator and as we seek out the source of the rational 
order of the creation we are directed to the creator (see section 5.2.9). Torrance argues 
that Athanasius' writings do not provide support for independent natural theology; 
rather they point to a unitary approach in which natural theology is integrated into the 
body of systematic theology. ' 51 This is what he believes Barth has achieved. Torrance 
notes that the Contra Gentes is 'a twin' to the treatise De Incarnatione which deals with 
the incarnation of the Logos who gave the creation, including humanity, its rational 
order, and who became human within the structures of the created universe as redeemer 
and rqvealer (Torrance 1980b: 77). Instead of providing an example of independent 
natural theology the writings of Athanasius show us that natural theology is integrated 
150 See the discussion of contingence in Torrance's theology in section 5.2. 
151 Torrance argues that: 'What [Athanasius] has to say ... of the knowledge of the 
world in its intrinsic intelligibility and order, within which God is known, cannot be 
abstracted and made to stand on its own, for it holds good and is consistent only in a 
deep and unbreakable polarity with our actual knowledge of God revealed in and 
through Jesus Christ' (Torrance 1980b: 78). 
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within revealed theology; that our knowledge of God and our knowledge of the creation 
both derive from the one Logos of God (Torrance 1980b: 77f). The God who reveals 
himself in the incarnate Christ reveals himself in and through the creation. The 
argument that it is possible to know God independently, without God's knowledge or 
consent finds no support in the writings of Athanasius. The natural world may be a 
locus of divine self-revelation but not of independent knowledge of God. 
Torrance argues that his non-independent natural theology is not novel or 
innovative; its origins are found in the patristic understanding of natural theology as 
witnessed by the writings of Athanasius. He argues that traditional approaches to natural 
theology which are independent a priori systems originate in periods when dualism 
dominated western thought and when, for apologetic reasons, the church tried to 
establish the existence of God independently of special revelation (Torrance 1985b: 37- 
39). He argues that traditional natural theology is innovative and that Barth, in rejecting 
natural theology is preparing the way for the restoration of a proper natural theology 
which is not rooted in dualism but is consonant with the unitary cosmology and 
epistemology uncovered in the natural sciences. 
Torrance lays bare for us exactly what an independent natural theology means; it 
is to know God without the action of God to reveal himself and without God's 
knowledge or consent (Torrance 1984a: 292, Torrance 1985b: 59, c. f. Torrance 
1959: lxxiii). Even on an understanding of knowledge of God as merely propositional 
this would be a difficult position to hold; if we accept Torrance's argument that 
revelation and reconciliation are one and that knowledge of God is personal knowledge, 
then the concept of independent knowledge of God is meaningless. 
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4. Z5 Natural theology and the self-revelation of God 
According to Torrance another problem with independent natural theology is 
that it abstracts the being of God from the acts of God. If God is known in the economy 
of salvation as Father, Son and Holy Spirit is this Triunity inherent to God's eternal 
being or is it merely a phenomenon of God's actions? A natural theology which 
presupposes that we can know God independently of his acts suggests that God as he is 
in himself is not necessarily identical with God as he is in his actions. An independent 
natural theology implies some sort of essential divine nature or abstract divinity which 
is different from the Trinitarian nature of God as revealed in the economy of salvation 
(Torrance 1980b: 89). Torrance rejects absolutely this cosmological dualism. 152 The 
doctrine of the homoousion is pivotal to Torrance's theology because in asserting that 
the Son is of one being with the Father any divergence between the act and the being of 
God is rejected. Torrance argues that the essential unity of the economic and the 
immanent Trinity belongs to the basic Christian concept of God and makes problematic 
any doctrine of the one God gained apart from the economy of salvation (Torrance 
1980b: 89). For Torrance 'God' means 'Trinity'. He believes that his non-independent 
natural theology is no novelty, rather he regards his reintegration of natural theology 
within the body of dogmatics as a return to the understanding of the nature of God and 
the relation of the acts and the being of God which obtained in the early centuries of the 
church (Torrance 1996a: 6-9). The epistemological importance of the homoousion is 
that it forges a link between God in the economy of salvation and God in his essential 
nature (Torrance 1990: 170-174). Torrance argues that: 
152 In the discussion of the integration of form in section 4.5 we will see that Torrance 
rejects traditional natural theology in large part because of its inherent dualism, both in 
its content that is its notion of God and in its epistemology. Torrance argues that 
developments within science and theology (especially the work of Barth, Polanyi and 
Einstein) undermine such dualisms. 
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This self-revelation of God in the Gospel amounts to the greatest revolution in 
our knowledge of God. It is precisely when we grasp its truth that we discern the 
enormous significance of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. For Judaism as for 
Greek philosophy, or indeed for every religion apart from Christianity, God 
remains ultimately incomprehensible to men and women in the bare and 
unfigured simplicity of his Being - he is the Nameless One who cannot be 
apprehended in himself or be conceived in the personal relations of his inner life 
as a Communion of Love. Hence statements made about God, apart from his 
active personal self-revelation, as many ancient and modem philosophers would 
have it, are non-cognitive - they are at best of no more than tangential borderline 
significance. It is quite otherwise in the Gospel when we say that the Father, the 
Son, and the Holy Spirit are God, the One God whom we know and with whom 
we have to do as the God of our salvation. The three divine Persons are the 
Triune Being of God: the Triune Being is three Persons (Torrance 1996a: 3, 
emphasis Torrance). 
Independent, abstract knowledge of God which traditional natural theology claims to 
provide leads not to the God as he has disclosed himself but to an abstract divine 
essence which is not linked to the economy of God's actual revelation and salvation; it 
introduces dualism into the being of God. 
When we consider the essentially Trinitarian nature of the Christian 
understanding of God then the traditional approaches to natural theology constitute a 
return to a pre-Christian understanding of God. This is hardly surprising for, as we have 
seen, Torrance demonstrates that this approach to natural theology originated in times in 
the west when the church deliberately sought to ground the existence of God, not in 
Christian revelation, but in abstract, general, non-Christian philosophy. He argues that 
in these periods natural theology was valued precisely for its independence of special 
revelation (Torrance 1985b: 37-39). 
In contrast to traditional natural theology Torrance argues that Barth's 
epistemology is a systematic and scientific method. Barth's theology is an a posteriori 
and dogmatic science developed according to the reality of God as disclosed in Christ 
rather than in independence of God's self-revelation. For this reason Torrance argues 
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that the doctrine ofjustification by grace, especially its epistemological significance, is 
pivotal to Barth's theology (Torrance 1990: 146f). We have seen that the epistemology 
of grace is also fundarnental to Torrance's doctrine of revelation because his 
understanding of revelation is Christologically grounded; and this Christologically 
grounded epistemology of grace forms the foundation of his particular interpretation of 
revelation in Scripture and nature. The epistemology of grace in relation to the 
knowledge of God is a dogmatic and scientific method. We will see in chapter five that 
Torrance argues that his understanding of scientific method places Christian theology 
among the special sciences. The doctrine ofjustification by grace means objectivity in 
theological method (Thiselton 1980: 316), grounding all Christian theology in 
Christology. It also means a willingness to question all presuppositions and all sources 
of authority which are external to the object of our enquiry, whether those sources of 
authority are the rationalism of the enlightenment or the traditions of the church 
(Torrance 1969a: 75; Torrance 1980b: 90; Toffance 1964: 151-52). 153 Torrance argues 
that the epistemological significance of the doctrine of'justification by grace is that 
Christian theology is always founded on the nature and activity of God in his self- 
revelation (Torrance 1980b: 90). God is the only proper or possible source of our 
knowledge of him and this epistemology of grace is found in all aspects of Torrance's 
understanding of revelation because the only possible source of divine revelation is 
God. The problem with traditional natural theology then is its independence from actual 
self-revelation. 154 An independent theology is the self assertion of humanity over 
against God. Traditional natural theology develops an approach to God which is 
separate from the self-revelation of the Trinity within the universe of space and time in 
153 Torrance writes: 'Expressed theologically, Barth found that to be put right with God 
through justification by grace alone, meant that he himself with all his ideas and 
F esuppositions was put in the wrong' (Torrance 1990: 113). 
5r4( See section 3.2.3. 
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Christ and it divides Christian theology into two parts: natural theology which leads to 
the one God; and revealed theology which leads to the Trinity. Torrance regards such 
dualism as 'intolerable' (Torrance 1980b: 91). 155 
4. Z6 Natural theology and the rational structure of the knowledge of God 
According to Torrance one function of a non-independent natural theology is to 
establish a rational structure in our knowledge of God. He argues that such a structure 
is: 
No longer extrinsic but intrinsic to actual knowledge of God, it [i. e. a non- 
independent natural theology] will function as the necessary intra-structure of 
theological science, in which we are concerned to unfold and express the 
rational forms of our understanding that arise under the compulsion of the 
intelligible reality of God's self-revelation (Torrance 1985b: 40, emphasis 
Torrance). 
In traditional natural theology this rational structure is independent of the actual 
knowledge of God which comes from self-revelation; its origins are in an a priori 
philosophical system which is imposed upon the content of theology. Instead of 
imposing a philosophical system such as existentialism onto theological method 
Torrance derives his epistemology from the material content of dogmatic theology, 
namely the doctrines of creation, Christ and the Trinity. Torrance aims to affirm the 
place within revealed theology for a rational structure in our knowledge of God which 
is: 
grounded in the intelligible relations in God himself, for it is there, under the 
compulsion of God's self-disclosure in Being and Act that the rational structure 
appropriate to him arises in our understanding of him (Torrance 1980b: 91). 
155 Torrance's concern to counter the prevailing dualism of western thought is central to 
his understanding of theological science and is important for his dialogue with the 
natural sciences. See section 4.5. 
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This rational structure is intrinsic to, and emerges from what God has revealed of 
himself in the economy of salvation. 
Theologians may direct their thoughts beyond the created universe towards God 
its transcendent creator; however, they can only do so from within the universe of space 
and time. Theologians must not make the unexamined and unspoken assumption of 
having a standpoint or perspective which is independent of the universe. There is no 
neutral observation point beyond the universe either for the theologian or the scientist. 
We are only able to know God from our position within the universe; we can only know 
him in and from his interaction with the universe that is within space and time (Torrance 
1985b: 36). For this reason traditional natural theology is seen as a distortion because it 
seeks to know God in the abstract, apart from his actual interaction within space and 
time (Torrance I 985b: 3 8,41). A chief objection raised against independent natural 
theology is that it assumes an absolute, though illusory, objectivity. Barth makes the 
same point from a different perspective in his Gifford lectures when he discusses the 
meaning of natural theology. It is, he comments, a 'science of God' which is to be 
(constructed independently of all historical religions and religious bodies... without 
reference to or reliance upon any supposed special exceptional or so - called miraculous 
revelation' (Barth 1938: 3). 156 
Torrance points out a further implication of the fact that we can only know and 
speak of God from within the universe of space and time even though God transcends 
the universe; he argues that it means that there must be a close correlation between 
theological science and the natural sciences (Torrance 1985b: 36). This correlation 
between theology and the natural sciences points to the proper place for a non- 
independent natural theology because we can only know God as he has actually 
156 Barth is here quoting the terms of reference for the Gifford lectures. 
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interacted with the material world of space and time (Torrance 1985b: 36f). In 
Torrance's reinterpretation natural theology has come to mean theology that is natural 
to God as he has revealed himself and natural to the world in which that self-revelation 
has occurred; it includes the proper methods of investigation of this world which God 
has created from nothing (Torrance 1985b: 39). 
One question raised by Torrance's development of Barth is whether what he 
proposes is natural theology at all. Torrance writes of a transformed natural theology 
which is not independent of God's actual revelation. In one of his later writings 
(Torrance 1989: 65-85) he refers to a 'theology of nature' rather than natural theology 
(Torrance 1989: 82) and he does so in a context where we expect him to refer to natural 
theology. Gunton remarks that Torrance's work is best seen not as a transformed natural 
theology but as a theology of nature (Gunton 1995: 63 note 38). This is more than 
simply a question of terminology; the very term 'natural theology' is so strongly 
associated with the tradition of two sources of knowledge of God, nature and revelation, 
that it implies a notion of independence from God's active self-revelation. It is therefore 
more appropriate and accurate to speak of Torrance's theology of nature or natural 
revelation. His use of the phrase 'theology of nature' in later works is evidence that 
Torrance eventually recognises this. However, since he only uses this phrase in his later 
work we will continue to use the less adequate phrase 'natural theology'. 
4. Z 7 Discussion 
Torrance's argument that Barth rejects natural theology because of its 
independence of revealed theology is supported by Barth's own comments and also by 
Hauerwas' interpretation of Barth. Its importance for Torrance's understanding of 
revelation and for this thesis is that it allows Torrance to develop a non-independent 
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natural theology which is fully integrated with revealed or dogmatic theology. This non- 
independent natural theology is more properly termed a theology of nature. 
Torrance seeks to ground all knowledge of God in God's action to make himself 
known within the universe. For Torrance this means as he has revealed himself in 
Christ. The abstract and speculative nature of traditional natural theology attempts to 
circumvent the contingent aspect of all our knowledge of God. In fact human 
knowledge of God is doubly contingent for the theologian operates from within the 
universe of space and time and can only come to knowledge of the transcendent God as 
God has acted to reveal himself within the contingent reality of the universe. 
Torrance's relocated natural theology is crucial to his epistemology because it 
allows him to bring natural theology into the sphere of the sciences by making it an 
integral element of theological science which is to be regarded as a science so long as it 
allows the object of enquiry, namely God, to determine the method of enquiry. This has 
the practical effect of bringing natural theology into relation with the most basic datum 
of Christian theology, namely, God as he is revealed in Jesus Christ, the Word of God 
incarnate in the universe of space and time. 
More important than bringing natural theology into the scope of revealed 
theology is that by relocating natural theology into dogmatics theological knowledge of 
God is brought into correlation with scientific knowledge of reality. Each discipline 
proceeds by empirical investigation of reality as it discloses itself to investigation. This 
allows Torrance to argue that the rational order disclosed in nature is no accident but 
arises from the creative Word of God who is incarnate in Jesus Christ. Theology then 
needs to engage with the understanding of the universe as disclosed to the natural 
sciences, and the natural sciences are able to be brought into a mutually fruitful 
relationship with Christian theology. 
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4.3 Doing theology in an Einsteinian universe 
We can only know God, and God can only make himself known to us, within the 
universe of space and time, therefore the scientific understanding of the universe is 
central to a theological epistemology derived from Torrance's doctrine of revelation. 
The understanding of the universe has undergone a radical change with the advent of 
Einstein's theories of relativity (see for example Torrance 1985b: 45f). Einstein's 
paradigm of the universe is important for Torrance's transformed natural theology 
because his natural theology is actually a theology of nature and an understanding of 
God's self-revelation in and within nature. 
Polanyi is another influence on Torrance and on his understanding of post- 
Einsteinian epistemology. His insight that scientific knowledge is always personal 
knowledge, i. e. the knowledge of persons who exist within the universe, has been of 
particular influence (Torrance 1980a: xv). Since we can only know God from within the 
creation changes in our understanding of the universe, including changes in the way in 
which the natural world and its processes are investigated by the natural sciences will 
have implications for theological science. Torrance seeks to expound the implications of 
Einstein's theories of relativity for theology. He regards Einstein's work as more than 
just another discovery to add to our understanding of the world; it represents a 
fundamental shift in our understanding of and approach to the universe (Torrance 
1985b: 430. Newton's model of the universe is an essentially different place to that 
described by Einstein and this shift in scientific worldview has important implications 
for theological science (Torrance I 984a: 264). 
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Torrance uses Einstein's analogy on the relation of Euclidean geometry to the 
rest of physics in order to explain what he means by a transformed natural theology and 
its relation to revealed theology. 157 He argues that what Einstein has done for geometry 
in relation to the body of physics, Barth has done for natural theology and its relation to 
revealed theology. 158 Torrance summarises Einstein's critique of Euclidean geometry in 
this way: 
The rise of four-dimensional geometries of space and time has revealed to us 
that Euclidean geometry is an idealization, a distorting abstraction of geometry 
from experience or from empirical reality, in which it has been erected into a 
self-contained conceptual system on its own, pursued as a purely theoretic 
science antecedent to physics, in which we develop our actual knowledge of the 
world (Torrance 1980b: 91f). 
The change in our understanding of the relationship of geometry to the rest of physics 
occurred because Einstein realised that reality cannot be fitted into the framework 
provided by Euclidean geometry without distortion. According to Einstein Euclidean 
geometry is not a logically necessary system though it is traditionally regarded as such. 
In reality it has empirical foundations. Since Einstein geometry has a new place within 
the body of physics. It is seen as an essential part of physics, not as something logically 
prior to or separate from physical reality. Torrance writes that it has become a natural 
science. 159 Geometry remains but not as something self-consistent; instead it is an 
element of physics (Torrance 1980b: 92). 
157 See Torrance 1976: ixf ; Torrance 1980b: 91-93; Torrance 1985b: 40f-, Torrance 
1990: 148f; Torrance 1999: 32f. 
158 Torrance writes: 'I was anxious to get Karl Barth's reaction to the way in which I 
explained ... his attitude to natural theology by referring to Einstein's account of the 
relation of geometry to experience, or to physics.... It is in a similar way, I argued, that 
Karl Barth treats natural theology when he rejects its status as apraeambulafidei... 
(Torrance 1976: ix). 
159 See for example Torrance 1980b: 92. 
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The relocation of geometry within the body of physics provides Torrance with 
an analogy for his development of natural theology and its relation to the rest of 
systematics. He argues that the groundwork for such a relocation of natural theology has 
been done by Barth in his rejection of independent natural theology (Torrance 
1980b: 92). He regards traditional natural theology as the same sort of abstraction from 
reality as Euclidean geometry independent of physics (Torrance 1980b: 91). Traditional 
natural theology distorts theology in terms of its content and its method. In terms of the 
content of theology Torrance criticises it because it does not lead to knowledge of God 
as he has revealed himself to be, that is Trinity; instead it leads to an abstract 'deity'. 160 
In terms of the method of theology Torrance criticises natural theology for engaging not 
with God's actual self-revelation in Christ but with abstract notions of how in theory 
God might be known. 16 1 Torrance argues that Barth has opened the way for a non- 
independent natural theology to take its proper place within revealed theology (Torrance 
1985b: 39). 
A natural theology which is inherent to dogmatic theology rather than 
antecedent to it is 'natural' in the sense that it is 'natural to the material content of 
theology' (Torrance 1980b: 92, emphasis Torrance). This relocated natural theology is 
not an independent discipline, nor is it under the control of the knowing subject (Barth 
1938: 4). Torrance argues that this transformed natural theology has an important place 
within dogmatic theology, for there 'it will function as the essential sub-structure within 
theological science' (Torrance 1980b: 93, Torrance 1985b: 600. Torrance's non- 
independent natural theology cannot be separated from the content of revealed theology 
for apart from the body of theology it is incomplete and inconsistent (Torrance 
1985b: 42). 
160 See section 4.2.5. 
161 See section 4.2.2. 
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4.4 The dialogue between theology and the natural sciences 
4.4.1 Natural theology and belief in the natural sciences 
According to Torrance the proper place for a transformed natural theology 
within the body of dogmatics is in the common ground that exists between the natural 
sciences and theological science (Torrance 1999: 3 1). 162 For purposes of clarification 
only Torrance pursues his redefined natural theology in isolation from the rest of 
Christian doctrine, but he does not regard it as an independent discipline. His study of 
natural theology separate from the rest of dogmatics is artificial and is a temporary 
device. It is not to be inferred that natural theology has any sort of existence isolated 
from or antecedent to the body of revealed theology; it is a part of God's self-revelation 
(Torrance 1985b: 42f, cf. Torrance 1980b: 107). 
Torrance pursues his relocated natural theology in the dialogue between 
theology and post Einsteinian science (Torrance 1999: 3 1). 163 According to Torrance the 
natural sciences and Christian theology share a common history which he explores in 
several places in his writings. 164 Another factor which links theology to the natural 
sciences is that they are engaged in a common struggle against certain dualisms which 
Torrance regards as almost endemic in contemporary western thought. 165 A third area of 
common ground is when contemporary science reaches its natural limits. As 
162 Torrance writes: 'Natural theology then constitutes the epistemological 'geometry', 
as it were, within the fabric of 'revealed theology' as it is apprehended and articulated 
within the objectivities and intelligibilities of the space-time medium through which 
God has made himself known to us' (Torrance 1985b: 39). 
163 Torrance's exposition of his non-independent natural theology is found in: Torrance 
1980b: 75-109; Torrance 1985b: 32-63; Torrance 1990: 136-159; and Torrance 1999: 30- 
34. 
164 For example, see Torrance 1980b: 44-74. 
165 For Torrance's insight into the effect of this dualism in theology, see Torrance 
1971: 29-55. 
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contemporary science understands more and more of the structures of the universe it 
shows signs of reaching the natural limits of scientific enquiry (Torrancel 985b: 51-59). 
Torrance demonstrates that the natural sciences constantly throw up questions 
that they cannot ignore but which they cannot answer either. Ile refers to the universe 
silently crying out for an explanation (Torrance I 985b: 5 8). This is more than simply a 
return to some sort of 'god of the gaps' in which theology brings in God as the answer 
to questions which the sciences are currently unable to answer. Torrance argues that the 
contingent universe throws up questions that the natural sciences are logically unable to 
answer for these questions point to the ultimate beliefs which undergird all scientific 
activity (Torrance 1980c: 7). These ultimate beliefs form part of the background 
assumptions with which the sciences operate. Torrance derives his notion of ultimate 
beliefs and the role that they play in the natural sciences from Polanyi. 166 Torrance 
shows that it was from Einstein that Polanyi derived his understanding of the place of 
belief in scientific activity (Torrance 1980a: 9f-, cf. Polanyi 1962: 3-17). The most 
fundamental scientific act of faith is in the rational order of the universe and in the 
possibility of the scientist apprehending that rational order and structure (Torrance 
1980a: 9f-, c. f Polanyi 1962: 264-268). 
Torrance is far from introducing a god to fill or explain a gap in scientific 
knowledge; it is the very success of the empirical sciences which demands an 
explanation. 
Torrance's transformed natural theology has an important role to play in the 
dialogue between theology and the natural sciences in the area of the ultimate beliefs of 
the sciences, for the relationship between the contingent universe and its transcendent 
166 See Torrance's essay 'The Framework of Belief in Torrance 1980a: 1-27. 
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creator points to God as the ground of the ultimate beliefs with which the sciences 
operate. 1 67 Torrance argues: 
In all natural science we are concerned to lay bare the intelligible structure of the 
universe, and try everywhere to grasp reality in its own rational depth, but 
everywhere we are faced with questions as to the very existence of such a 
universe, and as to the immanent rationality embedded in that which exists. Why 
is there a universe and not nothing? What is the reason for this state of affairs, 
the existence of a universe that is accessible to rational inquiry? Yet the universe 
does not carry in itself any explanation for this state of affairs, and even the 
rationality embedded within it is not self-explanatory (Torrancel985b: 52). 
At this point in his argument Torrance introduces his new approach to natural theology 
in order to explore the relationship between natural science and Christian theology. In 
this discussion of the relationship between theology and science he takes care not to 
reintroduce the idea of natural theology as a preamble to faith; he is equally careful not 
to suggest any kind of logical bridge between God and his creation. Although the 
contingent creation cries silently for a transcendent creator Torrance has no place for a 
(chain of inferential reasoning from the contingent to a 'necessary' creator' (Torrance 
1985b: 58). 
4.4.2 Dualism and natural theology 
Torrance notes that traditional natural theology tends to flourish in times which 
exhibit a dominant cosmological dualism (Torrance 1985b: 37); by this he means a 
complete distinction and distance between both absolute space-time and the empirical 
universe and also between God and the world. He finds an example of such dualism in 
the English deism of the eighteenth century which was founded upon the thought of 
Newton and Locke (Torrance 1985b: 37). According to Torrance independent natural 
theology was also characteristic of the early twelfth century. He argues that it flourished 
167 See section 5.2.9. 
161 
in these different ages because of a common desire, for apologetic reasons, to ground 
the existence of God in something other than special revelation (Torrance 1985b: 38). In 
the eighteenth century it was the independence of natural theology that made it valuable 
to apologists. Torrance argues that these ages display an attempt to bridge the gulf 
between God and creation in order to give independent support for belief Natural 
theology was thought to provide this bridge (Torrance 1980b: 80, Torrance 1985b: 38). 
Torrance argues that this logical 'bridge' from humanity to God is based upon 
the false assumption of a logical connection between concepts and experience (Torrance 
1980b: 81 0. He argues that underlYing this is a form of 'logical empiricism' (Torrance 
1985b: 380, a theory of how scientific knowledge is arrived at which assumes that 
theories are deduced logically or by abstraction from empirical data. A natural theology 
which assumes such an epistemology tries to connect God and the world, not on the 
basis of God's actual interaction with the world, but on the basis of abstraction from 
experience and from a priori assumptions. It proceeds by way of inference and 
deduction from experience. Independent natural theology operates with the assumption 
of a logically necessary relationship between God and the universe. Independent natural 
theology's concept of God is deduced from the data provided by the world rather than 
from revelation. Torrance argues that there is, in reality, no such logical bridge between 
ideas and experience either in the way that ideas are discovered or verified 168 . The 
concept of a logical bridge is an illusion and Torrance argues that it collapses with the 
demise of 'positivist science' which also attempts to 'derive concepts from 
observations' (Torrance 1985b: 39; c. f. Torrance 1980b: 81 0. In place of this logical 
bridge between ideas and experience, Torrance argues for a more complex relationship 
168 In this assertion Torrance is supported by Einstein (Einstein 1982: 224-227). 
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between the two, a 'tacit' knowledge which he believes he finds in the work of Einstein 
and Polanyi. 
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In his transformed natural theology Torrance does not attempt to build a 
systematic, causal or logically necessary link between God and humankind. This is one 
of the most important differences between Torrance's non-independent natural theology 
and traditional philosophical arguments for the existence of God. The relation of God to 
the world is not a necessary relation (that is it is not the kind of relation on which a 
logical argument from humanity to God could be built); nor is it an arbitrary relation. 
According to Torrance God's relation to the world is contingent and free (Torrance 
1981a: 21 f). 170 Although Torrance's non-independent natural theology is a form of the 
cosmological argument (Torrance 1980b: 106) he assumes a different relationship 
between concepts and experience and a different relationship between God and the 
world. He argues that the relationship between God and the universe is real and it is 
rational because it is based upon the gracious interaction of the free and rational creator 
with his creation; however, this relationship is not logically necessary. Traditional 
natural theology attempts to construct an epistemology without reference to the actual 
knowledge of God in his self-revelation, whereas Torrance's theological epistemology 
is founded upon God's self-revelation in Christ. Traditional natural theology tries to 
find a logically necessary relationship between God and creation of which its 
epistemology is an expression. In rejecting such an epistemology Torrance follows 
Barth who insists that theology is an a posteriori discipline; we can only give an 
account of how we come to know God based upon our actual knowledge of God and 
that is by his self-revelation in Christ (Torrance 1990: 141-143). This actual knowledge 
169 See section 4.5.4. 
170 The notion of contingency is very important in Torrance's theology and will be 
explored in section 5.2. 
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of God undermines and renders irrelevant traditional natural theology (Torrance 
1990: 139,144). Torrance argues that a natural theology which is independent of God's 
actual self-revelation becomes a source of confusion in theology (Torrance 1990: 142). 
4.4.3 Discussion 
One of the great strengths of Torrance's theology is that it is coordinated with 
the universe disclosed to the post-Einsteinian natural sciences. It allows theology to find 
support for its rejection of dualist modes of thought in the natural sciences; it also 
allows theology to enter debate within the sciences as Torrance, by integrating his non- 
independent natural theology with revealed theology allows for a coordination of 
theological and scientific thought. Theology must take account of the universe of time 
and space in which God reveals himself and in which human beings come to knowledge 
of God. Theology can also be brought into scientific discussion, especially in those 
areas where empirical science is logically unable to provide explanation, such as the 
question of why the sciences are so successful at disclosing the rational order of reality. 
This is not a traditional 'god of the gaps' in which theological answers were brought in 
to supply gaps in scientific knowledge. It is not deficiency but the success of the natural 
sciences which demands explanation. The sciences themselves cannot provide this 
explanation for they can only proceed by assuming that which they would be trying to 
explain, namely the intelligibility of the universe. 
Torrance also operates with an assumption that is common to the natural 
sciences, and this is that the sciences disclose the rational order of the universe rather 
than impose a rational order upon the results of empirical investigation. 
The epistemological significance of Torrance bringing natural theology within 
the scope of revealed theology is that it points to the gracing of this component of 
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theological knowledge no less than revelation in Christ or in the Bible the knowledge of 
God derived from the creation is an aspect of divine self-revelation. It also coordinates 
the knowledge of God disclosed in creation with revelation in Christ. 
4.5 Epistemological and cosmological dualism in natural and theological science 
Torrance's work on the relocation of natural theology is his attempt to restore it 
to its proper place within revealed theology. One of his arguments is that independent 
natural theology brings dualism into the understanding of God, separating the Trinity 
from the unity of God's being. Torrance also notes that traditional natural theologies 
have flourished in ages dominated by cosmological and epistemological dualism. 
Torrance's critique of dualism in western thought is an important aspect of his doctrine 
of revelation. Ile believes that the epistemological dualisms which have dominated 
western thought since Descartes have led to the cosmological dualism that we find in 
much western theology, not least in traditional natural theology where a general divinity 
is set over against the Trinitarian understanding of God and a dualistic epistemology has 
taken precedence over ontology within theology (Torrance 1980b: 33-34). 
4.5.1 The integration ofform and being in natural and theological science 
Torrance argues that dualism has become 'second nature' in western thought 
(Torrance 1980b: 95). He also argues that although many different kinds of dualism have 
emerged in western thought in different periods of history and that while these dualisms 
differ in many details they have some common ground, not least that they display a 
'disruption of the unity of form and being' (Torrance 1980b: 95). Torrance argues that 
Einstein challenges the roots of this dualism (Torrance 1980b: 23,30-3 1); that in 
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unden-nining the concept of a supposedly real world abstracted from the world of 
empirical reality Einstein's general theory of relativity has undermined western dualist 
thought (Torrance 1980b: 30). Torrance argues that the theory of relativity compels the 
unity of form and being on the natural sciences; he further argues that this unity of form 
and being holds true, not only for the natural sciences, but also for theological science. 
Torrance argues that this restoration of the unity of form and being in the natural 
sciences and in theology is a return to the patristic roots of theology, seen for example 
the doctrine of the homoousion (Torrance 1980b: 96). Furthermore he argues that 
Barth's insistence on the unity of God's act and being has anticipated those movements 
in physics which have unden-nined western dualism (Torrance 1984a: viii). Ile argues 
that what Einstein has done for the sciences with his theory of relativity, eliminating 'an 
independent conceptual system detached from actual experience' (Torrance 1984a: ix), 
Barth has done for theology by his rejection of natural theology as an independent 
source of knowledge of God detached from actual revelation. 
Torrance argues that in western thought the disruption of the unity of forni and 
being leads to a split between the empirical and theoretical components of knowledge 
and also to the precedence of theoretical knowledge, regarded as logically necessary, 
over empirical knowledge, regarded as occasional, accidental and therefore only an 
approximation of reality. In support of this assertion Torrance quotes Heidegger who 
notes in western thought a 'damaging secession of logos from being, leading to a logical 
tyranny of abstract ideas over being' (Torrance 1980b: 8 1). 17 1 This dominance of the 
abstract and theoretical over the empirical in western thought is due to the implied 
notion of a logical bridge between concepts and experience. It is a seductively simple 
notion which asserts that abstract ideas are directly derived from empirical data, and has 
17 1 The actual references to Heidegger's work are not given by Torrance. 
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led to positivism in philosophy and the sciences. Again Einstein's work on general 
relativity shows that this idea of a logical bridge is a fallacy; the relationship between 
concepts and experience, between the theoretical and empirical realms, is much more 
complex (Torrance 1980b: 82). 
Torrance argues that the change in scientific epistemology brought about by 
Einstein is of consequence for natural theology because the precedence of abstract over 
empirical knowledge was also prevalent in theology and gave rise to a positivist natural 
theology in which abstract concepts and theories of how God might be known came to 
dominate the actual knowledge of God in his interaction with the universe. Independent 
natural theology follows the scientific method of its day in attempting to 'throw a 
logical bridge between our knowledge and experience of this world and knowledge of 
God' (Torrance 1980b: 8 1). Torrance argues that positivist natural theology is 
undermined on three fronts: by Einstein's work on science and epistemology; by the 
patristic doctrine that Christ is homoousios to patri, that God as he is in the economy of 
salvation is the same as he is in himself; and by Barth's insistence on the unity of act 
and being in God. Barth and Einstein both hold that instead of our knowledge being 
abstracted from reality we can only have knowledge from within reality. Consequently 
there are no necessary truths, either in theology or in the natural sciences; rather there is 
empirical and, following Polanyi, personal knowledge. 
Torrance shows clear correlation between Barth's theology and Einstein's 
science. Ile shows that both theology and science have suffered from dualistic patterns 
of thought and that both have overcome these dualisms by arguing for the unity of form 
and being. While both theology and the sciences argue for the possibility of knowledge 
of the reality under investigation they escbew a positivist epistemology and instead 
pursue a more complex scientific method. Torrance's theological epistemology rests 
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upon the application of insights from the natural sciences to theology and philosophy. 
He demonstrates the undermining of dualist traditions in the natural sciences by 
Einstein's general theory of relativity. 
The importance of Torrance's correlation of theology with the natural sciences is 
not only in his applying the advances in science to theology; it is that implicit in his 
theology is the justification for so doing. Torrance is able to bring together these two 
discourses because he has brought natural theology into the body of Christian dogmatics 
and has argues for a rigorous application of scientific method to theology. It is for this 
reason that he is able to use arguments based on Einstein's work against philosophical 
and theological dualism. 
4.5.2 Scientific method in theology 
We have seen that one of the most fundamental insights of Torrance's theology 
is his argument that in investigating an object the nature of the object itself must 
determine the method of investigation (Torrance 1969a: xii). He argues that the 
grounding of epistemology in being is one of the conditions for a scientific theology I; P.; 
(Torrance 1964: 149, c. f. Torrance 1959: xxiv). While he draws a distinction between the 
methods used to investigate an object and the object itself, he does so without separating 
the two (Colyer 2001a: 322). This distinction without separation of ontology and 
epistemology is fundamental to any understanding of Torrance's work. 
The notion that true knowledge of God arises only from self-revelation is one of 
Torrance's main assertions in support of placing theology among the sciences 
(Torrance I 969a: 203). A second and equally important point that he makes is that 
objects do not exist in isolation; rather as Clerk Maxwell discovered relationships are 
intrinsic to all objects; Torrance writes of 'onto-relations' (See Torrance 1984a: 229- 
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234). 172 An object must be investigated by means which are determined by its nature 
and not in isolation but in its intrinsic relationships; for, he argues, these onto-relations 
are 'constitutive' of ob ects in space and time (Torrance 1984a: 230). Another of j 
Torrance's working assumptions is that some sort of correlation exists between 
scientific or objective thinking which 'enters into a close and active engagement' with 
the object of enquiry 'and lays itself open to the nature and reality of the object in order 
to take its shape from the structure of the object' (Torrance 1971: 9) and that objective 
reality itself (Torrance 1971: 10). This makes Torrance's theology and epistemology 
realist in the sense outlined by Hardy (Hardy 1990: 76f) who notes that Torrance 'sees 
reality disclosing itself to the various sciences, theological and natural, in such a way as 
to make human beings capable of understanding' (Hardy 1990: 76). However, Hardy 
argues that Torrance is a realist in a modified sense, and not if the term: 
means a necessary correspondence between reality and thought... [Torrance's] 
realism suggests that there is an actual correspondence between reality and 
thought or language ifthe thinker is conformed to the mode of rationality 
afforded by reality (Hardy 1990: 77, emphasis Hardy). 173 
Hardy correctly identifies Torrance's epistemology as realist and then qualifies 
this by adding that his realism is actual rather than necessary due to the a posteriori 
nature of scientific thought (Torrance 1969a: 186). Torrance believes that reality 
discloses itself to investigation by the sciences, both natural and theological, if the 
theologian or scientist is 'conformed to the mode of rationality afforded by reality' 
(Ilardy 1990: 77). Through a disciplined obedience of the mind to reality it is possible to 
172 In his work on field theory, Clerk Maxwell argued that relations within nature are 
fundamental, and he 'insisted ... that the relations he referred to were not just imaginary 
or putative but real relations, relations that belong to reality as much as things do, for 
the inter-relations of things are, in part at least, constitutive of what they are. Being- 
constituting relations of this kind we may well speak of as "onto-relations". ' (Torrance 
1984a: 230). 
173 On Torrance's critical realism see section 5.3.7. 
169 
grow in our knowledge of that reality (Torrance 1969a: 9 cf. Torrance 1984a: 275). In 
this way theory may correspond to reality; however, there is no logically necessary 
reason why it must do so. In Torrance's thought the relationship between reality and 
theory is actual rather than necessary; it is rational (Torrance 1969a: 11), but it is not 
logically necessary. Hardy writes of the 'gracing of knowledge' in Torrance's 
theological epistemology (Hardy 1990: 77). He means by this that Torrance is clear that 
any correspondence between God's reality and theology is always due to the intention, 
action and therefore grace of God for we do not discover God, rather God gives himself 
to be known. As Torrance writes: 'in the last resort theology is thrown back wholly 
upon the nature and activity of God for the justification or verification of our concepts 
and statements about him' (Torrance 1980b: 90). This is the epistemological significance 
of the reformation doctrine ofjustification by faith (Torrance 1980b: 90). 
Toffance's theological epistemology is scientific because it is determined by the 
reality of the object of enquiry as that object gives itself to be known, and all 
preconceptions are called into question by that reality. Rather than a simple positivist 
model of a bridge from reality to our understanding Torrance proposes a complex model 
of encounter and disclosure which promises the possibility of knowledge of reality; but 
he insists that this knowledge always comes as a gift. His theological epistemology is 
therefore profoundly rooted in the incarnation and the doctrine of justification by grace. 
4.5.3 The dualist tradition in western thought 
We have noted Torrance's argument that independent natural theologies tend to 
flourish in periods which are dualist in outlook (Torrance 1980b: 76; Torrance 
1985b: 37). Ile further argues that the prevailing dualism of these ages is reflected in the 
natural theologies which arose in them (Torrance 1980b: 76,81). Torrance traces the 
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influence of various forms of dualism on western thought (see for example Torrance 
1984a: 1-59,61-105) and notes that although ancient Greek thought is characterized by 
an epistemological dualism (Torrance 1984a: 1) the roots of contemporary dualist 
thought are found in the writings of Descartes and Newton who introduced both 
cosmological and epistemological dualism into western thought (Torrance 1984a: 6). 
Torrance argues that Descartes introduces cosmological dualism into western 
thought which involves an epistemological disjunction between the inner world of 
images presented to the mind via sensory perception and the external world of matter 
which extends in space and time (Torrance 1984a: 10- 11). Ile notes that Newton's 
philosophy of science is influenced by Cartesian dualism (Torrance 1984a: 13f). The 
triumph of Newtonian science led to the extension of this dualism to influence the 
whole of western thought (Torrance 1980b: 95). Torrance writes: 
For Newton ... science was composed of laws stating the mathematical behaviour of nature solely - laws clearly deducible from phenomena and exactly 
veriflable in phenomena - everything further is to be swept out of science, which 
thus becomes a body of absolutely certain truth about the doings of the physical 
world.... Science is the exact mathematical formulation of the processes of the 
natural world (Torrance 1984a: 18). 
The success of Newton's scientific method led contemporary theology to view 
the universe as mechanistic, governed by logically necessary laws and closed off from 
direct interaction with its creator. It also led to the disjunction of necessary truths of 
reason and accidental truths of history (Torrance 1980b: 23). This understanding of 
reality is implicit in traditional natural theologies which assume a division between God 
and creation and between the theoretical and empirical components of knowledge; 
traditional natural theology is an attempt to negotiate these dualisms. We have noted 
that one reason for Torrance's rejection of independent natural theology is the division 
it introduces between the Trinity and the unity of God's being. Barth, followed by 
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Torrance, insists upon the unity of act and being in God; and this presents a challenge, 
not only to traditional independent natural theology, but also to the dualist 
understanding of reality in western thought (Torrance 1980b: 1 1-12). 
Contemporary philosophical and cosmological dualisms are founded not only on 
Newton and Descartes but also on the philosophy of Kant. Torrance's purpose in 
studying the history of epistemology is to support his Christocentric theology as that 
which is most consonant with scientific method post-Einstein. 174 The place of 
Torrance's transformed natural theology in this argument is two-fold. First, Torrance 
argues that his non-independent natural theology conforms more closely with the 
natural sciences' understanding of the cosmos and of scientific method, whereas 
traditional natural theology is undermined by the changes in contemporary physics. 
Second, he argues that this transformed natural theology 'constitutes the 
epistemological structure of our knowledge of God' (Torrance 1976: x); the 
epistemology which proves to be appropriate to a natural theology which seeks to know 
God as he gives himself to be known, and which is faithful to the reality of the universe 
as disclosed by Einstein and Polanyi provides a model for the rest of theology. 
Torrance argues that Kant is aware of the intrinsic deficiency of approaches to 
knowledge based purely on empiricism (Torrance 1984a: 36); he realises that a more 
adequate epistemology is one in which the theoretical components of knowledge are 
integrated with empirical data into the basic structure of science and scientific method 
(Torrance 1980b: 26). Kant's solution is to search for a way of bringing theoretical 
factors which are not derived from sense experience to play a fundamental role in the 
scientific investigation of the universe (Torrance 1984a: 36). 
174 The sub-title of Torrance's The Ground and Grammar of Theology (Torrance 1980b) 
is Consonance between Theology and Science (emphasis added). 
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In his attempt to unite the theoretical a priori elements of knowledge with 
experimental aposteriori observations Kant argues for the synthetic apriori in which 
the structures of the human mind bring an interpretative framework to bear on 
everything perceived by the knowing subject, making it 'impossible for him ever to 
penetrate behind his cognitive activity to what things are in themselves' (Torrance 
1980b: 26). "' This brings a radical dualism into all human knowledge (Torrance 
1980b: 25-27). Torrance argues that in Kant the universe is not so much disclosed to the 
enquiring mind as it is created by it (Torrance 1984a: 36ff). 176 He argues that the 
problem with Kant's epistemology is that he treats the theoretical component of 
knowledge as a necessary structure imposed upon reality in our experience of it 
(Torrance 1984a: 42). 
Torrance's critique of Kant is founded on one of the basic axioms of his 
theology: that the object of enquiry determines the method of enquiry. 177 He argues that 
the theoretical structure of our knowledge arises not from the apprehending mind, as 
with Kant, but is inherent to the object of investigation. However, Torrance notes that 
such a solution is ruled out by the a priori nature of Kant's theoretical structures 
(Torrance 1984a: 42). Torrance returns to Newton's epistemology by insisting that the 
175 Torrance writes: 'when he gave to time and space the status of 'forms of sensibility', 
and to causality as well as to substance the status of 'categories of the understanding', 
he rejected the possibility of any knowledge of things in themselves, limiting 
knowledge of them to what we can make out of their appearances, (Torrance 1980b: 26). 176 Torrance writes: 'Kant retained the 'absolute' or independent character of Newton's 
mathematical time and space, its character as an inertial system for the scientific 
determination of the atomic structure of nature, but he transferred it to the human 
understanding, that is, to Locke's centre of reference in the consciousness of the 
observer, to constitute the basic 'forms of sensibility' which are independent of 
experience but regulative of our spatio-temporal apprehensions. To these he added 
substance, relation and causality as formal structures of the mind, called 'categories of 
understanding', likewise independent of experience, through which the observer 
organises everything apprehended in time and space as objects of human knowledge' 
(Torrance 1984a: 37). 
177 See section 4.5.2. 
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theoretical component in our knowledge originates in the object of enquiry itSelf. 178 
According to Torrance the problem of dualist epistemology lies at the heart of Barth's 
rejection of traditional natural theology and the integration of form is central to his non- 
independent natural theology (Torrance 1980b: 89-90). 179 
Torrance's theological and scientific epistemology is a synthesis of some of the 
insights of Newton and Kant. With Kant he argues that we cannot know things apart 
from their theoretical structures; with Newton he argues that the structures by which we 
know things are not arbitrary, or imposed by the observer, but instead arise from the 
object of enquiry itself. Torrance argues that form must be grounded in the inherent 
rationality of the object (Torrance 1984a: 45). Torrance argues that in the work of 
Einstein modem thought has returned to the idea of the inherent intelligibility of the 
objective universe (Torrance 1984a: 45). 
4.5.4 Einstein and Polanyi 
Although he makes use of the theory of relativity in his Christology 180 
Torrance's main interest in Einstein is his scientific methods (Kaiser 2001: 244). He 
argues that Einstein's relativity theories, like Barth's Christocentric theology, avoid the 
epistemological problems of Newton and Kant (Torrance 1985b: 77 cf. 
Torrance 1990: 129-130); he therefore finds in Einstein support for his unitary 
understanding of cosmology and epistemology. 18 1 He argues that Einstein recognised 
that the positivist epistemology associated with Newton is not how Newton actually 
developed his understanding of the universe (Torrance 1985b: 73). Einstein rejects a 
positivist model of scientific method and he also rejects Kant's notion that the 
178 See Torrance's quote from Max Planck in Torrance 1984a: 45f 
179 See section 4.6. 
180 See section 1.3. 181 See Torrance 1984a: 78. 
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theoretical structures of scientific knowledge are a priori categories imposed upon 
phenomena by the investigating mind. 
In Einstein there is a role for 'intuitive apprehension' in the sciences; yet they 
are not 'mere fictions or empty fantasies' (Torrance 1985b: 77, c. f. Kaiser 2001: 243). 
Einstein describes his scientific theories as free inventions of thought (Torrance 
1985b: 77, c. f Einstein 1982: 272). ' 82 Torrance argues that in Einstein theories are not 
logical rules imposed upon reality nor are they abstractions from reality, rather they 
arise from a rigorous and sympathetic engagement with reality (Torrance 1985b: 77). 
In Einstein's method there is no disjunction between the theoretical and empirical 
components of knowledge. Theories arise from the mind of the observer but are not 
arbitrary impositions (Torrance 1985b: 77). In Einstein's method there is no direct or 
logically necessary link between ideas and reality; however there is, or there may be, an 
actual link, a hannony, between reality and scientific theory (Torrance 1984a: 76-80). 
The universe exhibits a mysterious comprehensibility (Einstein 1982: 292). Torrance 
shows that in his appropriation of Maxwell's dynamic field theory Einstein derives a 
non-dualist epistemology in which form is seen as intrinsic to being rather than 
abstracted from, or imposed upon, being (Torrance 1984a: 76). Theories which arise 
from our encounter with reality are rational and coherent; they are neither arbitrary nor 
logically necessary (Torrance 1985b: 53, c. f. Kaiser 2001: 246). As Torrance writes: 
There is, and must be, of course, a real harmony between our concepts and 
experience, and they must be capable of being elaborated in a logically coherent 
manner in order to serve as the basis for deductive reasoning, otherwise we 
would never get beyond our immediate observations and no explicatory science 
would be possible at all. But it is easier to speak of this harmony negatively than 
positively, for since we are not concerned with a logical but a trans-logical or an 
extra-logical relation between concepts and experience, it is impossible to say 
182 See Torrance 1985b: 94, note 14 for further references in Einstein's writings. 
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precisely how concepts are correlated with experience, or to devise a clear-cut 
systematic method for that derivation (Torrance 1984a: 77). 183 
Torrance's scientific theology is influenced by Polanyi whose work on 
epistemology he regards as an advance on Einstein (Torrance 1984a: 116). He finds in 
Polanyi an understanding of how the formal components of knowledge arise from our 
enquiry into and apprehension of reality. Polanyi relies upon the idea of implicit 
knowledge, the 'tacit dimension', 184 which enables the enquirer to discern coherent 
patterns or: 
'Gestallen, in the heuristic leap from parts to a whole, comprehending patterns 
of coherence, and 'in the informal (non-logical) but rational process of 
integration evident in verification as well as in discovery' (Torrance 1984a: 116). 
According to Einstein theories arise as 'free creations of thought'. 185 As we have noted 
the relation of theory to experimental observation is neither fonnal nor logically 
necessary. Polanyi speaks of Einstein's method as a process of 'speculative 
discovery'; 186 and Torrance comments that the actual relation between ideas and 
experience is 'unformalisable' (Torrance 1985b: 77, emphasis Torrance). Newton's 
mistake is to attempt to reduce the complex relationship between ideas and reality to a 
simple and logical connection; whereas Polanyi shows that this tacit dimension is an 
important factor in all scientific knowledge. This tacit dimension to knowledge means 
that the scientific thinker must have a critical relationship to culture and tradition, 
183 See Torrance 1984a: 103 note 46 for supporting references to Einstein's writings. 
184 Torrance defines the tacit dimension of knowledge in this way: 'In itself it is a non- 
fort-nal apprehension of reality, but it constitutes the necessary ground or condition for 
all explicit knowledge such as we develop in the various sciences' (Torrance 
1984a: 112). 
185 Einstein, A. The Evolution ofPhysics, quoted in Torrance 1985b: 77. 
186 Polanyi, M. Science, Faith and Society, new edition Chicago 1964: 87, quoted in 
Torrance 1985b: 77. 
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because the tacit dimension to all knowledge is influenced by the culture and language 
which we inhabit (Torrance 1980c: 12f). 
187 
The concept of the tacit dimension to knowledge holds together fon-n and being 
as intrinsic to each other. There is no abstraction of form from being as with Newton, 
nor is form imposed upon being as with Kant. The idea of a tacit dimension also brings 
a personal component to all knowledge without being entirely subjective. True 
knowledge in any field arises from personal encounter with reality (Torrance 1971: 52); 
the observer is situated within the universe of space and time and also within culture 
and history. Torrance does not pretend to an illusory absolute objectivity, nor does he 
allow the subjective components of knowledge to dominate. In his theological 
epistemology the relationship between the theoretical and empirical components in 
knowledge is not abstract, arbitrary, or logically necessary; rather that relationship is 
actual and is therefore rational. In his integration of the work of Einstein and Polanyi 
into his theological epistemology he is building the foundation of a critically realist 
epistemology. 188 
4.5.5 Dualism in contemporary theology 
Torrance argues that his transformed natural theology 'constitutes the 
epistemological structure of our knowledge of God' (Torrance 1976: x). One implication 
of this is that a non-dualist epistemology will be central not only to his natural theology 
but also to the whole of Christian theology. The stance against dualism, cosmological 
and epistemological, is an important feature of Torrance's thought. 
187 Torrance writes: 'We always know more than we can tell, and our implicit thinking 
is shaped by the world of knowledge embedded in and handed on in the tradition of 
culture into which we are born' (Torrance 1980c: 13). 188 See section 5.3.6. 
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We have seen that epistemological dualism has often been associated with 
cosmological dualism in western thought. 189 For Torrance, therefore, a properly 
scientific epistemology not only provides a way beyond the epistemological dualisms 
associated with Newton, Kant and their successors; it also provides a solution to the 
associated cosmological dualisms. In 'The Eclipse of God', ' 90 an essay which takes its 
title from a series of lectures by Buber (Torrance 1971: 29), Torrance looks at the 
outworking of dualist epistemology in terms of the doctrine of God as found in the 'new 
theology' associated with Bultmann, Tillich and John Robinson. 
Torrance finds in this 'new theology' a prevailing emphasis on the subjective 
pole of knowledge (Torrance 1971: 40) which argues that when the scriptural authors 
write about God and Christ they are in fact writing about themselves and their own 
inner states. Torrance argues that they work with an assumption, rooted in Newtonian 
cosmology, that the universe is a closed system (Torrance 1971: 37f, 49). For these 
theologians the word 'God' becomes a cipher for our relationship with God; and 
theological statements are transformed into statements about ourselves. God is eclipsed 
in their theology. Torrance reminds us that an eclipse occurs when something gets in the 
way of the sun (Torrance 1971: 29); the eclipse of God in the new theology occurs when 
what he calls our 'bloated selfbood' (Torrance 1971: 29) gets between our existence and 
God. We have seen that Torrance does not deny that there is a subjective pole in all 
knowledge, bis appropriation of the work of Polanyi empbasises the personal aspect of 
knowledge; however, his argument is that in the new theologians the study of history, 
specifically the history of Jesus Christ, and the study of theology have become entirely 
subjective. Ile argues that Bultmann 'reduces the content of revelation to our own self- 
189 See section 4.5.3. 
190 The essay appeared in The Baptist Quarterly, Vol. YXII, No4, October 1967, pp 194 
- 214. It is reprinted in God and Rationality (Torrance 1971: 29-5 5). References are to 
the 1971 reprint. 
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understanding' when he argues that in theology 'the only content our statements can 
have is the determination of our existence by the impact of His 'Word' upon us' 
(Torrance 1971: 40). 191 In contrast to the new theology Torrance argues that the New 
Testament authors write with the intention of bearing witness to the life and history of 
Jesus, not to tell us about their own souls (Torrance 1971: 37f). 
Torrance argues that the problem with the new theology is scientific as well as 
theological (Torrance 1971: 50,52). In the writings of these theologians theological 
language is divorced from the divine nature; and theology is reduced to anthropology, 
even psychology and autobiography (Torrance 1971: 50). The new theology, even in its 
interpretation of the historical Jesus, is germane to Torrance's non-independent natural 
theology for he argues that the radical dualism of the new theologians comes from a 
distorted understanding of the doctrine of creation and is related to their understanding 
of nature and its relation to God (Torrance 1971: 55). The Christian doctrine of creation 
means that we study nature out of itself and on its own terms and not from theological 
first principles (Torrance 1971: 39). Torrance argues that the doctrine of creatio ex 
nihilo can have the effect of detaching nature from God. Instead of regarding nature as 
contingent upon its creator it is perceived as independent of God (Torrance 1971: 48), its 
freedom no longer regarded as originating in God. 192 He argues that the disjunction 
between God and creation, seen in the cosmological dualism of the new theology, leads 
to 'something like the old pagan dichotomy between the intelligible and the sensible 
realms, or the old deistic disjunction between an idle God and a mechanistic universe' 
(Torrance 1971: 49). He argues that this radical dualism is seen in Bultmann's division 
191 On Bultmann's programme of demythologization, see Fergusson 1992, Chapter Six, 
especially pp 108-113. 
192 Torrance argues that in these theologians 'nature is sealed off from any meaning 
beyond itself in God' (Torrance 1971: 49). 
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of history into Hislorie and Geschichte. Torrance argues that in Bultmann history is 
divided into: 
a scientific reconstruction of historical events operating with the principle of a 
closed continuum of cause and effect, which eliminates the actual historical 
Jesus almost completely and certainly makes Him of no account for faith; and an 
interpretative account of history in which Christ stands for the way the Early 
Church creatively expressed its orientation to 'other-worldly' reality, and so 
becomes the point at which we in our generation may through 'faith' gain an 
authentic relation to existence.... And so historic Christianity is reduced to a 
pietistic individualism in which each man fills the symbol of 'Christ' with his 
own 'self-understanding' (Torrance 1971: 5 1). 
According to Torrance the way forward from the subjectivism and radical 
dualism of the new theology which he regards as a 'retreat from the truth' (Torrance 
1971: 52) is to be found in a properly scientific theology which begins with the axiom 
that you can 'know something only in accordance with its nature, and that you develop 
your knowledge of it as you allow its nature to prescribe for you the mode of rationality 
appropriate to it' (Torrance 1971: 52). 193 What this means for theology is the recognition 
that the kind of question we address determines the sort of answer that we can receive; 
and so the theologian must ask the questions that are appropriate to God. 194 If 
theologians ask only anthropological or psychological questions of God then they will 
receive only anthropological or psychological answers; only a theological question can 
yield a theological answer. It is difficult to ask appropriate questions about God, 
because all questions are inadequate to God's reality, however, a question that falls 
short of God is not necessarily a wrong question. Theology will only progress when 
theologians ask the right questions (Torrance 1971: 53f ). Torrance however does not tell 
us what these appropriate questions are! 
193 On Torrance's scientific theology, see Chapter Five. 
194 Torrance writes: 'To know God I must enter into the mode of rationality prescribed 
by the nature of God' (Torrance 1971: 52). 
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Torrance argues that the new theology illustrates the problems of cosmological 
and epistemological dualism; it rejects a priori the idea of God as active and present in 
the universe and this leads to a subjectivism in which theology is translated into 
anthropology and psychology (Torrance 1971: 55). 
In his critique of cosmological and epistemological dualism in theology 
Torrance returns to the objective self-revelation of God within space and time in Jesus 
Christ because a scientific theology must be grounded in the being of its object and the 
being of God is revealed in the incarnate Son. As in his doctrine of revelation in 
Scripture he focuses upon the Bible as witness to the Word of God in Christ, 195 so a 
theological-scientific epistemology, while having a subjective pole in the person who 
seeks to know God, has its objective pole in the doctrines and events of incarnation and 
creation. 
Torrance's theology begins with the presumption (cf Jijngel 1983: 161) that God 
has spoken in Jesus Christ within history; he assumes that the role of the theologian is to 
ask the appropriate questions of this event. In this presumption he puts theology on the 
right track. He draws attention to the danger of assuming that in the event of Jesus 
Christ and in the witness to that event in Scripture we have not God addressing us but a 
more familiar voice. If this is our assumption as we approach Jesus and the Scriptures 
we will certainly not hear in them the word of God, even if it is there to address us. 
There may be no sun in the sky but we will only discover this by looking for the sun and 
not by looking at ourselves. 
195 See Chapter Two. 
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4.5.6 Morrison and dualism in Torrance's scientific theology 
We have seen that Torrance is aware of the problems for theology of 
cosmological and epistemological dualism and that he challenges dualism on 
theological and scientific grounds. Morrison however, argues that Torrance has failed to 
eliminate dualism from his own theological epistemology (Morrison 1997a: 285). Ile 
argues that Torrance's dualism is a remnant inherited from Barth and ultimately from 
Kierkegaard (Morrison 1997a: 285). He accuses Torrance of a 'Barthian 
"transcendentalism"' which removes 'God's Truth from the present historical situation 
toward non-objectivity' (Morrison 1997a: 286). He argues that this transcendentalism 
has: 
forced a schism within his theological thinking so that a gulf is found finally to 
exist between divine and human at the point of space-time relation in the world. 
This demands that existential Word-event ... for theological "knowledge" and faith-ful response in the task of doing what he calls "mystical theology" 
(Morrison 1997a: 319). 
According to Morrison, the only point at which humanity can come to knowledge of 
God is in this 'existential Word-event'; a timeless encounter in which the truth of God is 
removed 'from the present historical situation toward non-objectivity' (Morrison 
1997a: 286). Morrison argues that Torrance has abstracted the timeless encounter with 
the word 'beyond the historical domain of the existing self' (Morrison 1997a: 317). 
If Morrison's charge that Torrance's is a dualist epistemology is upheld then he 
has failed in his own terms to offer an adequate theological method in the post-Einstein 
world. For as Torrance emphasises the theory of relativity does not allow for a timeless, 
supra-historical, encounter with reality. Truth is situated in time and space. However, a 
closer reading of Torrance's writings shows that Morrison's charges are not 
substantiated. Torrance takes care to stress that in all of our encounters with reality, 
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whether that reality is God or the universe, the observer is not granted a privileged, 
abstract or ahistorical vantage point (Torrance 1985b: 36). 
Torrance emphasises the objective pole in the relation of God to the universe of 
space and time; this is the 'epistemological significance of the incarnation' (Torrance 
1969a: 3 10) in which God in Christ enters into the contingent reality of time and space 
(Torrance 1969b: 52), but God does not relate to humanity in a spaceless and timeless 
way (Torrance 1969b: 61); rather he chooses to be present in the contingent creation in 
the life and person of Jesus. In the person of Jesus the absolute truth of God becomes a 
contingent event in space and time (see Torrance 1969b: 67). By placing emphasis on 
the entry of God into the space and time of creation Torrance affirms the possibility of 
our actual knowledge of God; nevertheless, he is aware that there is a subjective pole to 
all knowledge, including our knowledge of God. He quotes Brown who writes: 
'It is part of our situation that we are inevitably and inseparably inside the 
knowing relation, from the start to the end, and so cannot step outside of 
ourselves to an indifferent standpoint from which to view and adjust the 
relations of thought and being' (Torrance 1969a: 1, emphasis Brown). 
In most of his writings Torrance's main concern is to establish the incarnation of God as 
the basic datum of a scientific theology; however, the quotation from Brown is a 
reminder that just as God enters into space-time reality in order to be known, so 
theologians are also inevitably bound to their relative place in time and space. While 
Torrance does not expand upon the theme of the situatedness of all human knowledge, 
including knowledge of God, he does not ignore it. He writes: 
It may also be remarked that since theology, even when properly grounded in 
God's self-revealing interaction with the world, remains a human inquiry, 
operating within the contingent intelligibilities of space and time that it shares 
with natural science, it is also characterized by ambiguity in its formalized 
concepts and statements. By their contingent nature they fall short of the divine 
realities they indicate, pointing far beyond themselves to what is infinitely 
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greater than we can conceive or express; God cannot be brought into any 
compulsive relation to our concepts or statements about him (Torrance 
1980b: 144). 
In commenting on the improvement that Torrance makes on Barth's 
understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit in the interpretation of Scripture Thiselton 
writes that 'the Holy Spirit does not bypass human rationality, or make questions about 
the nature of human language irrelevant' (Thiselton 1980: 91), 196 he continues: '[t]he 
epistemological relevance of the Holy Spirit lies not in some esoteric gnostic route to 
knowledge, but "in the dynamic and transformational aspects of this knowledge"' 
(Thiselton 1980: 92, quoting Torrance 1971: 166). Torrance acknowledges not only the 
reality of the incarnation in time and space but also of the theologian. Far from being 
guilty of 'Barthian transcendentalism' Torrance acknowledges the relativity of all 
human theological knowledge and language; he makes no claim for a privileged 
objectivity for the theologian. 
4.5.7 Discussion 
The attempt to refute the cosmological and epistemological dualisms associated 
with Newton and Kant is such a recurring theme of Torrance's theology that Colyer 
regards it as the central and unifying concept of his theology (Colyer 2001a: 57-60). In 
his criticism of the dualism in western thought Torrance draws on the writings of 
Einstein, Polanyi and Clerk-Maxwell and draws philosophical and theological 
conclusions from their scientific writings. The justification for his taking the methods 
and results of the physical sciences and applying them to theology is his relocation of 
natural theology within the body of revealed theology, for in doing so he correlates 
theological science with natural science. Natural theology, or a theology of nature, is 
196 Thiselton here refers to Torrance 1971: 146-51 and 183-92 (Thiselton 1980: 91, n. 38). 
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concerned with God's self revelation in the universe. This means that the natural 
sciences and their investigation of reality are an important component of knowledge of 
God. It is in the contingent events and processes of the universe that God has disclosed 
himself. 
Torrance's rejection of dualism is an important component of his nuanced 
understanding of realism. Torrance is a realist but his account of realism, which he takes 
care to correlate with the realism of the natural sciences, comes with no prior 
philosophical justification. There is no reason why reality should disclose itself to the 
enquirer, but it does - or at least it may, it has the capacity to do so. Torrance's account 
of theological epistemology is actualist in its realism rather than necessary; there is what 
Hardy calls a gracing of theological knowledge. There is also a gracing of scientific 
knowledge. Human knowing whether of God or of the universe is necessarily 
contingent and personal, but through the disciplined obedience of the mind to reality 
true knowledge may arise. From the perspective of the natural sciences the human 
ability to apprehend reality will always be incomprehensible; from the perspective of 
theological science which is coordinated to the relation of God to creation as disclosed 
in the doctrines of incarnation and creation, the comprehensibility of the universe is 
contingent upon the creative word of God. The importance of Torrance's rejection of 
dualism for a realist theological epistemology is the implication that there is one world, 
one reality and so the truth of God, like the truth of the universe, is discovered not by 
speculation but by attention to actual self revelation. 
4.6 Torrance's Transformed Natural Theology 
Of his transformed natural theology Torrance writes: 
185 
A natural theology in this full sense will have its proper place in the dialogue 
between theological science and natural science within their common sharing of 
the rational structures of space and time conferred on this universe by God in his 
creating of it, and within their common sharing in the basic conceptions of the 
unitary rationality of the universe, its contingent intelligibility and contingent 
freedom - which derive ... from a Christian understanding of the relation of God 
to the universe (Torrance 1980b: 94). 
There are a number of important differences between Torrance's transformed natural 
theology and traditional natural theology. The first major difference is that Torrance's 
natural theology leads us not to a general theism which is distinct from and antecedent 
to the God of Christian revelation but to the Trinity and the incarnation. A second 
important difference is that the way that Torrance understands the natural world, 
science, and scientific method is shaped by his reading of Einstein and Polanyi whose 
work has transformed our understanding of the natural world and of scientific 
investigation of that world. This is of significance for all of Torrance's theology, but 
especially for his transformed natural theology which we have argued is more properly 
seen as a theology of nature. 
4.6.1 The creator's relation to the creation 
One of the focal points of Torrance's exposition of the relationship of God to the 
universe is the doctrine of creation. ' 97 God is the creator of the universe. The universe 
197 The development of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is the distinctively Christian 
contribution to the understanding of creation (Gunton 1997: 141). It was developed by 
the patristic theologians from their interpretation of the biblical material and was the 
usual Christian understanding of creation until recent years. Some twentieth century 
movements in theology, such as Process Theology, deny that creation was out of 
nothing (Griffin 1999: 140). Some process theologians interpret creation as the 
imposition of order on pre-existing chaos (Cobb and Griffin 1977: 65). Moltmann and 
McGrath defend the doctrine (Moltmarm 1985: 86-93, McGrath 2001: 159-166) and 
although it has been challenged in recent decades the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo 
remains the main Christian understanding of creation (Davies 2004: 2). 
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of space and time is not etemal, it is finite and its origin is in God; its existence is not 
logically necessary, it is not self-created. God is the transcendent creator. There was a 
point at which God began to create, a point before which the universe did not exist 
(Torrance 1988a: 84-89); Torrance's point is that God is essentially and in himself 
Father and Son and Holy Spirit (Torrance 1988a: 76,110,193-196). The doctrine of the 
Trinity gives us more insight into the being of God than does the doctrine of creation 
(Torrance 1988a: 76-80). According to Christian theology God created the universe out 
of nothing (Torrance 1988a: 95-98). The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is important for 
Torrance's understanding of the relationship of God to the creation. The world is not 
part of God nor is its existence necessary; it is not eternal. It is a contingent reality 
(Torrance 1985b: 33; c. f. Torrance 1980b: 102) and it is finite in the sense that it had a 
beginning; it is from God but it is not of God. As a contingent reality the universe is 
relatively free of God but its freedom is contingent upon God. This contingent freedom 
means that we come to an understanding of the nature of the universe by empirical 
investigation of nature (Torrance 1985b: 33). 
Torrance argues that the creation also has a contingent rationality conferred 
upon it by its creator (Torrance 1980b: 53-57). Created rationality is not the same as 
God's own logos, nor is it independent of God. It is part of God's gift to the universe 
which he created out of nothing. This Christian understanding of the creation of the 
universe from nothing, including time and space, also includes the rationality and 
intelligibility of the universe and means that although the universe has its transcendent 
ground in God, if we are to understand the universe, then we must attend to the universe 
and not to God (Torrance 1985b: 33). This is one of the ways in which Torrance's non- 
independent natural theology differs from traditional natural theologies. According to 
Torrance the Christian doctrine of creatio ex Whilo compels such an empirical approach 
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upon us. In order to investigate the universe we must study the universe and not begin 
with the necessary truths of reason. In the west with its 'context of powerful 
cosmological and epistemological dualisms' (Torrance 1980b: 104)198 the universe's 
contingent and gifted independence has led to what Torrance calls a 'dogmatic 
secularisation in life and in thought' (Torrance 1980b: 104). However this secular 
approach to the universe involves a loss of meaning; 199 this is important to Torrance as 
he develops his non-independent natural theology. Ile speaks of the 'silent cry' of the 
universe for a sufficient ground (Torrance 1985b: 58). According to Torrance, the 
universe itself provides no explanation of its existence, of its rationality, or of its 
comprehensibility; an entirely secular understanding of the universe leaves important 
questions not only unanswered; it renders them unanswerable. If we are to recover the 
meaning of the world we must look beyond to its transcendent ground and creator 
(Torrance 1980b: 104). As a contingent reality the world cannot provide an explanation 
for its own existence. However, scientific exploration of the world can tell us a great 
deal about the contingent creation. 
Another focal point of Torrance's understanding of the relation of the creation to 
the creator is that it is Christologically grounded. Christ is the creative logos through 
whom all things were made. The Christological foundations of the relationship of God 
to the universe preclude any sort of deistic disjunction between God and the creation; it 
also means that redemption is also related to creation as the affirmation and renewal of 
the created order (Torrance 1976: 87f, 66). Torrance's understanding of nature is 
important not only for his understanding of the place of a transformed natural theology; 
198 See sections 4.5.3,4.5.4. 
199 In support, Torrance cites Polanyi 1969: 146, see Torrance 1985b: 34,61 note 2. 
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it also forms the basis of his attempt to correlate theology and the sciences as well as of 
his epistemology. 200 
4.6.2 God, Einstein's universe and natural theology 
Torrance argues that the paradigm shift in our understanding of the nature of 
reality brought about by Einstein achieved a 'unification of ontology and intelligibility 
in scientific knowledge' (Torrance 1985b: 44). This paradigm shift is of fundamental 
importance for Torrance's theology. The Newtonian worldview replaced by Einstein's 
was characterised by 'dualist and abstractive modes of thought' (Torrance 1985b: 44); it 
formed the basic understanding of the universe until the early twentieth century. 
Torrance argues that a God who 'contains and regulates' (Torrance 1980b: 68) the 
universe without being affected or changed by it cannot actively relate to the world in 
the way that the Scriptures and the patristic writers understand; much less could such a 
God become incarnate in the world of relative space and time. It is for this reason that 
Newton was unable to accept the doctrine of the incarnation (Torrance 1980b: 68). 
According to Torrance this deistic model of God formed the foundation of 
Newton's cosmology; he understood the laws of nature as eternal and unchangeable, 
founded upon an eternal and unchangeable God (Torrance 1980b: 680. Torrance claims 
that the deistic God of natural theology has had an impact on the development of 
western science and that the dualism inherent in the concept of God derived from 
traditional natural theology has left its mark upon pre-Einsteinian science. 20 1 Another 
source of dualism in western thought is Kant whose worldview separates the real from 
200 See chapter Five. 
20 1 Torrance writes: 'Newton's God was so transcendently related to the universe that he 
was deistically detached from it through his immutability and impassibility. It was, then, 
on this deeply dualist basis that Newton developed his grand synthesis of God and the 
universe that allowed him to explain the immutable, eternal laws of nature as they are 
grounded objectively in the immutability and eternity of God' (Torrance 1980b: 68). 
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the experienced in what Torrance calls the dualism between 'ontology and intelligibility 
in scientific knowledge' (Torrance 1985b: 44). This dualistic worldview was the basic 
scientific paradigm which existed before Einstein; in it reality is distinct from 
experience and from empirical knowledge. However, according to Einstein the 
empirical world is the real world; there is no noumenal realm abstracted from the world 
of experience. In Einstein's paradigm there is no dualism between ontology and 
epistemology, between reality and experience. In Einstein's model when the natural 
sciences investigate the universe they address reality and not merely phenomena which 
are given form by the observer. What is at stake in these two different models of reality 
is whether meaning is inherent in the universe or created by the observer (Torrance 
1985b: 32-33). He argues that the dualisms of Newton and Kant, though different in 
detail, imply that meaning is imposed by the observing mind upon the world. 
Epistemological dualism, he claims, still prevails in western society and thought except 
in what Torrance calls 'pure science and rigorous theology'; these operate with a 
working assumption that the world possesses rational structures which are inherent to it 
and not created by the observer (Torrance 1985b: 32). Torrance argues that the paradigm 
shift associated with Einstein is as important for theology as for the natural sciences 
because we can only know God as he has revealed himself within the universe of space 
and time (Torrance 1980b: 72). 
Torrance operates with a disclosure model of reality. He holds that proper 
scientific enquiry allows reality to disclose itself to investigation 'in accordance with its 
own inherent structures' (Torrance 1985b: 45). In investigating the universe we meet 
reality, being itself and not merely a world of phenomena divorced from being. The 
structures of reality are inherent to it and not imposed upon it by the human mind. 
Torrance writes that 'what we apprehend like this in the truth of its own being proves 
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itselfto us by bringing our minds under an imperative obligation which we cannot 
rationally resist' (Torrance 1985b: 48, emphasis Torrance). 
Having argued for realism in his approach to the universe, Torrance asks about 
the meaning of the universe as a whole. He regards the centuries before Einstein as 
6centuries of deism and secularism' (Torrance 1985b: 44) which led to a short sighted 
view of the universe; a 'habit of looking at the universe in such a way as to cut off its 
signitive or referential relations beyond itself (Torrance 1985b: 44). Torrance calls for a 
way of looking at the universe which also looks beyond the world to its ultimate ground 
in the transcendent rationality of God (Torrance 1985b: 44). This change in perspective 
originates in the incarnation of the Word of God whose person is the very place where 
the creation and the creator meet. From the perspective of natural theology the universe, 
contingent in its being and rationality, points beyond itself to a sufficient cause 
(Torrance 1985b: 44). In support of this, Torrance quotes Wittgenstein who writes: 
The meaning of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is 
as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists - and if it 
did exist, it would have no value. If there is any value that does have value, it 
must lie outside the sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens 
and is the case is contingent (zufd11ig). What makes it non - contingent 
(nich1zufd11ig) cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be 
contingent (zufdllig). It must lie outside the world. Wittgenstein, L. Logico 
Tractatus - Philosophicus, 6.41. (London 1961, quoted in Torrance 1985b: 62, 
note 9). 202 
Torrance argues that the very nature of the universe in its contingence poses a 'question' 
which demands an answer; however, the nature of the question posed is beyond the 
scope of scientific enquiry. 
202 Note that Torrance replaces 'accidental' and 'non-accidental' in the English 
translation with 'contingent' and 'non-contingent', which he argues is 'truer to 
Wittgenstein's thought'. Torrance 1985b: 62, note 9. 
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The natural sciences in their investigation of the universe try to 'lay bare the 
intelligible structure of the universe, and try everywhere to grasp reality in its own 
rational depth' (Torrance 1985b: 52). However, as the natural sciences investigate the 
universe and try to answer questions about it deeper questions are raised; questions 
which scientific investigation of the universe cannot answer. Torrance lists some of 
these fundamental questions: 'Why is there a universe and not nothing? ... What is the 
reason for ... the existence of a universe that is accessible to rational inquiry? ' 
(Torrance 1985b: 52). The universe is not self-explanatory, 203 nor is its inherent 
rationality; they are given as far as scientific enquiry is concerned. This lack of 
explanation is a problem for the natural sciences and, according to Torrance, the 
problematic nature of the universe 'points beyond itself with a mute cry for sufficient 
reason' (Torrance 1985b: 520. Torrance claims that it is the inexplicable 
comprehensibility of the universe which points towards a 'transcendent ground of 
rationality as its explanation. ... To be inherently reasonable the universe requires a 
sufficient reason for being what it is as an intelligible whole' (Torrance 1985b: 53). 
The universe as investigated by the natural sciences points us to the existence of 
an active agency which is the ground of the universe's being and which is the source of 
the universe's unity and structure which persist despite its constantly changing 
processes (Torrance 1985b: 56,58). This is where a transformed, non independent, 
natural theology finds its place. It is very similar to the place which traditional natural 
theology occupies in the cosmological argument. However, Torrance emphasises that he 
is not suggesting any sort of 'logical bridge' or 'chain of inferential reasoning from the 
contingent to a "necessary" Creator' (Torrance 1985b: 58). He argues that the movement 
of thought from the contingent universe to its transcendent creator is a fully rational 
203 Indeed if the universe were self - explanatory it would not be contingent. 
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movement but it is not a logically necessary movement. Should anyone read Torrance 
and suppose that the type of natural theology he is proposing here is in any sense 
independent, he is at pains to point out that we come to know God through the universe 
not because we trap him by our logic (Torrance 1985b: 59); rather God: 
interacts with us and the universe, ... and discloses himself in a positive way to 
us. ... it is not with discovery that we have to do here, as in our inquiries into 
mute and determinate realities when we seek to let them 'disclose' themselves to 
our questioning, but with revelation in which our seeking and inquiring are 
anticipated, prompted and supported by creative activity on God's part (Torrance 
1985b: 59). 
Here again Torrance goes beyond revelation in Christ. Just as a close reading of his 
doctrine of revelation in Scripture pointed to the Bible as more than a witness to the 
Word but as a locus of divine self-revelation, so too his transposed natural theology and 
points to the creation as a place of revelation. Again because the creative word of God 
became incarnate in Jesus Christ there is no possible contradiction between revelation in 
Christ and revelation in nature. 
4.6.3 Discussion 
The universe disclosed to the natural sciences is not self explanatory. It is the 
very success of the natural sciences in investigating reality that highlights this. The 
rational order and comprehensibility of the universe raise questions that are unanswered 
and from the perspective of the natural sciences are unanswerable. It is here that 
Torrance's transposed natural theology is important. From the Christian doctrines of 
creation and incarnation he argues that the universe is created by God to be free, and 
this contingent freedom is the ground of the empirical method which has been so 
successful in providing explanations of the universe. Natural theology points, not to 
God in general but to the God revealed in Christ and in the scriptures as the ground of 
193 
rationality and being in the universe. In the creation of the universe God has conferred a 
relative freedom on his creation which means for the natural sciences that knowledge 
progresses by attention to the universe itself rather than by abstraction and speculation. 
The empirical method in general and Einstein's theories of relativity in 
particular point to the inherence of meaning in the universe. Meaning is discovered or 
disclosed, it is not imposed by the observer. When this is applied to theology it points us 
to the places and events whereby God has acted to disclose himself within the universe 
as the only source of knowledge of God. It points to revelation in Christ, in Scripture 
and in the creation, but underlying all of this it points to the gracing of all knowledge of 
God; that it is his self-gift. This leads to the doctrine ofjustification by grace in its 
epistemological significance - for theological science and also for the natural sciences. 
4.7 Conclusion 
Torrance has two clear aims in his approach to natural theology. He wants to 
develop from Barth's rejection of independent natural theology his own non- 
independent natural theology which is better seen as a theology of nature. His second 
aim is to correlate this non-independent natural theology with the understanding of the 
universe and of scientific method post-Einstein. 
Torrance begins with Barth's rejection of natural theology and develops a new 
aecount of natural theology that is not independent of revealed theology. He argues 
forcefully that Barth's objection to natural theology is its independence of God's actual 
revelation. He is not alone in reading Barth on natural theology in this way, Stanley 
Hauerwas in his Gifford lectures also portrays Barth as a great natural theologian 
(Hauerwas 2002: 90. Further support is found in Barth's own work on natural theology. 
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Torrance argues that 'instead of rejecting natural theology per se, Barth has 
transposed it into the material content of theology where in a changed form it 
constitutes the epistemological structure of our knowledge of God' (Torrance 1976: ix 
f). Torrance's aim is to relocate natural theology within dogmatics, where one of its key 
roles will be to establish a rational structure in our knowledge of God. It has been 
demonstrated that the rejection of epistemological and cosmological dualism in 
theology informs Torrance's criticism of some of his theological contemporaries. 
Torrance's rejection of traditional approaches to natural theology is on both 
theological and scientific grounds. Torrance applies the insights in scientific method 
associated with Einstein and Polanyi to theology. He believes that the epistemological 
dualism of traditional approaches to natural theology is undermined by Einstein's work. 
Torrance learns from the natural sciences that an a posteriori epistemology entails a 
rejection of dualism, not only in his transformed natural theology, but in all theology. 
When Torrance's development of natural theology is examined an emphasis on the self- 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ as the place in time and space where God encounters 
his creation is seen. Here the theologian comes up against the reality of God. Torrance's 
theological science rests on his application of the insights of the natural sciences to 
theology. He is able to apply the work of Einstein on the unity of formal and empirical 
components of knowledge to theology because he makes a strong case for the 
correlation of the understanding of the universe disclosed to the natural sciences with 
that derived from the Christian doctrines of creation and incarnation. 
Torrance's transposed natural theology points to a gracious self revelation of 
God in the creation. This revelation is independent of revelation in Christ only in terms 
of the locus of revelation for the transcendent creative Word is the same Word of God 
who became incarnate in Jesus Christ. This supports the argument that there is a 
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fundamental gracing of theological knowledge in Torrance's thought that is more basic 
even than revelation in Christ and is constitutive of his realist theological epistemology. 
Theology, like all knowledge, is always personal; it is the knowledge of persons 
within the space time universe. There is no abstract or neutral vantage point from which 
the theologian works and therefore a non-independent natural theology will seek 
consonance with the natural sciences in terms of their common understanding of the 
creation and in terms of how the universe is to be understood by the scientist, whether a 
natural or a theological scientist, and so we will see in chapter five how Torrance 
develops his non-independent natural theology into Theological Science. Chapter five 
will examine the central place of contingence in Torrance's thought, and his correlation 
of scientific and theological episternologies. 
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Chapter Five Natural theology III: theological science 
5.1 Introduction 
Torrance's doctrine of revelation is founded on his conviction that we can only 
know God as he has actually given himself to be known to us. For him this means in 
Christ. This forms the basis of his understanding of revelation in Scripture and of his 
transposed natural theology; however, a close reading of Torrance's writings on 
revelation reveals an understanding of revelation in nature and Scripture. From this 
doctrine of revelation there emerges an understanding of the gracing of all human 
knowledge of God. Foundational to Torrance's theological epistemology is the 
reformed doctrine ofjustification by grace alone. 
Torrance takes account of the locus of both revelation and of the recipients of 
revelation within the created universe. Jesus Christ is God's revelation within the 
universe of space and time, 204 and those who interpret the Scriptures do so from a 
position within space and time. It is for this reason that dialogue with the natural 
sciences is important for an account of Torrance's theological epistemology. If God is 
known within space and time then the nature of the universe is important for Christian 
theology. He argues that a Christologically founded theology is scientific in that it is 
founded upon the actual self-revelation of God within the creation. 
In his dialogue with the natural sciences Torrance does not attempt to place 
theology into a philosophy derived from his understanding of the sciences, nor does he 
attempt to place the sciences within a philosophy derived from Christian theology. 
Instead he situates his theological understanding of the universe alongside the 
understanding of the universe found in post -Einsteinian science. In Torrance's 
theology the two accounts of the universe are arrived at separately in accordance with 
the two distinct disciplines each with their own appropriate methods of enquiry. What 
Torrance finds when he places these two understandings of the universe together is a 
204 See section 1.3.1 
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correlation and congruence between them. 
In chapter four it was noted that the shift in contemporary accounts of the 
natural sciences from a dualist to a unitary outlook is central to Torrance's attempted 
rapprochement between theology and the sciences. Torrance's unitary understanding of 
reality 'makes it possible again to see how one and the same reality is invoked when the 
scientist speaks of the world and when the theologian speaks of God's creation' 
(Scharlemann 1983: 198). This correlation or congruence between Christian theology 
and the natural sciences is central to Torrance's development of a theology of nature 
and to his dialogue with the sciences. This dialogue is two way and each discipline 
benefits from the engagement. 
Having examined the relationship between theology and the sciences we 
critically examine Torrance's account of theological science and in particular his 
argument that theology is a scientific endeavour in the same way as physics. He argues 
that in contemporary accounts of human knowing theology is to be grouped with what 
the exact sciences rather than with the humanities or the human sciences. He argues that 
both Christian theology and the natural sciences give support to a critical realist 
understanding of the universe and that each provides support for the other in debate 
with non-realist traditions; however Torrance's account of critical realism is arrived at 
a-posteriori; it is an actual realism, based on experience, rather than an a-priori 
logically necessary realism. Finally it will be argued that his scientific epistemology has 
an application wider than theology and the natural sciences. 
5.2 Theology and Science 
5. Zl God and the creation: introduction 
The doctrine of creation is important for Torrance's theology and epistemology 
for two reasons: first, it has a direct bearing upon the relationship between theology and 
the natural sciences; second, the nature of creation has implications for how God relates 
to and communicates with and within it. Torrance believes that the relative nature of 
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space and time as disclosed in the natural sciences is crucial to our understanding of 
God's relationship to creation. This is especially so for the doctrine of the incarnation 
whereby God does not simply relate to the creation but becomes part of the universe of 
space and time. The doctrine of the homoousion implies that the absolute truth of God 
becomes a contingent and historical event. Torrance finds significant parallels between 
the understanding of the nature of the universe in the patristic writers and that developed 
by Einstein. 
God's contingent relationship to the creation is important in Torrance's 
theology. Ile uses the term contingent in two different but related ways. The universe is 
contingent rather than necessary because it could have been other than it is (Torrance 
198 1 a: vii). Its laws and its inherent rationality could have been different from how they 
are. 205 The second sense in which Torrance uses the term is when he conceives of the 
universe as being contingent upon its creator. He argues that God's existence, being 
necessary, is of a different order from the creation 206 which depends upon its creator for 
its existence and its nature (Torrance 1988a: 78f, Torrance 198 1 a: 26). The universe is as 
it is because of the decision and gift of God. Torrance's two uses of contingence are 
related for if the universe's existence was necessary then it could not be dependent on 
God for its nature. 207 
S. Z2 Torrance's Christocentric doctrine of creation 
According to Torrance the doctrine of creation is Christologically founded for he 
argues that the incarnation impacts upon our understanding of creation and its 
relationship to God (Torrance 1996a: 213-216, and Torrancel988a: 155,183). He 
correlates this theological understanding of creation with the natural sciences. He is 
205 Torrance writes: 'Regarded in itself the universe is what it is, this one and only 
universe which has come into being, but considered from the side of God's free creation 
it is only one of all possible universes since it might have been very different' (Torrance 
1981a: 22). 
206 The necessity of God's existence is contested by some theologians and philosophers 
of religion, notably in process theology (Griffin 1999: 141). 207 See Mann 1999: 264-270. 
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unusual, but not unique, among Barthians for his interest in the doctrine of creation and 
the relation of theology to the natural sciences. Luoma notes that due to the 
Christocentric nature of Barth's theology Barthians are supposed to be 'politely 
indifferent' toward these areas of theology (Luoma 2002: 18). 208 Barth argued that the 
natural sciences have little to contribute to a theological understanding of creation 
(Barth 1958b: ix). However, Toffance's work demonstrates that there is no dichotomy 
between a Christocentric theology and an interest in the natural sciences; rather he 
argues that the two disciplines can learn from each another. in fact, according to 
Torrance's understanding of what constitutes a scientific discipline, only a 
Christocentric theology can enter into meaningful dialogue with the natural sciences for 
only a Christocentric theology can claim to be scientific. 
Torrance's Christocentric approach to the doctrine of creation is not simply that 
Christ is the creative logos; more significantly he understands the incarnation as forging 
an unbreakable link between the universe and the incarnate Son. This makes revelation 
in Christ normative for the content of Christian theology, whatever its origin. He does 
not use the concept of the relation of the creator to creation as the basis of a general 
revelation. His formulation of the doctrine of creation is firmly rooted in his 
understanding of divine grace and the centrality of Christ in the economy of revelation. 
Torrance argues that in Christian theology God is primarily Father and only 
secondarily creator (Torrance 1988a: 6). He argues that: 
In contrast with Judaism and its stress on the innumerability of God, the 
Christian Faith is concerned with God as he has named himself in Jesus Christ, 
and incarnated in him his own Word, so that in Christ we know God as he is in 
his own inner being, as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Jesus Christ is the arche .... 
the Origin or Principle, of all our knowledge of God, and of what he has done 
and continues to do in the universe, so that it is in terrns of the relation of Jesus 
the incarnate Son to the Father, that we have to work out a Christian 
understanding of the creation. It is the Fatherhood of God, revealed in the Son, 
that determines how we are to understand God as Almighty Creator, and not the 
other way round. It was through thinking out the inner relation of the incarnation 
to the creation that early Christian theology so transformed the foundations of 
208 See also Webster 2000a: I 10. 
200 
Greek philosophy, science and culture, that it laid the original basis on which the 
great enterprise of empirico-theoretical science now rests (Torrance 1988a: 7). 
The understanding of God derived from the patristic doctrine of the homoousion is a 
209 
controlling factor in Torrance's theology (Torrance 1988a: 77). 
Torrance articulates his understanding of God as creator from within the 
perspective of the relation of the Father and the Son (Torrance 1988a: 78). He argues 
that we can only know who God is, even as creator, from his self-revelation in Christ 
(Torrance 1988a: 76). He argues that the unity of being between the Father and the Son 
implies a unity of action between them. The Nicene Creed names God as 'the Father, 
the Almighty, maker of heaven and earth', and goes on to say that the Son is 'eternally 
begotten of the Father'. "O Torrance cites Athanasius who writes that when we call God 
'Father' we do not refer to some quality or attribute of God, but signify 'his very being' 
(quoted in Torrance 1988a: 79). When Torrance derives his understanding of God as 
creator from a prior understanding of God as the eternal Father of the Son this implies 
that God is essentially creative. He argues that God is able to be the creator of heaven 
and earth because, as Father of the Son, he is in himself essentially productive (Torrance 
1988a: 79); and as the transcendent, Triune creator, God is totally other than the creation 
(Torrancel 988a: 800. "' 
According to Torrance this Christocentric approach to the doctrine of God tells 
us that although God was not always creator he is eternally the Father of the Son and the 
209 See also Seng 1992: 341,366 
2 10 For a contemporary translation of the Nicene Creed, see Common Worship. Services 
and Prayersfor the Church ofEngland. Church House Publishing, London. 2000, 
" age 173. 1 Torrance writes: 'He the eternal Father, with the eternal Son and the eternal Spirit 
who are consubstantial and co-equal with himself, is the transcendent Origin (apX11) of 
all created things, visible and invisible alike, whose transitory natures are utterly 
different from his own' (Torrance 1988a: 80f). 
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fount of all being; 212 (Torrance 1988a: 84). He argues that the generation of the Son is 
unlike the creation of the universe for the Son is eternally begotten of the Father that is 
before the beginning of time; whereas the creation of the universe is within time in the 
sense that time is itself an element of the universe. Another significant difference is that 
the Son is begotten of the Father 'within the one being of God, as God of God' 
(Torrance 1988a: 84); whereas the universe is created not of God but by God out of 
nothing and is external to the being of God. 213 The distinction between the generation of 
the Son and the creation of the universe is that it is in the nature of the Father to beget 
the Son but it is in the will of God to create the world. The generation of the Son flows 
from God's being; the creation of the universe flows from God's decision. "' The Son is 
eternal in the same way as the Father, however, the creation is not eternal (Torrance 
1988a: 87). "' The implication of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is that the existence of 
the universe is contingent upon the will and act of God. 
The created universe has a definite beginning. It may have been in God's mind 
to create before he in fact did so (Torrance 1988a: 87), but when God brought the 
universe into being by the act of his will he gave it an origin. Torrance acknowledges 
212 Here of course language begins to become less than adequate, as Torrance, following 
the Nicene Creed, speaks of events within God which occurred 'before' the creation of 
the space-time universe. 
213 Torrance writes: 'The Son is begotten of God's nature and is without beginning ... 
like the Father and without any interval between him and the Father, for he is one and 
the same being and nature as the Father. Creatures, on the other hand, are freely brought 
into being from non-being by the will of God and have an absolute beginning, for they 
utterly different in being and nature from God' (Torrance 1988a: 84). 
214 Torrance writes: 'Athanasius argued [against the Arians] ... that there 
is no likeness 
between a son and a created thing which might equate the function of a father and of a 
maker, for there is a vast disparity between a created thing brought into being from 
nothing by the will of God as 'a work external to his nature', and the Son who is 'the 
proper offspring of the being of God' and is internal to his nature' (Torrance 1988a: 86). 
"5 Torrance writes: 'In answer to the question why God, though always with the power 
to make, does not always make, Athanasius pointed to the fact that owing to their 
intrinsic nature created things could not have existed eternally, for they were created out 
of nothing, (Torrance 1988a: 87). 
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that there is problem of language when speaking of God. He uses words such as 
'before' and 'beginning' which imply temporal relations which are only proper when 
speaking of events within the universe as time itself is a component of the universe. 
Torrance is stretching language beyond its everyday use, he is not reading back 
temporal relations into God (Torrance 1988a: 87f). However, he draws a parallel 
between the decision of God to create and the decision of God to become incarnate and 
argues that they are both new actions which flow from God's will (Torrance 1988a: 880. 
These new actions have implications for our understanding of God. In the incarnation 
and creation God is free to do and to be what he did not and what he was not eternally. 
Torrance argues that the idea of something new happening in God is at odds with the 
Hellenistic understanding of the divine nature which holds that God is impassive 
(Torrance 1988a: 89). While the Hellenistic understanding of divine nature has been 
influential upon western philosophy and theology the biblical and patristic 
understanding of God is different. Torrance argues that the patristic doctrines of 
incarnation and creation introduce change in the will and even in the being of God. He 
refers to the 'Self-moved God' (Torrance 1996a: 23 9, emphasis Torrance) of biblical 
revelation which he contrasts with the immutable Unmoved Mover of scholastic 
theology who does not personally interact with the world of space and time and with 
the Moved Unmover of Whitehead's process theology who is inextricably attached to 
the world (Torrance 1996a: 239). 
In place of the God of the scholastics and the God of the process theologians 
Torrance writes of the paradox of the constancy and freedom of God 'who is eternally 
new and constantly surpasses himself in all that he does' (Torrance 1996a: 23 9). 216 Thus 
216 C. f. Barth 1957: 502f. 
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in creation God who is eternally Father becomes creator, 217 and in the incarnation God 
the creator becomes a creature. God's life is not limited or characterised by time; yet 
there is a purpose which gives direction to God's eternal life (Torrance 1996a: 241). 
Torrance argues that although God relates to time in a non-temporal way (Torrance 
1988a: 90) in creation and incarnation he conceives of purpose and direction in God's 
eternal life. This direction is characterised by 'distinct moments' in God's eternal life 
such as before and after creation and incarnation (Torrance 1996a: 241, emphasis 
Torrance). He grounds the change and temporality which characterises creation in the 
direction and in these 'moments' of God's eternal life. 
5.2.3 God the transcendent creator 
Torrance depicts creation, like revelation, as an act of absolute grace (Torrance 
1996a: 208,239-40). 218 The creator's relation to creation is neither necessary nor 
arbitrary but is grounded in God's own decision and purpose (Torrance 1988a: 93). 219 
Just as God is free to reveal or not to reveal himself in and to his creation, so he is free 
to create or not to create. Torrance, citing Athanasius, argues that the existence of the 
universe is not a random event, rather God created through his Word; therefore its 
rational ground is in God, specifically in Jesus Christ, the Word of God incarnate 
(Torrance 1988a: 920. God's freedom with respect to creation rules out both pantheism 
and panentheism. 220 Torrance argues that the universe is not divine, it is external to 
God; a 'temporal analogue, taking place outside of God, of that event in God himself by 
217 Torrance writes: 'the creation registered a distinct 'moment' in the eternal life of 
God' (Torrance 1996a: 24 1). 
218 Torrance refers the Barth 1957: 491-522. 
2 19 Torrance writes about the 'Self-moved God who is transcendentally and majestically 
free' (Torrance 1996a: 239, emphasis Torrance). 
220 Moltmann defines panentheism as the doctrine that space is 'an attribute of the 
eternal, divine Being. As a dimension of the divine omnipresence' (Moltmann 
1985: 154). 
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which God is Father of the Son' (Torrance 1988a: 93). 22 1 Torrance notes that while it is 
usually Augustine who is credited with the notion that creatio ex nihilo includes the 
creation of space and time, the idea had been around in Christian theology since the 
second century (Torrance 1988a: 104). 
As he develops his understanding of the nature of time and space Torrance 
argues that the doctrine of the incarnation put Christian theology at odds with the 
(container' understanding of space which prevailed in the patristic period (Torrance 
1969b: 4). 222 By the container or receptacle view of space he means the idea that space is 
an inert or passive vessel in which things simply exist or happen (Torrance 1969b: 4f). 
He notes that although this model of space originates in early Greek philosophy it has 
continued in western thought until Einstein's theory of relative space-time. 223 Prior to 
Einstein's general theory of relativity space and time were regarded as the forms under 
which knowledge was attained. Newton regarded space and time as 'an inertial system 
independent of material events contained within them but acting on them and 
conditioning our knowledge of the universe' (Torrance 1969b: 58). Einstein's theory 
points to a relational understanding of space-time in which both space and time are 
bound up with the events of the universe. Space is understood as space to be; space for 
event. Torrance explores what this relational understanding of the spatio-temporal 
structures of the universe means for Christology. He argues that the hypostatic union of 
human and divine nature in the one person of Jesus Christ establishes him as the place 
in the universe of space and time where God and humanity meet. Jesus Christ is the 
place where human nature is open to God and where 'the infinite Being of God 
221 In support Torrance quotes Barth, Dogmatics in Outline page 52, and Church 
Dogmatics 111.1.13 ff. 
222 See the whole of Toffance 1969b chapter 1, pages I- 21. 
223 Torrance writes: 'In modem as in ancient thought some form of the receptacle 
notion of space seems to have been predominant. Only in comparatively recent science 
have we departed from it' (Torrance 1969b: 22). 
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penetrates into our existence and creates room for Himself within the horizontal 
dimensions of finite being in space and time' (Torrance 1969b: 75). 224 However we have 
seen that Torrance is not consistent in his Christocentric understanding of revelation. 
We noted in chapter two that he clearly conceives of God acting through the Scriptures 
to effect revelation, a personal encounter within space and time. This revelation in 
scripture remains under God's sovereign control and is Christologically founded in the 
sense that it is the same God who becomes part of the contingent universe in Christ who 
reveals himself in scripture. Similarly he conceives of the creation as a place where we 
are encountered by God (Torrance 1980b: 1), but again this is not separate from 
revelation in Christ for Jesus Christ is the creator: 'the ultimate Ground and Source of 
all being, order and rationality, the Creator Word of God who is God' (Torrance 
1996a: 213). 
Torrance argues that the idea of God becoming human rather than entering into a 
human as some sort of vessel to be filled militates against the understanding of the 
nature of space which dominated Greek science and philosophy and prompted the 
patristic theologians to develop relational concepts of space and time (Torrance 
1988a: 104). Torrance finds significant congruence between the concepts of space and 
time developed by the patristic theologians in response to the doctrines of creatio ex 
nihilo and incarnation and that developed by Einstein in his theories of relativity. 225 The 
nature of the universe is central to Torrance's doctrine of revelation because it is within 
the universe that God reveals himself and is known by humanity. 
In his discussion of the relation of God to the universe Torrance turns from the 
224 In his Gifford lectures of 1984-1985 Moltmann discusses the idea of space and its 
relation to God (Moltmann 1985: 140-157). His understanding of relative space is 
similar to that of Torrance, he rejects the notion of absolute space and instead relates it 
to being and action. 
225 Torrance gives a summary of the contingent nature of the universe as outlined in 
Einstein's scientific theories in Torrance 198 1 a: 11. 
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226 incarnation to the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. He argues that this doctrine implies 
that the nature and being of the universe are completely other than God 
(Torrance I 996a: 207); it is fundamental to his understanding of the contingence of 
creation (Torrance 1996a: 217) and the justification of empirical method. He argues that 
the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is founded upon the Old Testament but is not explicitly 
mentioned there (Torrance 1988a: 95). Later Jewish and Christian readings of Genesis 
take the notion of creatio ex nihilo to be implied in the biblical text (Torrance 1988a: 95- 
227 98). He notes that the Hebrew term bara is used exclusively in Scripture to speak 
divine action 'in bringing about something utterly new' (Torrance 1988a: 95). "' Ile 
argues that the patristic theologians founded their understanding of creation on the 
resurrection of Christ rather than on Genesis, for in the resurrection we see the power of 
God over life and death, over being and non-being (Torrance 1988a: 97). The 
incarnation forced the theologians of the early church to reflect upon the nature of 
created existence (Torrance I 988a: 97).. According to Torrance it was Athanasius who 
best understood the issues at stake and pioneered the church's understanding of the 
contingence of creation (Torrance 1988a: 98). 
226 The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, criticised by some theologians, is defended by 
Barth in Volume 3/1 of the Church Dogmatics (1958b: 16ff). Moltmann also notes that 
there is a consensus from the patristic period through to the reformation and beyond that 
the creation was ex nihilo See Moltmarm 1985: 72-79, especially page 74 and also 332- 
333, note 3. Process theology is one important tradition which denies creatio ex nihilo 
(Griffin 1999: 140). 
227 Westennann comments that whether or not God creates out of nothing is irrelevant 
to the biblical text (Westermann 1984: 108f). 
228 See Westennann 1984: 98ff for a discussion of the use of the verb bara in the 
Hebrew Bible. Westermann notes that bara is used only of God in the Hebrew 
Scriptures, and that in the Priestly source of the Pentateuch (P) bara is used of God's 
creative action. This interpretetation of bara in the Bible is supported by the patristic 
commentators (Torrance 1988a: 95f, note 86) 
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S. Z4 The contingent creation 
Torrance builds his understanding of the contingence of creation on the 
doctrines of creatio ex nihilo and incarnation. The contingent nature of the relation of 
God to creation is central to Torrance's doctrine of revelation because, as we have 
noted, revelation occurs within the universe of time and space to creatures bound by that 
universe. Torrance argues that the universe is neither necessary nor accidental (Torrance 
1988a: 105) but has a complex relationship of dependence and independence to its 
creator. In Torrance's understanding the universe is doubly contingent: it is neither 
logically necessary nor accidental but depends on God for its actual form; it also 
depends on the grace and will of God for its existence and continuation. 
The contingent nature of the universe in its gifted and relative independence 
from its creator has important implications for the development of scientific, empirical, 
method (Brooke and Cantor 2000: 19-20). If the universe is truly independent of its 
creator, even if that independence is given by the creator, then we can only come to 
knowledge of the universe by investigating the universe in itself and on its own terms 
and not by extrapolating from first principles from our understanding of divine nature. 
This means that the natural sciences must operate without reference to theological 
science. Torrance writes that: 
The universe is not self-supporting or self-explaining as though it had an interior 
principle of its own, but neither is it mere appearance for it is ontologically 
grounded beyond itself on God who has given it an authentic reality and 
lawfulness of its own which he unceasingly sustains through the presence of his 
Creator Word and Spirit (Torrance 1988a: 101). 
Torrance argues that while the meaning of and within the universe is ultimately 
contingent upon its creator whose being undergirds creation the natural sciences must 
progress without reference to the creator. This means that while the natural sciences are 
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able to investigate the universe from within there are larger questions of the purpose and 
meaning as well as the origin of the universe which by their very nature the sciences are 
unable to answer. 
5. Z5 The contingent creation and the incarnation 
The incarnation is fundamental to Torrance's understanding of how God relates 
to the universe. He argues that the incarnation by which God the Son unites himself to 
the universe in order to save it reveals the instability and corruption of creation 
(Torrance 1988a: 101). The instability of creation has a moral and ontological dimension 
for Torrance; therefore the salvation wrought by the incarnate Word also has an 
ontological and ethical nature. He argues that the incarnation reveals that humanity, in 
turning from God, has gone beyond the corruption natural to the rest of creation having 
also the corruption of evil which stands under divine condemnation (Torrance 
198 8a: 10 1); only God can now redeem humanity. According to Torrance: 
Christian theology recognised that the contingence of creation was corrupted by 
an inherent being-destroying (meonic) tendency that had to be overcome if the 
creation were to be saved and directed toward the end for which it had been 
designed by its Creator. However, by transferring our contingent existence into 
himself, in whom ... divine and human, uncreated and created, realities and 
natures are indissolubly united, Jesus Christ has secured its origin and end in his 
own eternal being. Regarded in this way, the incarnation is to be understood as 
completing the work of creation and of consummating its contingent relation to 
God. Thus in a certain sense the creation is to be thought of as proleptically 
conditioned by redemption (Torrance 1988a: 102). 
Although he does not develop this argument there is a moral dimension to the 
contingence of creation in Torrance's thought, an implied relationship between sin and 
non-being, between ontological and moral corruption. Torrance comments that in 
Calvin the fall, which results from the human desire for independence of its creator, 
'tears down the order of creation' (Torrance 1952: 49). The fall has implications for the 
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whole of creation as has Christ's (Torrance 1952: 50). 
Torrance takes the understanding of the contingence of the universe in the 
natural sciences to illuminate his theological understanding of the ontological 
implications of the fall for the creation (Torrance 198 1 a: 120). He argues that in 
Christian theology 'evil and the menace of nothingness' are not limited to the human or 
moral sphere, 'for in Jesus Christ God has shown that his saving and recreating work 
comprehends all creation' (Torrance 1981 a: 120). Torrance's understanding of the 
ontological and cosmological implications of the fall is founded upon his commitment 
to the universal extent of salvation in Christ. From theological reasons he expects to 
find signs of corruption and evil in the creation and he turns to the natural sciences to 
see if there is any evidence of this in the universe; thus he considers decay and entropy 
in the universe to be related to the fall. However, he notes that: 
if we did not believe that God is good and that the temporal order of things he 
has conferred upon the universe serves his good will, we would have no problem 
with decay, decomposition, and death, or with entropy, nor would we find 
affliction and suffering intolerable for they would be treated merely as part of 
the natural process of things (Torrance 198 1 a: 120). 
Torrance does not contend that the natural sciences in any sense 'prove' Christian 
doctrine; rather, when theological science and the natural sciences independently 
investigate reality according to their own proper methods, he finds correlation between 
them. These two independent disciplines display complementary understandings of the 
universe. Torrance does not interpret theology through philosophy; philosophy and 
science in his writings are a development or illustration of a prior theological 
princip I. 
229 
229 Luoma makes essentially the same point when discussing the realist nature of 
Torrance's theology. He argues that the reason why Torrance's realism is so hard to 
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5. Z6 The contingent necessity of the universe 
Torrance's understanding of the free and dependent nature of the universe, for 
which he believes he has support in Einstein, 230 replaces an older, dualist understanding 
of the world 'in which a God of inertial motion and a determinate universe governed by 
necessary relations are correlated with each other' (Torrance 1981a: 21). The patristic 
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, developed from the biblical accounts of creation and 
resurrection, leads Torrance to posit a free and dependent relationship between God and 
creation instead of a necessary and detennined relation. 23 1 Nevertheless, he argues that 
there is a contingent necessity to the universe. 
God created the universe out of nothing without compulsion to create at all or in 
any particular way; therefore the universe could have been different. However, once 
God has created the universe has a contingent necessity; it cannot be other than it 
actually is (Torrance 198 1 a: 22). God remains free in his relationship to creation even 
though, by bringing into being one particular universe, a type of necessity has been 
introduced into creation. The necessity of the actual universe is grounded in the 
unlimited freedom of God and therefore it is a type of necessity which is perfectly 
consistent with the contingent nature of reality. Torrance is not introducing determinism 
into his model of creation. Because of its contingent necessity we can only come to 
knowledge of the universe by investigating it on its own terms and not from some sort 
of a priori argument based either in the nature of God or on any predetermined 
categorise is that it is a theological realism, and not a philosophical realism (Luoma 
2002: 64f). See section 5.3.6. 230 See section 5.3.1. 
23 1 Torrance writes: 'far from there being a necessary relation between God and the 
universe and the universe and God, God remains utterly free and is not at the disposal of 
the conceptions and necessities of any deductive argumentation or logical compulsion 
on our part (Torrance 198 1 a: 2 1). 
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understanding of reality, for the contingence of the universe precludes any necessity in 
its nature. 232 The sciences can only progress by interpreting the universe as it actually is. 
5. Z 7 The contingent intelligibility of the universe 
A further implication of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is that the rational order 
which is intrinsic to the universe is contingent in two different but related ways: the 
rational order inherent in the universe is not logically necessary, it could have been 
other than it actually is; further this rational order has its origin and ground not in itself 
but in its creator. 
Torrance argues that in the act of creation God brought into being not only the 
physical matter of the universe but also its 'rational form and order' (Torrance 
1988a: I 02f). That the universe is both rational and intelligible is a fundamental 
assumption of the natural sciences (Torrance 1980b: 13 1) and, because it is an axiom, 
the source of this rational order is not a question that can be answered by the sciences 
(Torrance 1981a: 58ff, especially pp 60f). 233 In fact without the basic assumption of the 
rational order and comprehensibility of the universe there can be no science. The 
rational order of the universe is not predictable but can only be disclosed by empirical 
investigation into the universe and its systems and processes. 234 
Just as there is a clear distinction between the being of God and the being of 
232 Torrance writes: 'It is because this freedom and rationality within the universe are 
contingent upon the infinite freedom and inexhaustible rationality of God that the 
universe meets our inquiries with an indefinite capacity for disclosing itself to us in 
ways which we could not suspect, manifesting structures or patterns which we are quite 
unable to anticipate a priori' (Torrance 198 1 b: 22). 
233 Note Einstein's comment: 'The fact that it [the creation] is comprehensible is a 
miracle' (Einstein 1982: 292). 
234 Torrance defines empirical science as a 'respect for the objectivity of facts' which 
proceeds by reference to an 'externally given reality' (Torrance 1969a: 288). This 
understanding is applicable to theological science, whose given external reality is the 
self-revelation of God, as much as to the natural sciences. 
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creation; so there is a clear distinction between the rationality of God and that of his 
creation. God's being is uncreated and necessary, the universe's being is created and 
contingent; God's rationality is uncreated, the universe's rational form and order are 
created by and contingent on God (Torrance 1988a: 103). Far from being overwhelmed 
or undennined by divine rationality the rational order of creation is sustained by God in 
its contingent existence. The work of the Word of God within the universe means that 
the whole of creation is filled with a single rational order which is contingent upon 
divine rationality. Torrance follows Athanasius who upheld the biblical notion of the 
distinction between the creator and his creation, and who also claimed that all rational 
order within creation is derived from the divine Word of God (Torrance 1988a: 102- 
104). 
Torrance's contribution is to demonstrate that the traditional Christian 
understanding of the relation between the creator and the creation correlates with post- 
Einsteinian understanding of the universe and that these two understandings, while 
independent of each another (Torrance 1981 a: 3 5,82ff), provide mutual support. He 
argues that the Einsteinian paradigm of reality correlates well with the traditional 
Christian understanding of creation (Torrance 1980b: 73f) and could form the basis of a 
mutually beneficial dialogue. Torrance notes Einstein's comment on the 
'incomprehensible comprehensibility' of the universe; that the intelligibility of the 
universe is not self explanatory (Torrance 198 1 a: 3 5; c. f. Torrance 1980b: 105). The fact 
that the universe is not only rational but is also intelligible to finite creatures cries out 
for explanation and sufficient cause, however, the natural sciences are unable to provide 
an explanation of that which is a fundamental assumption of their operation; so the 
comprehensibility of the universe becomes a pointer to a rational creator. Torrance 
argues that the contingent universe as disclosed by Einsteinian physics points beyond 
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itself to the ultimate ground on which the universe and our comprehension of it rest 
(Torrance 1981a: 28,61). 
5. Z8 The contingentfreedom of the universe 
Having explored the implications of creatio ex nihilo for the rational order of the 
universe Torrance turns to the freedom of creation. He argues that the universe which 
depends upon God for its existence and nature has a freedom with respect to God. 
However, this freedom is limited because it is conferred on creation by its creator 
(Torrance 1988a: 105). The created universe is truly free with respect to its maker in 
spite of the fact that its freedom is limited. Torrance argues that creation's relation to 
God exhibits simultaneously both dependence and independence (Torrance 198 8a: 107); 
this is inherent in the concept of contingence. However, Torrance argues that although 
the universe enjoys a limited freedom, if this freedom is correlated to the unlimited 
freedom of God, then the freedom enjoyed by the creation must be in its own way 
unlimited also. Ile argues that 'owing to its contingent relation to God, there are 
unlimited and inexhaustible possibilities in the created universe' (Torrance 1988a: 107). 
Torrance regards the relationship between God and the creation as 'elusive' and 
'indeterminate' (Torrance 1988a: 107). This dependent relationship between the creation 
and its creator means that a scientific understanding of the universe comes from 
empirical investigation because the gifted freedom of the universe means that its laws 
are fundamentally unpredictable; they can be uncovered by scientific investigation but 
not deduced from a prior doctrine of God. 
From his theological perspective Torrance argues that the universe has been 
given a true independence by its creator but that everything depends on the truth of 
God's self-revelation in Christ, for it is from this self-revelation that Torrance derives 
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his understanding of creation (Torrance 1988a: 108). Torrance argues that a theological 
understanding of creation correlates well with the understanding of the universe 
disclosed by the natural sciences (Torrance 1981 a: 73). 
In Torrance's doctrine of creation there are two constant and interrelated 
elements. Firstly there is an emphasis upon the self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ. 
This is the foundation upon which Torrance builds his theology. We have seen that what 
Torrance calls the 'contingent freedom' of the creation with respect to its creator is 
rooted in the grace of God which is supremely disclosed in Jesus Christ. Secondly, we 
also see that Torrance operates with an epistemology of grace. Anything that we can 
truly know of God is first God's gift to us; it is never our independent discovery. In 
Christ, in the economy of redemption and reconciliation, God reveals himself to be the 
gracious and the faithful God. "' Torrance argues that Jesus Christ is God's 'pledge' for 
our understanding of the 'freedom, integrity and reliability' of the created universe, and 
this includes even its 'physical order and behaviour' (Torrance 1988a: 108f). 
Torrance argues that in the Christian understanding of the relation of God to the 
universe there is a 'double contingency"" operating as we consider the contingency of 
the world from the side of God as well as from the side of the creation. The creation is 
independent in the sense of being free from its creator while at the same time and in a 
deeper way it is completely dependent upon him (Torrance 1988a: 105); its very 
freedom is gifted by God. Torrance argues that God's decision to create at all is free, 
God did not have to create, nor did he have to create in the way that he in fact did. 
However, the contingence of creation does not mean that the universe either irrational or 
235 In support of this, Torrance draws attention to the point made by Athanasius that 
Christ himself is the will of God. See Torrance 1988a: 105, note 127. 
236 Torrance cites Georges Florovsky, "The Concept of Creation in Saint Athanasius", 
Siudia Patristica, 1962, p. 37; Collected Works, Vol 11, pp. 48f, 57ff, quoted in 
Torrance 1988a: 105- 
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arbitrary, for the whole of the creation is grounded in divine rationality through the 
creative logos. We have seen in the discussion of relative space that God gives the 
universe space to be-, 237 we now see that in giving the universe contingent freedom God 
gives it space to be itself 
The idea of creation being free from God even though that freedom is a gift of 
God is a novel element in early Christian thought. Torrance writes that by contrast the 
ancient world was dominated by ideas of the eternity and immutability of the world. He 
argues that this was in part this is due to the pantheism of the ancient world which 
conceived of a synthesis of God and nature (Torrance 1988a: 106). " The linking of the 
universe to divine being led to determinism and fatalism in ancient thought and, he 
argues, is responsible for the linking of rationality and necessity in ancient philosophy 
and science. Ile notes that the early apologists made much of the notion of freedom 
from the control of fate which is inherent in the Christian understanding with its 
correlation of creation to the freedom of God (Torrance 1988a: 107f). He argues that 
Christian theology's understanding of the freedom of creation arose from doctrines of 
creatio ex nihilo and redemption. In the incarnation God the creator enters the creation 
in order to redeem it from sin and corruption. Christ's redemption and liberation applies 
not only to humanity but to the whole of creation, 'for Christ is the Head of the whole 
creation, its Origin and its End' (Torrance 1988a: 106). In the incarnation God 
establishes a new relation with his creation giving the universe a freedom 'grounded in 
239 
the transcendent and unlimited freedom of God' (Torrance 1988a: 106). 
Torrance argues that the contingent nature of the universe upon which scientific 
237 See section 1.3.2. 
238 See Torrance 1988a: 106, note 131 for references. 
239 Although the understanding of Christ as the redeemer of creation is rooted in 
Scripture Torrance comments that it was more prevalent in the Greek rather than the 
Latin church (Torrance 1988a: 107). 
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enquiry is founded originates in the understanding of creation in Judaeo-Christian 
theology. This understanding of the contingent freedom of the universe was assumed by 
natural scientists in the west, and explains why in western Europe the empirical sciences 
rose to such prominence (Torrance 1981a: 26). The doctrine of creallo ex nihilo led 
theologians to posit both the orderliness and contingence of the creation; and this is 
presupposed by the natural sciences. Nevertheless there is a paradox at the heart of the 
natural sciences for although they are founded upon an understanding of reality which is 
derived from Christian theology, yet the contingent freedom of the universe means that 
the sciences must progress by referring only to the universe itself and not by reference 
to the creator. 
5. Z 9 Theology and the natural sciences 
Torrance argues that the relationship between theological science and the natural 
sciences is a reciprocal relationship and although the two disciplines have their own 
integrity there is a correlation between them. We have touched on one area of 
correlation, in which the value of theological science to the natural sciences can be seen, 
namely the presuppositions with which the natural sciences operate. 
Torrance calls scientists who seek to understand the reality of the universe 
'priests of creation' (Torrance 1980b: 5-6,111). He regards the work of the natural 
scientist through which the universe discloses its 'harmonies and regularities and 
symmetries in its contingent intelligibility' (Torrance 1980b: I 11) as a religious exercise 
(Torrance 1980b: 112). Note the language of revelation he uses with respect to scientific 
knowledge of the world. There is in Torrance's account of the natural sciences an 
understanding of revelation in nature and in the natural processes of the universe. 
Torrance argues that in any account of the universe the human mind whose place 
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in the universe is to investigate and interpret reality must be part of the picture 
(Torrance 1980b: 40. As scientists investigate the universe in its own contingent rational 
order the scientist encounters what Torrance calls a 'depth of intelligibility that reaches 
indefinitely beyond what our finite minds can comprehend' (Torrance 1980b: 4). 240 
However the rational order of the universe which is disclosed to human enquiry points 
us not to some transcendent mind, nor to some abstract and general divinity but to the 
creative Word of God who became human in Jesus Christ (Torrance 1988a: 104, 
Torrance 1996a: 213). Torrance gives an account of the natural sciences which points to 
real knowledge of God arising from our encounter with the universe, but one which is 
not in any sense independent of God's self-revelation nor separate from revelation in 
Christ. 
Torrance is aware that the natural scientist is forced to operate with certain basic 
assumptions about the nature of the universe. The universe disclosed to the natural 
sciences is not self-explanatory; its rational order and comprehensibility raise questions 
which the sciences are unable to answer. By definition the axioms on which all 
scientific activity is based cannot be proven by the natural sciences. The universe 
silently cries out 'for a transcendent agency in its explanation and understanding' 
(Torrance 1985b: 58), and this is found in theological science. Torrance writes that: 
the fact that the intelligibility of the universe is not self-explanatory and the fact 
that its astonishing unity and self-identity persist through all its changing 
processes, would seem to suggest that there is an active agency other than the 
inherent intelligibility and harmony of the universe, unifying and structuring it, 
and providing it with its ground of being (Torrance 1985b: 56, emphasis 
Torrance). 
Torrance argues that the contingent nature of the universe points beyond itself to the 
(ultimate intelligible ground upon which the universe and our knowledge of it finally 
240 See Einstein 2005: 27. 
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rest' (Torrance 198 1 a: 28). Torrance argues that the alternative to positing a transcendent 
rational ground of the universe is to affirm that it is ultimately incomprehensible 
(Torrance 1981 a: 28). Torrance demonstrates an external consistency between theology 
and the natural sciences: neither depends on the other; neither proves the truth of the 
other, but the understanding of the universe which emerges from Christian theology 
correlates well with that which emerges from the natural sciences. This area of 
correlation between theological science and the natural sciences is part of Torrance's 
understanding of the place of a transformed natural theology. 241 
Torrance argues that the rise of empirical science was founded on ideas of 
contingence developed within the early church as theologians responded to the doctrines 
of creatio ex nihilo and incarnation (Torrance 198 1 a: viii). He further argues that these 
ideas of contingence are an essential component of contemporary science, yet they are 
not, nor can they be, demonstrated by science as they form the basic assumptions on 
which the sciences rest (Torrance 1981a: ix). 
Torrance notes that the understanding of the contingent relation between God 
and creation which characterised the theologians of the fourth century was superseded 
as the dualism of the surrounding culture came to dominate theology (Torrance 
198 1 a: 5). God came to be regarded as the umnoved mover, the first cause who is 
immutable and impassible and whose relation to the universe is logically necessary. "' 
This shift in the understanding of God led to a change in the understanding of the 
universe. Torrance argues that the notion of God as first cause led to an understanding 
of the creation as 'a system of necessary and causal relations in which it was difficult to 
241 See section 4.4.1. 
242 Torrance writes: 'the God who has revealed himself in Jesus as sharing our lot is the 
God who is free to make himself poor, that we through his poverty might be made rich, 
the God invariant in love but not impassible, constant in faithfulness but not immutable' 
(Torrance 1981a: 7). 
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find room for any genuine contingence' (Torrance 198 1 a: 6). This understanding of God 
and his relation to the universe continued to be influential from the middle ages until the 
time of Newton. Toffance comments that 
Newton's God is inertially attached to the universe in a grand synthesis which 
makes him through absolute time and space the supreme regulative principle by 
which the whole system of the world is held together, while on the other hand he 
is so transcendentally related to the universe that he is deistically detached from 
it in his eternal impassibility and immutability (Torrance 1981 a: 8). 
Newton's God serves to fill in the gaps left by mechanistic models of the universe; he 
regulates the system as needed, however, this God's place in the understanding of the 
universe is diminished as better theories fill in the gaps in scientific knowledge until 
eventually the hypothesis of God is no longer required. This understanding of the 
relationship of God to the universe evolves into a model of the universe as a closed 
universe of cause and effect which is mechanistic and determined. On this model the 
biblical God becomes a deistic God who is unable to interact with creation. Torrance 
rejects this understanding of the universe and the deity implied by it not only on 
theological grounds but also for scientific reasons. This model of the universe is also 
challenged by Einstein (Torrance 198 1 a: 11). 
Torrance argues that just as Newton's model of the universe rules out the 
traditional Christian understanding of God so Einstein's leaves room for a Christian 
doctrine of God. Torrance argues that Einstein's theory of relativity shows that the 
universe is not a 'closed deten-ninistic system' but rather a 'continuous and open system 
of contingent realities and events with an inherent unifying order' (Torrance 198 1 a: 11). 
The universe described by Newton is not simply discarded; it is seen to be, not a 
description of the world, but an abstraction from reality. This model of the universe is 
useful in understanding the universe so long as we realise its true nature and limitations. 
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Torrance describes the universe uncovered by Einstein as 'a finite but unbounded 
universe with open, dynamic structures grounded in a depth of objectivity and 
intelligibility which commands and transcends our comprehension' (Torrance 
1981 a: 11). One of the basic assumptions of Einstein's work is that the rational order of 
the universe is not imposed by the observer but that there is one rational order inherent 
in the universe which may be disclosed to investigation (see Torrance 198 1 a: 17). 
Torrance argues that in Einstein he finds support for his understanding of the nature of 
reality which he derives from his patristic and reformed theology. 
Torrance does not argue that the natural sciences in any sense prove the truth of 
Christian theology; rather he attempts to demonstrate an external consistency and 
coherence between the two disciplines. He argues for a significant consonance and 
correlation between theological science and the natural sciences which serves to show 
the reasonableness of belief in the God that we meet in the incarnation and creation 
given the nature of the universe. He argues that both theology and the natural sciences 
have arrived at a point where they each need to adopt a 'fundamental attitude to the 
universe as a whole' (Torrance 198 1 a: 62). He notes that the fact that there have been 
occasions in the past when theology and the natural sciences have come into conflict 
indicates that theology has a basic understanding of reality (Torrance 1981a: 63f). In 
particular he argues that the Newtonian model of the universe, a closed and mechanistic 
system, conflicts with the understanding of reality disclosed by the theological concept 
of creatio ex nihilo which points to an open ended universe which shows an 
6astonishing combination of unpredictability and lawfulness' (Torrance 1981a: 71). He 
notes that the Einsteinian model of the universe, a unitary and open system, promotes 
exactly the contingent understanding of reality which is pointed to by the core Christian 
doctrines of incarnation and creatio ex nihilo (Torrance 1981a: 76,82). 
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S. ZIO Discussion 
Torrance's discussion of the relation of Christian theology to the natural 
sciences is focused on the nature of reality as disclosed to scientific investigation and 
the nature of reality disclosed to theology through the core concepts of incarnation and 
creatio ex nihilo. His thesis is that there is a close correlation between the two 
descriptions of reality. The importance of this for theology's dialogue with the natural 
sciences is twofold. Firstly as a closely argued account of a common understanding of 
the universe it represents a further justification of applying the findings of one field to 
the other, as Torrance does with the work of Clerk Maxwell, Einstein and Polanyi. 
Secondly Torrance presents a well argued case for his thesis that the world disclosed to 
scientific enquiry is founded on and points us to God as the source if its being, freedom 
and rational order. 
In his exposition of the work of natural scientists in uncovering the meaning and 
order inherent in the universe Torrance points to an understanding of the significance of 
their work which is at odds with his oft repeated assertion that it is only in Jesus Christ 
that God reveals himself It was argued in chapter two that he conceives of Scripture as 
more than merely a witness to Christ but as a vehicle of divine self revelation - the God 
who has become incarnate in Jesus Christ meets us, or at least may meet us, in the 
scriptures which witness to Christ. So in his theology of nature he writes of human 
beings, particularly the scientist, as 'priest of creation' (Torrance 1980b: II If). Through 
the investigation of creation human beings are brought into relationship with the 
creative reason which fashioned and ordered the universe. Part of the task of the 
scientist is to explore the design and meaning inherent in the universe, and to articulate 
what is uncovered. This articulation 'constitutes a great hymn of praise and adoration to 
God the Creator' (Torrance 1980b: 1 I If, cf. Torrance 1996a: 213). Torrance's point is 
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that the investigation of the universe in its own terms brings the scientist into relation 
with the creator. Knowledge of God in the creation is not uncovered; rather it is part of 
God's self revelation. However, as with revelation in ScriPture so with revelation in 
creation, the God we meet is identical with God as he has supremely revealed himself in 
the incarnation for the creative Word who is the source of order and meaning in the 
universe is the Word who became incarnate in Jesus Christ (Torrance 1996a: 213). What 
we find in Torrance is not so much a natural theology as an articulation of natural 
revelation. 
5.3 Theological science 
5.3.1 Einstein and the overcoming of western dualism 
Torrance believes that the understanding of the universe which is grounded in 
the Christian doctrines of creatio ex nihilo and incarnation correlates well with 
Einstein's model. One aspect of their respective models of reality which is important for 
Torrance is their rejection of dualism. Kaiser comments that the reason for Einstein's 
importance for Torrance is his championing of a non dualist epistemology (Kaiser 
2001: 242). Torrance often compares Einstein with Barth whose challenge to the western 
dualist tradition is crucial for Torrance's epistemology. "' Torrance even refers to 
Einstein's work as 'the homoousion of Physics' (Torrance 1980b: 162). According to 
Torrance Einstein undermines the grounds upon which a phenomenalist approach to 
knowledge stands (Torrance 1980b: 162, see Einstein 1982: 29 1). We have already noted 
Torrance's argument that Einstein broke through the form-being dualism which has 
243 See, for example, Torrance 1990: 18; Torrance 1984a: 280. 
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characterised western thought for centuries. 244 He argues that Einstein's importance for 
epistemology is his insight that our knowledge of reality is more than merely knowledge 
of appearances or phenomena but 'is a grasping of reality in its ontological depth' 
(Torrance 1980b: 162). The universe apprehended by the natural sciences is the real 
universe; there is no abstraction from the universe which is more real than that 
uncovered by empirical investigation, nor is there an ideal reality of which this world is 
but a shadow. There is a parallel between Torrance's interpretation of the importance of 
Einstein for scientific epistemology and his understanding of the significance of the 
patristic homoousion for the Christian doctrine of revelation. On Einstein's model of 
scientific epistemology what the empirical sciences uncover is the reality of the world 
(Torrance 1980b: 162); and in Christ who is of one being with the Father are 
encountered by the reality of God (Torrance 1988a: 130). Torrance argues that in the 
natural sciences we operate with an objective comprehensibility of the nature of reality 
that is independent of our perception (Torrance 1984a: 265) . 24' Torrance is interested in 
the implications of the Einstein's revolution for theological science. 
Torrance is not surprised that theological science should be supported by the 
natural sciences; he traces the roots of Einstein's theory of relativity to the origins of 
empirical science at the Renaissance where there was a rejection of medieval 
scholasticism which imposed its philosophical presuppositions on attempts to 
understand and interpret the natural world. With the Renaissance, argues Torrance, 
science attempted to understand the world 'on its own evidential basis and in 
accordance with its own interior principles' (Torrance 1984a: 267). He notes a parallel 
with the approach to theology found in reformers such as Calvin. As with the emerging 
empirical approach to science associated with the Renaissance we find an empirical 
244 See section 4.5.4. 
245 See section 5.2.7 on the contingent rationality and intelligibility of the universe. 
224 
approach in the reformers as they attempt to throw off scholastic theology and 
understand God solely from his self-revelation. Torrance's work on the doctrine of 
revelation and the epistemology that emerges from it are a continuation of this 
reformation project. 
He comments that in both scientific theology and natural science there is an 
attempt to allow reality to disclose itself to the enquirer. Both disciplines reject 
prescriptive patterns of thought in order to enable reality to disclose itself (Torrance 
1984a: 268). The empirical method which characterises post-renaissance natural science 
and reformation theology (Torrance 1969a: 288), while increasingly at odds with 
Newton's model of the universe, is fully accommodated into Einstein's theory of 
relativity with its rejection of dualism and move towards a unitary understanding of 
reality (Torrance 1984a: 273). In the theory of relativity we find a revised understanding 
of theory which better correlates with the results of empirical investigation. Torrance 
writes that in Einstein: 
'Theory' is no longer to be understood, as with the positivists, as a convenient 
arrangement of our observational concepts for certain pragmatic or technological 
ends, involving an economy of cognitive organisation that has no 'metaphysical 
relation' to any order inhering in nature; that is to say, it is not simply a 
provisional 'working hypothesis'. On the contrary, 'theory' is now understood in 
its original sense as theoria, a 'speculative' penetration into the structure of 
things, a refined 'lens' through which we see into the underlying order of nature 
or rather allow it to disclose itself to us.... What we have here are open flexible 
structures used postulationally, and therefore with fluid revision the further they 
penetrate into and lay bare the 'inner logic' of the field under investigation. And 
in so far as they succeed in revealing basic rational structures in the universe, 
they force upon us claims as to their validity, and we realise that we 'invented' 
or came upon them because they came at us from the side of the universe itself, 
compelling us to formulate them as 'laws' through the astonishing correlation 
between our human thinking and empirical reality (Toffance 1984a: 273f). 
In Einstein's paradigm theories emerge from an intelligible order within the universe 
itself so there is no longer a dualism between form and being, or between the empirical 
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and theoretical components of knowledge. 
The unitary approach to reality which is characteristic of the theory of relativity 
is as important for Torrance's theological science as it is for the natural sciences. One of 
Torrance's fundamental assumptions is that it is possible to take theories and paradigms 
from the natural sciences and draw out from them implications for our understanding of 
reality in general and for theology in particular. He assumes that there is one reality, and 
his reasons for this assumption are historical and practical. He argues that the empirical 
sciences are rooted in the understanding of reality associated with the patristic 
theologians; he also argues that we find empiricism in the natural sciences and in 
reformed theology as they each emerge from scholasticism. His practical reasons for 
assuming that the universe of the natural sciences and the creation of Christian theology 
are one reality is that he believes that there is a close correlation between the contingent 
universe disclosed in Christian theology and the Einsteinian model of the universe. 
In discussing the importance of the theory of relativity for theology Torrance 
contrasts relativity and relativism. He argues that the theory of relativity operates with a 
'disclosure model', whereas relativism works with what he calls 'an epistemology of 
perception' (Torrance 1984a: 275). According to the theory of relativity there is an 
inherent relationship between the objective structures of the universe and our 
representation of them. This relationship is not symbolic or a 'provisional arrangement 
of our ideas' (Torrance 1984a: 274); that would be relativism. Torrance argues that: 
There is an invariance in the universe which we are forced to affinn with an 
exclusiveness and a universality, which does not allow it any provisional 
character, but there are various ways of representing that invariance, and 
therefore various points at which axiomatic penetration into that invariance can 
be achieved. It is because we are concerned here not with the kind of picturing 
model thrown up by an epistemology of perception but with a disclosure model, 
that the cognitive instrument we use precisely in so far as it is appropriate directs 
us away from its own representation to the objective invariance we discern 
through it. The model and its representation will always be open to further and 
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further refinement, and in that sense are of a provisional character, but they are 
what they are through their coordination to an invariance that is not of a 
provisional kind (Torrance 1984a: 274f). 
With relativism all models of the universe are models of our perception of reality; 
whereas with the theory of relativity our models of the universe emerge from how the 
universe is objectively disclosed to us in our investigation into its inherent structures at 
our point in time and space. All knowledge is relative because it is inherent to concrete 
being; that is all knowledge is the knowledge of an actual person within time and space. 
We perceive the objective universe from our relative position in time and space. This is 
not, however, the same as the doctrine that in our knowledge of the universe it is not 
reality that we apprehend but our perception of reality onto which our minds have 
imposed structure and form. 
We can extrapolate from Torrance's writings to arrive at the foundations of a 
theory of knowledge which allows us to draw a distinction between exhaustive 
knowledge, true but partial knowledge, and mere appearance. Exhaustive knowledge is 
not possible for beings with finite minds that are part of the universe of space and time; 
but this does not mean that true knowledge is not possible. Exhaustive knowledge is 
possible only for one who is both infinite and who exists outside of relative space-time; 
that is, only God can have exhaustive knowledge. We can have knowledge of the 
universe which is true but partial or incomplete. This true but partial knowledge is not 
the same as the mere appearance of reality. It is, despite its relativity and partiality, true 
knowledge of the objective world; it corresponds to reality as it is disclosed to the 
perception of the enquirer and it is capable of being refined by closer attention to the 
object. However, human knowledge can never be exhaustive. Torrance argues that 
objective knowledge is possible as we allow reality to determine our epistemology; and 
yet all objective knowledge must have an inherent subjectivity as it is the knowledge of 
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actual persons in time and space. 
We can understand why Torrance believes that in Einstein he has found an ally 
in his struggle against epistemological dualism. He regards Einstein's theory of 
relativity as the overcoming of the epistemological dualism between phenomena and 
noumena which we find in Kant. According to Einstein empirical science impinges 
upon reality, not merely the scientist's subjective experience of reality. This 
understanding of science and scientific method is very important for Torrance's 
argument that theology is a science. 
Torrance's theological epistemology operates with a correspondence theory of 
truth. The truth of a theory is determined by its relationship to the world and the 
closeness of its description to reality. Einstein's writings on the relationship of theory to 
reality also presuppose a correspondence theory of truth. 246 Einstein offers no 
explanation of how theory corresponds to reality. It is a working presupposition of his 
epistemology. He writes of the scientist's faith that the universe is rational and 
comprehensible to reason (Einstein 1982: 48) but the rational order of the universe and 
its accessibility to human reason remains a mystery to Einstein, yet to deny it is to 
undermine the whole scientific endeavour. We have seen that for Torrance the universe 
including human beings within the universe is the creation of God who is the 
transcendent ground of the rationality of his creation, both the rational order of the 
universe and the imminent rationality of humankind. 
5.3.2 Theology among the sciences 
Torrance writes that theology is a science in the same sense as the natural 
sciences. He uses the phrase 'exact science' (Torrance 1962: 179) to characterise a 
246 For a discussion of correspondence theory see Kirkham 1992: 119-140. 
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discipline 'which restricts its activities to the limits laid down by the nature of its 
concrete object, and develops a method in accordance with the nature of its object' 
(Torrance 1962: 179). Torrance's argument is that theology, or at least those theologies 
which allow the self-revelation of God to determine their method of enquiry, do this and 
are rightly termed scientific (Torrance 1980b: 112). Traditional natural theology does 
not allow actual self-revelation to determine its method, therefore Torrance regards it as 
unscientific (Torrance 1985b: 38f). Scientific theology is determined by the object of its 
enquiry, namely God in his self-revelation in Christ. 
Torrance argues that scientific theology follows the natural sciences in rejecting 
what he calls 'logico-deductive argumentation from fixed principla' (Torrance 
1984a: 275). By this he means that the exact sciences, including theological science, 
reject a priori argumentation (Torrance 1980b: 90) and instead proceed by a posteriori 
method. In the sciences theory arises from observation. The object of enquiry 
determines the method of enquiry. He argues that theological science, like the natural 
sciences, rejects epistemological and cosmological dualism and instead works on the 
principle of the unity of form and being (Torrance 1980b: 89f). Both the natural sciences 
after Einstein and Christian theology following Barth display a fundamentally unitary 
approach to reality. Torrance places theology among the special sciences not because he 
imposes scientific method onto theology, but because he finds the same approach to the 
object of enquiry in the natural sciences as he finds in the theology of Barth as well as 
in the reformers and the patristic theologians. There is a methodological convergence 
between theology and the natural sciences and this causes Torrance to regard them as 
natural allies against dualist and unscientific thought. 
Toffancc consistently argues that scientific method is a posteriori (Toffance 
1971: 89,91). The scientist submits to the demands of the object under investigation 
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(Torrance 1971: 95). Failure to submit to the object of enquiry renders the investigation 
unscientific. Torrance makes the point that what makes a discipline scientific is its 
submission to the demands of its own subject matter, that it operates 'in terms of the 
inner law of its own being' (Torrance 1971: 91). To impose the methods associated with 
one discipline upon another is unscientific. For example it is unscientific to impose 
upon theology a method of investigation derived from physics or from the social 
sciences; according to Torrance this wrong 'dogmatizing' is often encountered by 
theology 'from "scientism" and from philosophical "empiricism"' (Torrance 1971: 9 1). 
The triumph of the exact sciences has sometimes led to their methods being improperly 
imposed on other disciplines. Torrance argues that this problem is particularly acute in 
the social sciences (Torrance 1971: 105). According to Torrance this dualism has been 
overcome in the natural sciences by Einstein and in theology by Barth; 247 he argues that 
in order for the social sciences to be truly scientific they must undergo the same process 
of overcoming dualism and allowing the proper object of enquiry to determine their 
method of enquiry. Torrance criticises the social sciences for imposing foreign methods 
derived from the physical sciences upon the human and social objects. 
Despite criticising the actual practice of the social sciences (Torrance 
1971: 105ft), Torrance argues that they can become scientific in the proper rather than 
the narrow and doctrinaire sense by becoming more objective, by allowing the object of 
investigation to determine their method. Torrance's work on scientific method has 
greater epistemological implications than he often indicates. One of the arguments of 
this thesis is that Torrance has introduced an epistemology which can be applied to any 
discipline, to any human form of knowing, not just to the sciences among which he 
situates theology. Torrance's objective epistemology has the potential to unite the 
247 See sections 4.5.4 and 4.5.5. 
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sciences, the social sciences and the humanities. 248 
5.3.3 Objectivity in theological and natural sciences 
Torrance's case for placing theology among the sciences is its approach to 
reality, its objective method. He argues that every form of human knowing that can be 
regarded as a science allows 'its own subject-matter to determine how knowledge of it 
is to be developed' (Torrance 1971: 91). He demonstrates that this scientific method in 
theology is not new by citing examples from the history of Christian thought. He gives 
examples from the patristic period and from the reformers and from Barth to show that 
some theologians have always allowed the material content of theology to determine the 
method of enquiry; that in certain theologians ontology has had precedence over 
epistemology. One of his objectives is to return the contemporary practice of theology 
to its scientific roots. Apart from Barth, Torrance gives sketches from Christian history 
of examples of theologians pursuing scientific method, namely Athanasius, Anselm and 
Kierkegaard. Each develop their theological method in response to divine reality; and in 
each we see an understanding of the unity of form and being which is, according to 
Torrance, an essential component of scientific theology. Another aim is to show that 
empirical method which today characterises the natural sciences has its origins in 
patristic theology. 
Torrance argues that it was Athanasius who gave Christian theology its scientific 
basis by arguing against the cosmological dualism of the surrounding Greek culture and 
placing the unity of form and being at the heart of Christian theology. In writing on 
creation and redemption Athanasius rejects a necessary connection between them and 
instead speaks of the 'structure of grace' (Torrance 1984a: 277) which is revealed in the 
248 Torrance is aware of the potential universal implications of his work; he refers to it 
once briefly (Torrance 1971: 9 If) but does not develop this insight. 
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Christian concept of the divine Word by whom God created the universe and through 
whom he interacts with the creation. Torrance argues that the 'logic of grace' (Torrance 
1984a: 277) in Athanasius' theology enables him to relate the doctrines of creation, 
incarnation and redemPtion in a way that thinks through Christian doctrine in its unity 
of form and being. This emphasis upon grace as theological method becomes the 
foundation upon which the Christian faith has been built. What this epistemology of 
grace does is make theology respond to God's actual revelation rather than being based 
on a speculative metaphysic. 
Torrance next considers Anselm in the eleventh century. He argues that 
Anselm's contribution to theology is his refusal to found the Christian faith upon any 
fixed premise. Anselm held that 'even Jesus Christ must not be treated like a fixed 
principle ... from which to extend formal logical connections and thus to build up a 
system of necessary truth' (Torrance 1984a: 277). Anselm instead deals with incarnation 
and atonement, the actual ways in which God has acted in revelation and redemption. 
Torrance speaks of the 'rational compulsion' upon our minds when they are open to the 
truth or reality itself which is a different form of compulsion from that which derives 
from a logical or formal necessity (Torrance 1984a: 278). Anslem's theological method 
of faith seeking understanding is important for any interpretation of Barth and his 
method which was in turn of foundational importance for Torrance. 
A third example of scientific method in Christian thought is Kierkegaard who 
also influenced Barth. Torrance notes that in The Philosophical Fragmenis Kierkegaard, 
like Athanasius and Anselm before him, rejects attempts to reason from fixed axioms. 
In drawing a contrast between Christ and Socrates Kierkegaard. looks at the 'movement 
of the eternal in time' (Toffance 1984a: 278). Toffance notes that in turning to the 
temporal component of the incarnation Kierkegaard makes up for a weakness in 
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Anselm. He writes: 
a hundred years ahead of his time Kierkegaard devised a way of thinking by 
abandoning a point of absolute rest and moving kinetically along with the truth 
in order to understand it (Torrance 1984a: 278). 
Kierkegaard is striving to do justice to God's actions within the universe by devising a 
way of thinking and understanding which is appropriate to God's actual involvement. 
He is an example of a thinker whose approach is a posteriori and therefore scientific. In 
order to understand God's involvement with the creation Kierkegaard does not make it 
fit into any philosophical frame or scheme. Instead he follows God's action and allows 
the inner logic of creation and redemption to be disclosed. Torrance draws a direct 
parallel between Kierkegaard's attempts to understand the temporal aspect of divine 
action with the way in which physicists try to comprehend the quantum world (Torrance 
1984a: 278). 
Torrance aims to demonstrate that the 'thinking after God' that he proposes as a 
scientific method in theology, a method which allows the inner logic of God's 
interaction with creation to be disclosed to the enquirer, is found in the great theologians 
of the past. For Torrance scientific, i. e. empirical, method originates with the Nicene 
theologians and not the natural scientist. He argues that much in contemporary theology 
is problematic because it is unscientific and when it is unscientific it betrays its origins. 
Barth however, has returned theology to its patristic and reformed roots and has set it 
back on track as a scientific discipline. 
Torrance argues that just as there has been a paradigm shift from Newton to 
Einstein in physics, so in theology there needs to be a corresponding paradigm shift 
away from an abstractive theological method to a unitary framework (Torrance 
1984a: 279). It is to Barth that Torrance looks for the basis of a scientific theological 
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method. He argues that the unity of act and being makes Barth's theology important, 
and that following this will set Christian theology upon its proper, patristic and 
refonned, foundations (Torrance 1984a: 280). According to Torrance Barth has 
advanced theology in the same way that Einstein and Clerk-Maxwell have advanced 
science. He proposes two means by which theology can build on Barth's work. First it 
must take seriously the relation between incarnation and creation; thereby establishing a 
closer relation between natural theology and revealed theology. This is what Torrance is 
trying to achieve in his work on natural theology when he transposes natural theology 
into the body of dogmatics. 249 The second area of development is in the area of 
epistemology, and the development of. - 
the appropriate cognitive instrument or instruments through which we may bring 
to light and represent for ourselves the profound harmonies and symmetries of 
the divine grace in which is enshrined the inner logic of God's creative and 
redemptive operations in the universe (Torrance 1984a: 28 I f). 
This corresponds to what Torrance is trying to achieve with his 'theological science' in 
which he focuses on creation and incarnation, the two foundational aspects of God's 
interaction with the universe. 
5.3.4 The distinction between theology and the other sciences 
Theology's place among the sciences depends on its method. Only those 
theologies which allow the material content of God's self-revelation to determine the 
method of enquiry can be regarded as scientific. However, despite its objective 
grounding in revelation even scientific theology remains a human science. It is an 
attempt to understand and express the truth of God but its nature as a science limits the 
endeavour (Torrance 1969a: 282). Torrance is aware that like all other scientists the 
249 See section 4.2.4. 
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theologian does not have a privileged or neutral point of observation abstracted from the 
universe of space and time but occupies a position within the universe. Theological 
knowing, like all scientific knowing is personal; it is the knowing of persons within 
creation. God's relationship to space is non-spatial (Torrance 1969a: 2); the scientist, 
whether theological or natural, is part of the relative universe (Torrance 1984a: 274). 
Torrance rejects relativism but acknowledges the subjective aspect of all human 
knowledge including scientific knowledge. The theological scientist is in the same 
relative relationship to the objective reality of the object of her enquiry as is any other 
scientist. 
God, however, is not simply an object within the universe like any other object 
to be investigated. Torrance argues that God's existence and relationship to the universe 
are unique; and this is reflected in his theological science. Each science is unique in the 
sense that each object or area of enquiry has to be investigated according to its own 
inherent structure and nature; there is no single scientific method which can be applied 
to all the sciences. Indeed the imposition of a method of enquiry appropriate to one 
particular field upon another is unscientific or pseudo-scientific (Torrance 1971: 91). 
The unique nature of each branch of science is due to the scientific or objective method 
of allowing the object of enquiry to determine the method of investigation. There is no 
science in the singular; there are sciences (Torrance 1969a: 106). Similarly there is no 
universal scientific method; instead there are the methods appropriate to each science 
developed in pursuit of its own proper object or objects. Torrance disputes the 
bracketing off of scientific method from other human ways of knowing and argues that 
6 science' is rather the 'rigorous extension of our basic rationality' (Torrance 1969a: 107) 
applied in an appropriate way to some field of enquiry. 250 Appropriate application in 
250 See Einstein's comments in Einstein 1982: 290. 
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this case means matching the method to the subject matter. This applies to all sciences 
including theological science. 
Torrance argues that God, as transcendent creator of the contingent universe, is 
unlike any other object investigated by any of the other sciences; indeed God cannot 
properly be regarded as an object at all. Torrance's case is that the unique nature of God 
makes theology unique among the sciences (Toffance 1969a: 2820. The object of 
theological science remains supremely subject in all human knowledge of him. 
Knowledge of God arises always and only from self-revelation; we have seen 
throughout that this is Torrance's understanding of theological epistemology (Torrance 
1969a: 299,307f). In Torrance's understanding knowledge of God, theological science, 
unlike the other sciences is not entirely separate from other areas of knowledge. The 
special sciences are separated from one another 'in accordance with the particular 
aspects of being to which they are devoted' (Torrance 1969a: 282). Indeed, Torrance 
argues that a 'criss-crossing' from one to another violates their scientific status 
(Torrance 1969a: 282). Apart from devotion only to its own proper object there is no 
common scientific method . 
25 ' However, this is not the case for theological science 
because theology deals not with limited aspects of creation but with the source of all 
created being (Torrance 1969a: 295). This is a further implication of Torrance's work on 
the contingence of creation 252 not only for the dialogue with the natural sciences, but 
also for a proper understanding of the scope of theological science as it strives for 
objective knowledge of the self-revealing God who is the transcendent creator of the 
universe (see Torrance 1971: 960. 
Klinefelter raises a concern about Torrance's theological epistemology. He 
25 1 As Torrance writes: 'In all the sciences we refer our thought to what is external to 
ourselves and are devoted to objectivity: scientific knowledge and objective knowledge 
are one and the same thing' (Torrance 1969a: 295). 252 See above 5.2. 
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argues that when Torrance makes a distinction between theology and all other sciences 
he places an unbridgeable gulf between them. He argues that Torrance's theological 
epistemology, derived from the absolutely unique nature of the object of theology, is 
doing no more than 'protecting a sophisticated Barthian fideism' (Klinefelter 1973: 128). 
He argues that Torrance's theological science is almost completely disconnected from 
ordinary rationality; so much so that when Torrance speaks of theological rationality it 
is so distinct from other uses of the word that it may be better called something else 
(Klinefelter 1973: 128). The irony of Klinefelter's critique of Torrance is that he argues 
that a theologian who has done so much to refute dualism in theological method has 
inadvertently introduced a gulf between theology and other human ways of knowing. 
Klinefelter is correct when he draws attention to the differences between 
theological science and other human ways of knowing in Torrance; in fact Torrance 
points to this as an attribute of theological science. 253 He draws attention to a difference 
in objectivity that makes theological science distinct from the natural sciences. In all 
other sciences both the knower and the object of knowledge are part of the relative 
space time universe. God, however, belongs to a different order of rationality to 
humankind (Torrance 1969a: 298) because God is of a different order of being. God 
infinitely transcends created being and is not bound by the relative universe of space 
time. This means that we can come to knowledge of God only as he has given himself 
to be known (Torrance 1969a: 299). Again we see that Torrance's theological 
epistemology is an epistemology of grace, but even this is not an absolute distinction 
between theological science and the other sciences, for as we shall see Torrance's 
epistemology, founded on the doctrine ofjustification by grace, is applicable to other 
human ways of knowing besides theology (see section 5.3.7) and points to a 
253 See Torrance 1969a: 295-313, Torrance 1971: 95-99) 
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fundamental gracing of all human knowledge. 
Torrance draws attention to a second fundamental distinction between theology 
and the natural sciences, a difference of subjectivity. He notes that all knowledge is 
subjective because it is human knowledge; even objective and scientific knowledge has 
a 'personal co-efficient' (Torrance 1969a: 303). Objective knowledge strives to remove 
unwarranted subjectivity, but it remains a personal activity. The object of theological 
science is God who is Lord and sovereign of all our knowledge of him (Torrance 
1969a: 308) and who calls us into a reciprocal relation to himself. Torrance argues that 
in theological science there takes place an inversion of the usual subject-object relation 
that pertains to other human ways of knowing (Torrance 1969a: 308). The nature of the 
divine object of knowledge means that as we come to know him, God retains primacy in 
the knowing relationship and is never a mere object of our knowledge. 254 Regarding 
knowledge of God true objectivity is found only in personal relationship with God 
(Torrance 1969a: 309). 
Despite these distinctions between theological science and the natural sciences 
in Torrance's theology we do not find, as Klinefelter argues, an unbridgeable gulf 
between knowledge of God and all other human ways of knowing. Every human way of 
knowing is unique because it is determined by the object of its knowledge; theology is 
6uniquely unique' due to the nature of God. Torrance argues that God is totally unlike 
any other object of human knowledge; he is 'the Lordly Object over whom we have no 
power but who we may know only through humble service and love' (Torrance 
1969a: 300). Torrance is well aware that this makes theological science profoundly 
different from all other sciences; however, the fact that he is able to draw analogies 
254 Torrance writes that with respect to knowledge of God 'a merely objectivist 
approach could not be properly objective for it could not do justice to the divine Reality: 
it could only abstract from it' (Torrance 1969a: 309). 
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from among the natural sciences indicates that there is no absolute gulf between 
theological science and other human ways of knowing. He draws an important analogy 
with biology in which the object of knowledge is a living being. Living beings can be 
analysed in terms of physical and chemical processes, but for a full account of a living 
organism we must go beyond physics and chemistry and take account of their organic 
and mental nature. In order to achieve objective knowledge of a living organism the 
laws and processes of physics and chemistry must be transcended. This provides us with 
an analogy for the way in which theological science differs from the natural sciences. 
Torrance notes in particular that the natural sciences progress by drawing comparisons, 
by generalising and grouping objects and experiences into classes; that is the natural 
sciences are adapted to multiplicity (Torrance 1969a: 301, c. f 302). God, on the other 
hand, is unique and incomparable. Furthermore Torrance is not only able to demonstrate 
the internal coherence of theological science (see 5.3.5), he also shows its external 
coherence; he demonstrates its correlation or consonance with the natural sciences. 255 if 
it is possible to draw meaningful analogies between theology and the exact sciences, 
further, if it is possible to see a correlation between these disciplines, then it cannot be 
maintained that there is dualism at the heart of Torrance's epistemology which 
absolutely cuts it off from all other sciences. The difference between Torrance's 
theological epistemology and that associated with the natural sciences is one of degree 
not kind. Rather in correlating theological and scientific epistemology Torrance points 
towards an epistemology which is appropriate and applicable to every human way of 
knowing. 
5.3.5 Torrance's 'disclosure model' 
Torrance's epistemology is a disclosure model; he begins not with the question 
255 E. g. see 5.2 above on contingence in theology and the natural sciences. 
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of how God may be known, but of how God is known and how God has disclosed 
himself (Torrance 1969a: 9). He argues that this disclosure model is characteristic of 
both theological and scientific epistemology (Torrance 1969a: 1300. Reality and not just 
God discloses itself to enquiry. 256 Torrance argues that in the natural sciences a 
dconceptual construct' is forced upon the scientist by the 'intrinsic intelligibility' of the 
object or field under examination (Torrance 1980b: 125). Science progresses by theories 
which are proposed, developed and refined in the light of what is disclosed of the nature 
of the object of enquiry to scientific investigation. According to Torrance a scientific 
theory is 'a sort of lens through which we allow nature in its intrinsic patterns to reveal 
itself to our apprehension' (Torrance 1980b: 125. C. f. Torrance 1969a: 318). He applies 
this disclosure model from the natural sciences to theology, particularly to Christology; 
for, as we have seen, he argues that it is in Jesus Christ that God meets us within the 
space and time of the universe. Despite our argument that against himself Torrance 
introduces the notion of revelation in Scripture and in nature into his Barthian theology, 
this does not undermine his argument in favour of a disclosure model, for in the 
articulation of revelation in scripture and nature found in his theology the emphasis 
remains on the self disclosure of God no less than with revelation in Christ. In 
theological science theories are refined as the self-revealing Christ is encountered in his 
own inherent rationality (see Torrance 1980b: 126), just as the natural sciences theories 
are refined and modified by the scientist's encounter with the reality of the object of 
enquiry. 
We see both the force and the limit of Torrance's disclosure model for theology 
when he writes that: 
256 CE Einstein's comment: 'The supreme task of the physicist is to arrive at those 
universal elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built up by pure deduction. 
There is no logical path to these laws; only intuition, resting on sympathetic 
understanding of experience can reach them' (Einstein 1982: 226). 
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Far from being a theoretic model, the disclosure model of Christ does not seek to 
explain, for example, how he is constituted in the hypostatic union of his divine 
and human natures, but serves as a theological instrument through which we 
allow Christ in his own mystery and reality to impose himself upon our 
apprehension of him, so that we know him more and more out of himself and in 
his intrinsic significance (Torrance 1980b: 126, emphasis Torrance). 
Torrance's disclosure model offers no proof or evidence of the self-revelation of God 
instead it functions more like the five ways of Aquinas which were traditionally viewed 
as arguments for the existence of God but are now seen rather as evidence of the 
coherence or inner consistency of belief. 
When we add Torrance's argument for the inner coherence of Christian theology 
to his arguments for an external correlation with the natural sciences we can understand 
why he gave one of his works on the relationship between theology and science the 
subtitle Consonance between Theology and Science (Torrance 1980b). Torrance's 
argument is that the two disciplines, theological science and natural science, not only 
share a common approach to knowledge, an a posteriori thinking after the object of 
enquiry which allows the object to shape the method of enquiry; he also argues that they 
have complementary ways of understanding the nature of the universe. 
5.3.6 Torrance's actualist account of critical realism 
Torrance clearly stands within the tradition of epistemological realism. We see 
this when he writes: 
We know things in accordance with their natures, or what they are in 
themselves; and so we let the nature of what we know determine for us the 
content and form of our knowledge. This is what happens in our ordinary, 
everyday experience and knowledge ... Science, in every field of our human 
experience, is only the rigorous extension of that basic way of thinking and 
behaving. This is a way of understanding scientific activity that is much more 
appropriate to the complexity and richness of nature as it becomes disclosed to 
us through the great advances of the special sciences than is that way to which 
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we have become accustomed within the compass of a mechanistic universe and 
its rigid instrumentalism (Torrance 1980b: 8). 
He positions himself within the Scottish realist tradition (Torrance 198 1 a: x) and 
commentators agree that his theology is realist. 257 There is though debate as to exactly 
what sort of realist Torrance is. The question of whether Torrance is best categorised as 
a realist, a critical realist or a post-critical realist is largely a problem of terminology for 
there is no generally agreed definition of these terms. Hardy writes that Torrance's 'is 
the most highly developed version of realism ... which is available in (and perhaps 
outside) modem theology' (Hardy 1990: 86). However, Hardy qualifies his designation 
of Torrance's theology as realist when he writes that if realism means a necessary 
correspondence between reality and theory then Torrance is not a realist; but if it means 
the possibility of an actual correspondence between the theory and reality then Torrance 
is a realist. Achterneier calls him a critical realist (Achtemeier 2001: 272) while 
Patterson calls him as a 'post critical realist' because he argues that rationality is not 
only inherent in the human mind but that it is a component of reality (Patterson 
1999: 13 f), 258 this is precisely why Achtemeier refers to him as a critical realist 
(Achtemeier 2001: 272). Luoma notes an element of compulsion in Torrance's realism 
which also makes him difficult to categorise (Luoma 2002: 66). All commentators'agree 
that Torrance is some sort of realist and that his account of realist epistemology is 
distinctive. It is also commonly agreed that his is a correspondence realism, but that he 
avoids what McGrath calls 'na7fve realism' which 'argues for a direct correspondence 
between concepts and experience' (McGrath 1999: 217). We will see that those 
elements which make Torrance's realist epistemology distinctive originate from his 
early encounter with Barth and are refined by his study of Einstein. 
257 See also for example McGrath 1999: 217; Achterneier 1994: 355. 
258 See Torrance 1985b: 3. 
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We have noted throughout that Barth's emphasis on the unity of act and being in 
God have been of formative influence on Torrance, as is Barth's Christocentricism 
which points to Jesus Christ as the place in creation where God encounters his people. 
Einstein, another influence on Torrance, can also be designated as an 
epistemological realist. He regards it as a fundamental belief of the natural sciences that 
the universe is comprehensible (Einstein 1982: 46) and that our understanding of it 
corresponds to reality (Einstein 1982: 291). He argues that our theoretical apprehension 
of the universe is a free creation of the human mind and that there is no logically 
necessary bridge between reality and theory; there is, however, an actual 
correspondence between them (Einstein 1982: 226). For Einstein the universe is 
comprehensible but this comprehensibility is not logically necessary nor is it imposed 
upon reality by the mind of the scientist. Comprehensibility is inherent in reality itself 
(Einstein 1982: 291). The laws of the universe arise in part from the scientist's 
engagement with reality and in part at least from the scientist's intuition (Einstein 
1982: 272,226). Einstein regards the comprehensibility of the universe as mysterious 
and even miraculous (Einstein 1982: 292). This makes Einstein, in Achtemeier's terms, 
a critical realist for as we have seen he rejects the notion of 'logically determinate paths 
connecting empirical apprehension to theoretical construct' (Achtemeier 2001: 272). 
Torrance's epistemology is an actualist rather than a necessary account of 
realism. By this is meant that, like Einstein, he denies any necessary link or bridge 
between reality and our comprehension of it, for if there were such a link, then science 
would progress by logical deduction from first principles rather than by empirical 
means (Torrance 1985b: 760. Torrance argues that it is logical positivism which asserts 
a necessary and logical link between reality and human perception of reality. However 
there is an actual correspondence between reality and theory (Torrance 1985b: 76) which 
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because it is not logically necessary cannot be anticipated or predicted . 
259 Torrance cites 
the example of Einstein whose ideas were not the result of abstraction from his 
observations nor did they come from logical deduction, rather they 'arose out of an 
intimacy with and a sympathetic understanding of experience, under the belief in the 
intelligibility or comprehensibility ... of the world external, to the percipient (Torrance 
1985b: 77). Hardy writes that in Torrance's understanding 'there is an actual 
correspondence between reality and thought or language ifthe thinker is conformed to 
the mode of rationality afforded by reality' (Hardy 2005b: 169, emphasis Hardy). 
Torrance rejects ideas of truth which involve a simple one to one correspondence 
between reality and idea; rather the correspondence is complex. Achtemeier writes that 
Torrance has a 'robust conception of truth ... as a holistic notion of mind adequate to its 
object (Achtemeier 1994: 364, emphasis Achtemeier). 260 
Despite his realism Torrance does not deny the subjective pole in human 
knowledge but he refuses to allow it to dominate the objective aspect. The knowing 
subject enters into a close engagement with the object of enquiry and strives not to 
'impose upon it a structure of its own prescription' (Torrance 1971: 90. He accepts that 
we are inside a knowing relationship and that we cannot step outside of ourselves to 
some objective point as a neutral observer; though he does deny that this entails 
scepticism (Torrance 1969a: 1). Torrance's case is that ordinary experience and the 
practice of the natural sciences assume that in some sense reality is capable of rational 
apprehension and exposition. He notes that an extreme turn to the subjective pole in the 
natural sciences associated with Ernst Mach and the Vienna Circle was challenged by 
259 CE Einstein 1982: 272. 
260 Achtemeier refers to Torrance 1985b: 15 where Toffance writes that in Calvin 
knowledge arises by 'fidelity ... to what we seek to know... The kingdom of nature or 
the dominion of science is not entered by dictating to nature but by following its own 
leading'. 
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Planck and Einstein. Mach and his associates claimed that scientific theories have no 
bearing upon reality but are simply conventions used to organise observational data 
(Torrance 1982b: 175). Planck and Einstein however 'insisted that in science we are 
concerned to grasp reality in its depth (Torrance 1982b: 175, emphasis Torrance). 261 
Torrance's actualist account of critical realism is an extension of his 
understanding of scientific that is, objective, method and it is developed from his 
encounter with Einstein. Torrance takes Einstein's account of the epistemology of the 
natural sciences and applies it to the field of theology, but he does so without reducing 
theology to science or science to theology. 262 Ultimately however his realism is founded 
on his Barthian Christology, for it is Torrance's conviction that in Jesus Christ we 
encounter the reality of God within space and time and that the theologies that emerge 
from this encounter are able, however inadequately, to grasp and express something of 
this reality. In his earliest lectures on Christology delivered at Auburn Seminary in New 
York State from 1938 to 1939 Torrance reflects upon the gracing of all authentic 
knowledge of God (Torrance 2002a: 80). He notes that the incarnation indicates that 
God is revealed rather than discovered (Torrance 2002a: 96). He argues that whether we 
are investigating the nature of the world or of God true understanding comes by a 
thinking after the object of our enquiry (Torrance 2002a: 97). Even at an early stage 
Torrance's reflections on theological epistemology lead him in the same direction as his 
mature thought. His encounter with the work of Polanyi and Einstein deepen and 
broaden his reflections as he begins to see that a similar thinking after the object of 
enquiry is characteristic of Einstein's scientific method. As with his reflections on the 
correlation of a theological understanding of creation with the scientific understanding 
of the nature of the universe, so in his reflections on the nature of the methods of 
261 See also Torrance 1985b: 54f. 
262 See Kaiser 2001: 242. 
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enquiry proper to a Barthian theology and post-Einsteinian science, we see in Torrance 
a unifying of knowledge and of two distinct disciplines without in any way reducing 
one to the other. 
5.3.7 Theology as a scientific discipline 
Torrance's claim that theology is best placed among the exact sciences and that 
it bears comparison in particular to physics is counter-intuitive. We expect it to be 
placed among the humanities or the social sciences. Torrance's argument rests on 
changes in the understanding of the nature and methods of science in the twentieth 
century and on his development of Barth's Christocentric theology. Louth notes the 
importance of Barth's 1929 lectures on 'Fate and Idea in Theology' for Torrance, in 
particular the idea that God is not simply to be discovered but is one who reveals 
himself in Christ (Louth 1983: 49). 263 He notes that when Torrance argues that theology 
bears comparison with physics he is not simply attempting to assimilate theology to 
science; instead his argument is that the contemporary sciences, particularly post- 
Einsteinian physics, have struggled with the problem of epistemology in a similar way 
to Barth. Torrance's study of the sciences has illuminated his search for a theological 
epistemology (Louth 1983: 52). Louth accepts Torrance's argument that scientific 
knowledge is objective in the sense that Torrance uses the word but he argues that what 
Torrance has demonstrated is not that theology is a science, rather that the sciences are 
'less unlike' the humanities than has been thought (Louth 1983: 52). Louth argues that 
263 Louth quotes Torrance's comment on Barth's lecture and its importance for 
epistemology: 'As it has turned out, does not theology bear a closer comparison with an 
exact science, such as physics, which restricts its activities to the limits laid down by the 
nature of its concrete object, and develops a method in accordance with the nature of its 
object, bracketing it off from every world-view (either as an a priori condition or as an 
a posteriori product), and invoking an open mind about what may be beyond the limits 
of its own area of knowledge' (Louth 1983: 50f, quoting Torrance 1962: 179f, emphasis 
Torrance). 
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Torrance is fundamentally mistaken when he places theology among the sciences; 
instead he argues that because theology does not involve experiment it is one of the 
humanities (Louth 1983: 520. Louth's case rests upon whether or not experiment is 
fundamental to science. He notes that Torrance is aware that theological method does 
not involve experiment, noting Torrance's comment that experimental investigation is 
inappropriate as well as impossible to God for scientific as well as theological reasons: 
only an idol and not the living God could be manipulated by an experimenter (Torrance 
1969a: 299, quoted in Louth 1983: 52). 
Louth's argument that theology is not to be counted among the sciences rests 
upon the definition of science, in particular on whether or not experiment is so essential 
to scientific activity that its absence from theology means that Torrance is mistaken 
(Louth 1983: 53). Louth acknowledges that some areas of science engage in very little 
actual experiment (Louth 1983: 52). Torrance's case is that it is objectivity and not 
experimental method that makes a science. The argument rests upon the definition of 
science, with Louth arguing for a narrow definition and Torrance arguing for a broader 
definition. Stem-nark notes there is no universally agreed definition of exactly what 
constitutes a science or a scientific method even among scientists and philosophers of 
science. There are several rival definitions (Stenmark 2001: 5). Torrance agrees that the 
nature of God separates theology off from the other sciences but he has argued that the 
sciences are separated off from each other (see 5.3.4) in a similar manner; he argues that 
there is not one scientific method but that each science is determined by its object. 
Louth is right to point out that Torrance has demonstrated that science is a 
human endeavour and as such it is closer to other human ways of knowing than has 
sometimes been thought (Louth 1983: 52). He is also right when he points out that 
theology has much in common with the humanities (Louth 1983: 53f), but as we have 
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seen, Torrance has not only argued for objectivity as the key element in a scientific 
discipline, he has also demonstrated correlation between theology and the natural 
sciences. 
We have arrived at an impasse which can only be solved by an agreed definition 
of what constitutes scientific activity, unfortunately, there is no agreed definition. 
However, there is a way beyond the impasse. Torrance has demonstrated the 
consonance between theology and the natural sciences both in terms of their 
understandings of the nature of the universe and in terms of their epistemology; Louth 
has argued for placing theology among the humanities, but he agrees that the sciences 
are not as distinct from other human ways of knowing than has often been thought. By 
combining the insights of Torrance and Louth we argue not that there are different 
human ways of knowing and that theology is to be placed among the sciences, but that 
there is one appropriate human way of knowing; this Torrance calls the objective 
method and this is applicable to all disciplines, to the sciences, to theology, to the 
humanities and to the social sciences. Torrance's insight that ontology is prior to and 
has precedence over epistemology in human knowledge is applicable to all human ways 
of knowing. 
Torrance has done more that demonstrate a rapprochement between theology 
and the natural sciences; he has pointed the way to an epistemology which unites the 
diverse human ways of knowing, one which while giving prominence to the objective 
pole in knowledge, does not ignore the sub ective elements. j 
Torrance is aware that his development of theological epistemology has 
implications far beyond the relationship between theology and the natural sciences. The 
first hint of this comes when he comments that scientific (that is in Torrance's terms 
objective) rationality is not separated from other human ways of knowing by an 
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impassable gulf; rather it is no more than 'the rigorous extension of our basic 
rationality.... Scientific activity ... is essentially open and flexible through fidelity to 
the manifold character of reality and is therefore universally applicable... ' (Torrance 
1969a: 107; cf Torrance 1971: 94f). From Torrance's epistemology we can make the 
case for a universal method of knowing which is founded upon the developments in 
epistemology in the natural sciences and in Christian theology when both disciplines 
independently allow ontology to have precedence over epistemology and allow the 
appropriate method to be developed by the enquirer's faithfulness to the reality of the 
object of investigation. Torrance comments: 
It is more and more clear to me that, under the providence of God, owing to 
these changes in the very foundations of knowledge in which natural and 
theological science alike have been sharing, the damaging cultural splits 
between the sciences and the humanities and between both of these and 
theology, are in the process of being overcome, that the destructive and divisive 
forces too long rampant in world-wide human life and thought are being 
undermined, and that a massive new synthesis will emerge in which man, 
humbled and awed by the mysterious intelligibility of the universe that reaches 
far beyond his powers, will learn to fulfil his destined role a the servant of divine 
love and the priest of creation (Torrance 1980b: 14). 
Norris points to a further potential problem with Torrance's theology. He argues 
that Torrance's definition of what constitutes theology is narrow in the extreme (Norris 
1984: 465f). Norris, like Ford, commends Torrance for attempting to think through the 
implications of contemporary physics for theology (Norris 1984: 465; Ford 1988: 277). 
He further comments that Torrance's work on epistemology 'is itself an epistemology 
which is consistent with the ma or advances of the modem sciences' (Norris 1984: 465). j 
He notes that Torrance claims that his understanding of theological method is not 
something which is novel but is found in 'most of the better theologians down through 
the centuries' (Norris 1984: 465). Norris questions this theological consensus arguing 
that it is not representative of the history of Christian thought throughout the centuries 
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(Norris 1984: 466). This criticism of Torrance was first made by Hick in 1969 who 
comments that in Torrance's work, theology means 'only one particular kind of 
Christian dogmatics' that is Barthian theology (Hick 1969: 58). 
It is certainly true that Torrance's understanding of what constitutes theological 
science is theology which is developed in fidelity to God's self-revelation in Christ. 264 
For him theology is not a speculative discipline in that sense. The Christocentric nature 
of Torrance's theology excludes not only other religions from Torrance's definition, it 
also excludes other Christian approaches to theology, notably and explicitly those in the 
tradition of Schleiermacher (Hick 1969: 58, c. f. Torrance 1968: 265). However this 
constraint in Torrance's definition of which Christian theologies can be regarded as 
theological science is governed by his definition of what constitutes scientific 
epistemology. Only those theologians who attempt to respond to God's self-revelation 
in Christ can be regarded as seeking to allow the objective pole in theological 
knowledge to determine the method of investigation. According to Torrance's definition 
of scientific knowledge those theologies which begin with human understanding or the 
human search for the divine rule themselves out because they do not begin with the 
actual self-revelation of God within space and time. Torrance argues that key thinkers in 
Christian history have sought to respond to the reality of God's revelation in Christ and 
these are the theologians whose approach to theological knowledge he attempts to bring 
into dialogue with the natural sciences. The biggest gap in Torrance's approach is that 
he does not discuss contemporary Catholic or Orthodox theologians being content after 
the patristic period to limit his discussion to reformed theologians, and then almost 
exclusively Calvin and Barth. 
264 See chapter one. 
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5.3.8 Discussion 
In this exposition of Torrance's theological science it has been found, despite 
Torrance's frequent assertions, that revelation in Christ is not the foundation of his 
theological epistemology. More fundamental is the doctrine ofjustification by grace. 
Torrance often uses revelation in Christ and revelation by grace interchangeable, for he 
regards Jesus Christ as the place in the universe where humanity is encountered by God; 
yet a close reading of his doctrine of revelation shows both scripture and nature as 
places of real meeting with God, and therefore as loci of revelation, and not simply as 
pointers to Christ. Revelation in Christ is normative for the content of our knowledge of 
God for Jesus Christ is of one being with the Father, but Torrance clearly articulates 
both the Bible and creation as places within creation where God can and does encounter 
human beings. Despite obvious differences with his teacher, Torrance's theological 
epistemology remains Barthian for there is no sense in his epistemology of independent 
knowledge of God; whether in Christ, Scripture or creation knowledge of God arises 
from divine self revelation and God is always in control of our knowledge of him. 
Torrance's epistemology does more than bring together theological and natural 
science. He develops an epistemology which has application to all human ways of 
knowing and which points to the gracing of all human knowledge. From his doctrine of 
revelation there emerges a universally applicable epistemology. His theological 
epistemology is realist and he operates with a disclosure model, but it is not naively 
realist. From his encounter with Einstein and Polanyi he is fully aware of the partial 
nature and situatedness of all human knowledge: but incomplete knowledge is or may 
still be knowledge; similarly an awareness of the subjective element of all knowledge is 
not the same as arguing that all knowledge is merely subjective. 
251 
5.4 Conclusion 
Torrance's theological science is important for two reasons: his correlation of a 
theological understanding of creation with a scientific understanding of the universe; 
and his rapprochement between theological and scientific epistemology. When Torrance 
writes of science and scientific method he refers to Einstein's reflections on the 
relationship between science and reality and specifically the relationship between the 
theoretical and empirical components of knowledge. Torrance's definition of theology 
is narrow. For him Christian theology is Christologically founded; it is patristic, 
reformed and Barthian. The writings of the Nicene theologians and Calvin are central to 
his understanding of the Christian faith. Despite this narrow definition of what 
constitutes a proper Christian theology, or perhaps because of it, Torrance is able to 
bring together the two distinct disciplines of theology and natural science. 
Torrance does not impose the methods of natural science upon theology or those 
of theology on the sciences. As he thinks through the implications of the epistemology 
of grace which he believes to be absolutely implicit in the doctrine of the incarnation, 
particularly as he engages with theologies which arise from a dualistic cosmology or 
epistemology, Torrance finds support in the work of Einstein and Polanyi on scientific 
method. He finds in Einstein's determination to allow the reality of the universe to 
determine his apprehension of it, whilst at the same time rejecting any sort of logical 
bridge between the two, a vindication of his own decision in the field of theology to 
follow Barth's Christocentricism. In theology as in the sciences a true, if not exhaustive, 
understanding of reality emerges from a faithful 'thinking after' the object of enquiry. 
Despite this Christocentricism there is implicit in Torrance's writings on theology and 
the natural sciences an understanding that knowledge of God can arise from the 
creation. This is not a return to independent natural theology and is better termed a 
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doctrine of natural revelation which arises form Torrance's theology of nature. 
In his work on the relationship between theology and the natural sciences 
Torrance demonstrates the correlation between his theological account of the contingent 
creation and the universe disclosed to scientific investigation. Neither of these is 
dependent on the other but he demonstrates congruence between them such that he is 
able to argue that the universe disclosed to the natural sciences points to the 
transcendent creator in its 'silent cry' for sufficient cause of its mysterious and 
incomprehensible comprehensibility. He also argues that the doctrine of creatio ex 
nihilo in Christian theology allowed the empirical sciences to evolve in western Europe 
by keeping the creator distinct from the immanent processes of the creation. 
Torrance's account of creation is unusual in that the relationship between God 
and the universe as unfolded in the incarnation is of more importance than the act of 
creation. In this he follows the patristic theologians and it enables him to develop his 
Christocentric theology of nature in a way that is thoroughly Barthian. It also enables 
him to argue that the change and temporality which characterise the creation are 
grounded in moments in God's eternal life. 
Torrance finds Einstein's concept of relative space fruitful in his exposition of 
the importance of the incarnation for our knowledge of God. He argues that this theory 
of space is similar to that developed by the patristic theologians as they tried to 
understand the importance of Jesus Christ for revelation. 
Torrance shows that theology and the natural sciences have benefited from a 
critical engagement with one another in the past and he believes that there can be a 
fruitful engagement in the future. He argues that these disciplines can learn from each 
other without one being subsumed into the other. In particular he argues that they are 
allies in a battle against dualism both cosmological and epistemological. 
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Torrance's actualist theological-scientific epistemology is an epistemology of 
grace. It originates in his encounter with Barth's Christology and is developed in his 
work on patristic theology and especially in his study of Einstein's scientific method. 
Torrance argues that a theology which follows such a scientific method will enable a 
rapprochement between systematic and biblical theology; moreover he argues that the 
division between these two branches of theology owes its existence to a falsely dualist 
epistemology in which event is separated from its meaning. In arguing that there are no 
uninterpreted facts or events he finds support in the work of Einstein and Polanyi. 
Torrance further argues that when theology allows its unique 'object of enquiry' 
to determine its method of enquiry then it is a science in the same way that physics is a 
science. He argues for a common scientific method in which each branch of science 
gives priority to the reality under investigation. Torrance's epistemology is objective 
and realist; like Einstein he argues that the objects of our experience have a reality and 
significance which is independent of our observation or investigation. Further he argues 
that although there is no logical bridge between reality and our theoretical construction 
of it yet there can be an actual correlation between the two. Despite his emphasis on the 
objectivity of the universe that is open to our comprehension he does not neglect the 
subjectivity of all human knowledge. Ile argues that knowledge can be partial but still 
true. While taking full account of the subjective element in all human knowledge he 
does not allow it to dominate. This is the essence of his critique of Kant and of those 
episternologies which are founded upon the Kantian disjunction between reality and 
perception. Torrance argues that Barth in the field of theology and Einstein in the field 
of science have both rejected this and on similar grounds. 
Torrance's realist epistemology has a wider application than to theology and the natural 
sciences. It is an epistemology which can be applied to all human ways of knowing. 
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What would make a social science 'scientific' in Torrance's terms is not the application 
of methods from biology or physics, this would be unscientific. Instead a field of 
knowledge is scientific when the object of enquiry is allowed to determine the method 
of enquiry. In true science ontology has precedence over epistemology. In his 
description of scientific method Torrance takes full account of the subjective nature of 
all human knowledge, requiring self criticism of the observer. In his epistemology 
Torrance relies on a connection between the human mind and the structures of reality 
which is mysterious and inexplicable apart from a commitment to a transcendent ground 
of rationality. For Einstein this connection is a mystery, even a miracle and he speaks of 
'intuition' and 'pre-established harmony' between the human mind and the structures of 
reality (Einstein 1982: 226); for Torrance this relationship is a gift of the God who 
reveals himself within the creation in Christ. Torrance's epistemology can accurately be 
termed realist or critically realist but it is better termed an epistemology of grace 
because the fact that the universe is comprehensible is inexplicable. Einstein regarded it 
as miraculous; there no logical explanation for either the ability of the human mind to 
grasp the immensity of the universe or for the accessibility of the universe to human 
investigation. The comprehensibility of the universe, from whichever side we regard it, 
is incomprehensible. It can only be accepted; but once it is accepted this points to a 
more fundamental gracing of all knowledge of reality; it points to a transcendent ground 
of rationality upon which is founded both the human mind and the structures of the 
universe. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis presents a clear and systematic account of the doctrine of revelation 
found in the writings of Thomas F. Torrance. He is shown to conceive of revelation as 
the gracious and miraculous self-revelation of God in Christ; further that the place of the 
Bible in revelation is as a dynamic witness to Christ while natural theology is 
transposed into the body of dogmatics and becomes a means of correlating theological 
with scientific accounts of reality. 
However, a close reading of Torrance on revelation shows that he actually 
operates with a different understanding of revelation. Even more fundamental than 
revelation in Christ is revelation by grace. This is of course seen most clearly in God's 
self-disclosure in Christ but it has been demonstrated that he conceives of both scripture 
and nature as places within creation where humanity is or may be encountered by the 
creator; that is Scripture and nature appear in his theology as loci of divine self- 
revelation. Revelation in Christ remains a controlling factor in all our knowledge of 
God because of the consubstantial relation between the transcendent God and the 
incarnate Son. This means that whatever the source or locus of revelation what God 
reveals about himself in Christ must always remain normative for the content of 
Christian theology. 
We have noted that Torrance's work on the human nature of Christ is vulnerable 
to Crisp's challenge to the Barth-Irving argument that it was a fallen and sinful human 
nature which Christ assumed at the incarnation. Crisp is particularly critical of the idea 
of a fallen human nature which is able to sin but does not; he rightly questions the 
meaning of the idea of a sinful nature which does not actually sin. However, the 
Barthian position which is an significant element of Torrance's understanding of the 
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vicarious humanity of Christ is given support in the notion of Christ's temptation or 
testing which is important, not only in the synoptic Gospels but also in the letter to the 
Hebrews. If Christ did not have the capacity to sin then there is no temptation or test at 
all, and his triumph over temptation, which according to Torrance has a vicarious 
significance, is illusory. 
The patristic idea of the homoousion has a central place in Torrance's theology 
beyond its historical roots in the Christological debates of the early Church. The 
homoousion is the linchpin of his doctrine of revelation in Christ. It is noteworthy that 
he accepts the definition of the phrase homoousios 16patri as found in the writings of 
Athanasius and Hilary of Poitiers. He takes no note of its modified meaning in patristic 
theologians after Origen. The word occurs throughout Torrance's writings and fonns 
the basis of his argument that theology is or may be a scientific discipline. The term is 
used sparingly in the Church Dogmatics but Torrance's development of the phrase for 
his own theological and epistemological purposes is rooted in Barth's exposition 
(Barth 1975: 295-3 04). 
Torrance's theological epistemology hinges on the identity between God as he is 
in himself eternally and God as he is in time and space in Christ; and Torrance founds 
this on the homoousion. Throughout his writings Torrance is working through the inner 
logic of the incarnation of the second person of the Trinity for theological method. 
When Torrance uses the tenn it bears the weight of his understanding that in Christ we 
have access to the reality of God in much the same way as the natural scientist has 
access to the reality of the universe through the empirical method; therefore for a 
theology to be scientific it must be Christologically founded. 
There is no recognition in Torrance that the tenn carries what Barth calls a 
'historical and material ambiguity' (Barth 1975: 440), rather he assumes that 
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Athanasius' use of the term and his reading of Athanasius stand; therefore Torrance's 
use of the homoousion is best seen as shorthand for his development of the 
epistemological significance of the incamation and not as a definition of the tenn. 
This thesis attempts a critical exposition of Torrance's doctrine of revelation; it 
also contributes to theological debate in several areas. It raises questions about the 
source of Christian theology, arguing that theologies which are not founded on the self- 
revelation of God in Christ are cut adrift from the primary datum of Christian theology 
and are in danger of falling into abstract and speculative discourse. If theology is to be 
in any sense a scientific discipline then it must maintain a fidelity to the object of its 
enquiry namely God as he has actually given himself to be known within the contingent 
universe. 
A second area in which this thesis contributes to debate is in the area of the 
relationship of theology to the natural sciences. It has been shown that in transposing 
natural theology to a place within the body of systematic theology where it becomes a 
theology of nature Torrance has brought the natural sciences under a wider theological 
account of reality. This enables a correlation of worldviews so that each discipline can 
contribute to the other. It also enables a theological account of the whole enterprise of 
empirical science grounding the otherwise inexplicable rational order and 
comprehensibility of the universe in the creative Word of God. However, the sciences 
are not restricted by being brought into a theological account of reality for the Christian 
doctrine of creation points to a gifted freedom and independence of the universe and of 
human investigation of reality. In such a theology of nature the natural sciences 
themselves become a type of natural theology in which the scientist by investigating 
reality comes to knowledge of the world by an encounter with the creative Word in 
empirical investigation. 
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It has been demonstrated that Torrance's interpretation of Barth's rejection of 
natural theology, while being an unusual reading of Barth, can be justified on the basis 
of Barth's own writings on natural theology. His interpretation of Barth forms the 
foundation of his development of a non-independent natural theology. 
Natural theology and its relation to the natural sciences has been one of 
Torrance's concerns throughout his career, however he has shown no interest in 
engaging with contemporary Roman Catholic traditions of natural theology in which 
theologians such as Rahner have developed traditional understandings of natural 
theology. Torrance's concern has been to engage with the Protestant tradition of natural 
theology and particularly with those times and traditions in which the independence of 
natural knowledge of God from revealed knowledge has been emphasised. One example 
of an understanding of natural theology as an independent source of knowledge of God 
is found in John Baillie, one of Torrance's Edinburgh teachers. 
In his attempt to correlate his reformulated natural theology with the natural 
sciences Torrance relies on the work of Einstein. He makes two uses of Einstein's 
physics. The first use made by Torrance is of Einstein's model of the universe as 
defined by the theories of relativity. This is important for Torrance because he believes 
that Einstein's model of the cosmos is a paradigm shift from that of Newton and is a 
more accurate description of the reality of the universe. There is an important 
theological principle displayed here, namely that the Christian faith which asserts both 
that God reveals himself to creatures who are part of the universe and that the creator 
God has become incarnate within the creation has a theological imperative to take 
seriously the understanding of the universe as disclosed to the natural sciences. This is 
one of the things that Torrance is attempting in his work on Einstein. The scientific 
model of the universe will change as the natural sciences progress and it is important for 
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Christian theology to continually engage with the natural sciences, but not by simply 
assimilating the current model of reality into theology, rather by correlating the 
theological understanding of creation with the scientific paradigm. 
Torrance's second use of Einstein is more foundational for his work on 
theological method. Einstein's writings on the philosophy and epistemology of the 
sciences are at the heart of Torrance's understanding of what constitutes a science and 
of his argument that a Christologically founded theology is scientific in the same way 
that physics is scientific. Torrance has demonstrated parallels between the 
methodologies of Barth and Einstein, and it is on the basis of their common methods 
that this thesis has argued for a common human way of knowing which unites not only 
theology and the natural sciences but potentially the sciences, the social sciences and the 
humanities. 
It has been shown that a realist theological epistemology emerges from 
Torrance's account of revelation which, while taking full account of the subjective 
element of all human knowledge, points to the possibility of objective knowledge of 
reality. This method has been termed an epistemology of grace because it is a disclosure 
model of theological method which implies a correspondence theory of truth. A reading 
of Einstein's writings on scientific method shows a similar understanding such that it 
allows Torrance to argue that theology and the natural sciences share a common 
epistemology. In the exposition of Torrance's theological epistemology in this thesis it 
has been argued that his methods have a much wider application than to theology and 
the sciences; in fact what emerges from an investigation of the doctrine of revelation is 
a universally applicable realist epistemology which points to the gracing of all human 
knowledge of reality. This thesis has something to say in the current debates on realism 
and non-realism in philosophy and theology and presents a challenge from the 
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epistemology of the natural sciences to those theologians who argue for a non-realist 
understanding of God founded on Kantian dualism. 
In Torrance's writings on revelation there is a very Protestant emphasis on 
personal relationship with God as opposed to mere knowledge of God. Torrance argues 
that the most complete knowledge of God is in Christ and that revelation comes through 
a personal relationship with Christ; consequently in his writings on revelation he places 
great stress on the difference between personal and propositional knowledge. lie uses 
the phrase 'personal knowledge' in two different ways, one taken from Polanyi and the 
other from Barth. 
From Polanyi Torrance takes the insight that all human knowing has a personal 
dimension; and this includes scientific knowledge. It is the refutation of the idea that 
there can be any sort of privileged or neutral point of view. All observers are bound to 
relative space time as well as to their place in history and culture. In part Torrance is 
reacting to the position of logical positivism which was an important world-view for 
much of his career. Polanyi's insight brings the methods of the humanities and the 
natural sciences into closer proximity, but it does not entail the relativist position that 
since every point of view has a personal dimension then every point of view is of equal 
value and that objectivity in knowledge is impossible. Torrance balances the objective 
and subjective components of human knowing in his theological epistemology. 
From Barth Torrance takes a different understanding of personal knowledge; 
that revelation is personal rather than propositional and that in his act of self-revelation 
God reveals himself and not propositions about himself. However, theologians such as 
Barth and Torrance deduce propositions from this self revelation. 
There are two problems with Torrance's presentation of personal knowledge in 
the Barthian sense. The first problem is with his attack on fundamentalist readings of 
261 
the Bible. He argues that fundamentalist theologians offer a static and propositional 
understanding of revelation instead of a dynamic and personal understanding. The 
problem with Torrance's critique is that he does not engage with any actual theologians 
whose work embodies such an understanding of revelation; and so it can appear that he 
is attacking a caricature rather than an actual theological position or tradition; 
nevertheless his work does sound a warning to traditions which emphasise biblical 
revelation that God is always far beyond human understanding or grasp. 
The second problem that Torrance's critique of propositional knowledge faces is 
that in the biblical tradition there is evidence of propositional knowledge; of God 
imparting knowledge about himself. The biblical and Christian tradition does not show 
such a stark contrast between personal and propositional knowledge as Torrance 
implies. 
A modified Torrancean position would acknowledge the presence within the 
tradition of both propositional and personal revelation but would argue that personal 
revelation, particularly revelation in Christ, is not only a more complete revelation; it 
also points to the utter transcendence of God. It is a reminder that God is always far 
beyond our thought or grasp for in every personal relationship there is always more of 
the person than can be known, there is always a mystery beyond our grasp. It is, in fact, 
a confession of theological humility reminding us of Barth who in the second edition of 
Romans conceives of God hiding himself as much as revealing himself in Christ. 
A final area of importance in theological debate is the support that this thesis 
gives to those theologians who are arguing for a rapprochement between biblical and 
systematic theology. The decision to ground all Christian theology on what God has 
actually revealed of himself in Christ means that systematic theologians must focus on 
the self revelation of God in Christ as revealed in the Scriptures and that biblical 
262 
theologians must be aware of the inherent theological context of the Jesus of history. 
This thesis is vulnerable to two main criticisms. It is founded on the presumption 
that God has in fact revealed himself by becoming incarnate within the creation in Jesus 
Christ. This is a fundamental axiom of both Torrance's theology and of this thesis. As a 
fundamental presumption it can be defended in two ways. Firstly it can be asked if it is 
a reasonable presumption and we can find many theologians over the centuries that have 
operated with this axiom. Secondly it can be asked if proceeding with this presumption 
is justified on a posteriori grounds. The evidence in support is that it leads to an 
understanding of theology which not only correlates with the natural sciences but also 
provides an explanation and justification of the empirical method. 
The theological epistemology which emerges from the doctrine of revelation by 
grace is vulnerable to criticisms of correspondence theories of truth. Particularly that no 
account of how or why theories are said to contain or point to truth is given. Both 
Torrance and Einstein simply assert that there is no logically necessary reason why 
there should be a correspondence between theoretical and empirical components of 
knowledge but that there is in fact such a relationship. The theological justification for 
this assertion is in the understanding that the rational order which is inherent in the 
universe originates in a rational creator who is also the creator of rational human beings. 
Without the assertion of a creative reason as the source of the universe the success of 
the natural sciences in disclosing the structures of reality remains inexplicable. 
There is one further criticism to be levelled at Torrance's theology and that is his 
use of secondary sources. On reading Torrance one is left with the impression that he 
simply searches through the writings of theologians from the past who agree, or who 
can be read in such a way that they can be seen to agree with his own position 
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developed from his reading of Barth. There is no sense of an engagement with thesc 
theologians in their own right except as sources of support for Torrance's position. 
This thesis contributes to knowledge in three areas: it is a systematic 
presentation and discussion of the key doctrine of revelation in Torrance's theology; it 
contributes to the current debate on the relationship between theology and the natural 
sciences; and it contributes to the debate in philosophy and theology on realism and 
non-realism. 
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